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Sadržaj

Digitalna transformacija sigurnosti i algoritamska demokratija

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Bosna i Hercegovina

Sažetak: Rad se fokusira na aspekte kritičko-sigurnosnih studija prateći kontekst informacijskog nereda u složenom komunikacijskom, medijskom, obrazovnom, političkom okruženju, kao i mogućnosti apomedijacije u kontekstu sigurnosnih izazova. Namjera je naglasiti kako su tradicionalni sistemski filteri kontrole i verifikacije informacija (*gatekeeperi*) destabilizirani „digitalnim stanjem" (referencijalnost, komunalnost, algoritmičnost), koje pomjera teret poimanja političke, a time i sigurnosne kulture ka razumijevanju postdemokratskog društva. Algoritamska amplifikacija novih društvenih, demokratskih i sigurnosnih odnosa stvara novu dimenziju društveno-političko-tehnoloških odnosa, koje u ovom radu pokušavamo obuhvatiti sintagmom algoritamska demokratija. Savremeni razvoj može, u sigurnosnom smislu, biti velika opasnost, ali u isto vrijeme i velika šansa za čovječanstvo i čovjeka kao pojedinca. Ključno je građansko osnaživanje obrazovanjem za digitalno doba, tj. preciznije: podizanje nivoa medijske i informacijske pismenosti kako bi se uloga *gatekeepera* u savremenom informacijsko-komunikacijskom okruženju vratila u ruke ljudi, a ne mašina.

Ključne riječi: digitalna transformacija sigurnosti, algoritamska demokratija, medijska i informacijska pismenost

Abstract: The paper is focusing on aspects of critical security studies following the context of information disorder in a complex communication, media, educational, political environment as well as the possibilities of apomediation in the context of security challenges. The intention is to emphasize how traditional information gatekeepers destabilized by the "digital condition" (referentiality, communality, algorithmicity) which shifts the burden of understanding political, and thus security culture, towards understanding post-democratic society. Algorithmic amplification of new social, democratic and security relations creates a new dimension of socio-political-technological relations, which in this paper we try to understand trough algorithmic democracy. Modern development can, in terms of security, be a great threat, but at the same time a great chance for humanity and

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man as an individual. The key is civic empowerment through education for the digital age, or more precisely: raising the level of media and information literacy in order to regain the role of gatekeepers in the modern information and communication environment to the hands of people, not machines.

Key words: Digital security transformation, algorithmic democracy, media and information literacy.

„We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves."George Orwell, „1984"

1.
Uvod: Kritičke sigurnosne studije, informacije i građani

Ovaj bi se rad, u klasičnom naučnom pogledu, mogao smatrati multi/inter/kros-disciplinarnim. Ipak, pristup će biti antidisciplinarni[2] s obzirom na to da kritička teorija sigurnosti treba stati protiv kompartmentalizacije[3] znanja i podjela intelekta (Neocleous, 2008; Roland, 1992). Savremene sigurnosne studije, u svjetlu antidisciplinarnosti, ne stoje u opreci spram disciplina, već, kako ističe J. Ito (2018) „istražuju ideje i istraživačke agende koje djeluju preko njih"[4] i prevazilaze nepotpun pristup problematici. Na to nas, na takav pristup, obavezuje kompleksnost digitalne transformacije

[2] U članku "Cyberculture studies: An antidisciplinary approach", Mckenzie Wark ističke antidisciplinarnost kao političku agendu razumijevanja svijeta napuštanjem tradicionalnih akademskih disciplina. Wark (2006) ističe da kiberkultura nosi potencijal ne samo da bude nova disciplina već i kraj disciplina koje održavaju oskudicu u znanju: „kiberkulturne studije mogu biti tačka iz koje oslobađanje znanja od oskudice započinje kao samosvjesni proces. Kiberkulturalne studije mogu biti kritička teorija, a ne hipokritička teorija, proizvodnje znanja iz sebe i za sebe (str. 72). Vidi: Wark, M. (2006). Cyberculture studies: An antidisciplinary approach (version 3.0). In D. Silver & A. Massanari (Eds.), Critical cyberculture studies (pp. 68-78). New York: NYU Press

[3] Termin iz oblasti informacijske sigurnosti – proces i stanje ograničenog pristupa informacijama za osobe koje su izvan određenog klastera, odnosno grupe koja je upoznata samo s određenim skupom informacija. „Vizantija je kompartmentalizirala znanje svog sistema (oružja, op. a.), tako da svako ko bi mogao pasti neprijatelju u ruke nema nego samo mali dio tajne." Roland,1992: 664. prevod autora.

[4] Antidisciplinarnost suočava sa izazovima izvan tradicionalno uspostavljenih granica. „Antidisciplinarni pristup može omogućiti zajednicama da nadiđu postojeće paradigme, a internet pruža priliku da preustroji visoko obrazovanje i razvoj znanja i disciplina koji podržavaju takav pristup. (…) Opisujem ideju antidisciplinarnog rada između i izvan disciplina i napominjem da je to posebno važno jer je svijet postao složeniji i brži zahvaljujući internetu." O antidisciplinarnom pristupu i programu vidjeti više u radu direktora MIT Media Laba, Joichi Ito. Ito, J. (2018). *Practice of Change*, Doktoska disertacija. Keio University. Preuzeto sa https://www.practiceofchange.org/

društva, politike, pa shodno tome i sigurnosti, te direktne povezanosti s medijskom i informacijskom pismenošću. Kako Krause i Williams (1997: 367) navode, „zadatak kritičkih sigurnosnih studija bio bi preoblikovati temelje sigurnosti i povezati ih s oblicima političke zajednice od kojih je odvojena raznim modernim praksama – od kojih je najmanje važna militarizacija“. Osim osnovnih pitanja konflikta i sile, ovim novim kritičkim pristupom vidjeli bismo sigurnost kao nadilaženje granica moderne države i rješavanje problema transnacionalne ranjivosti te povezivanje s *algoritamskom demokratijom*.

Ovu izazovnu temu razvijamo s pozicije kritičkih studija sigurnosti i zasnivamo na hipotezi da je digitalna transformacija društva uzrokovala ne samo tehničko-tehnološke promjene u oblasti sigurnosti već i promjene u sagledavanju demokratskog diskursa, kao i novih rizika i prijetnji. Polazimo s gledišta da je s ovim transformacijama sve značajnija uloga aktivnog građanina kao elementa snaga sigurnosti (Beridan, 2008), jer uslijed apomedijacije u složenom medijskom, informacijskom, obrazovnom, političkom i sigurnosnom okruženju tradicionalni sistemski filteri gube svoju pretpostavljenu ili očekivanu ulogu, te većinu tereta poimanja društveno-političke zbilje, pa i sigurnosne kulture, prepoznavanja prijetnji i rizika preuzimaju na sebe sami građani (Vajzović, 2019; 2020). Stoga je medijska i informacijska pismenost u savremenom trenutku neophodan i poželjan element sigurnosti pojedinca, organizacije, države i (post) demokratije. Postavlja se pitanje (istraživačko) u kojoj mjeri medijska i informacijska pismenost može biti (ključna) kompetencija viđena kao potrebna ne samo na individualnom nivou nego i za društvo i poimanje sfere sigurnosti.

Cilj ovog rada je teoretskim uklonom i naučnim metodama indukcije i dedukcije, analize i sinteze odgovoriti na postavljene hipoteze, tako da u radu počinjemo od pregleda i opisa korelacije između ljudi i informacija jer je upravo ta međukompleksnost glavni određujući faktor „digitalnog stanja“ danas (Stalder, 2018). Značaj razvoja kompetencija medijske i informacijske pismenosti (MIP) kao šestog čula provlači se, praktično, kroz čitav rad ukazujući na značaj razumijevanja digitalne transformacije društva i sigurnosti te njihove implikacije na demokratski diskurs. U konačnici, djelimično ćemo pokušati odgovoriti na pitanje uloge algoritama, umjetne inteligencije (AI) i tehnokapitalizma u navedenim temama, te njihove povezanosti s prijetnjama, rizicima i sigurnosti na državnom, korporativnom i individualnom nivou.

Budući da ćemo se u radu dosta susretati s terminom *sigurnost*, za koji se u engleskom jeziku upotrebljavaju dva zasebna termina: *safety* i *security*, u tom pogledu nužno se nameće pitanje pojmovnog određenja u sigurnosnom terminosistemu, posebno u smislu kontekstualizacije sigurnosti s digitalnom transformacijom društva te činjenice da se u bosanskom jeziku data terminološka jedinica razumijeva uglavnom kao jedan termin sa svojim dvjema sinonimskim odrednicama (*sigurnost* odnosno *bezbjednost*), koje se u pravilu percipiraju kao „varijantski" markirane vrijednosti, mada ima i tvrdnji da, kako navodi Dujević (2006: 139), „svestranija analiza ova dva termina nedvosmisleno pokazuje da su to različiti termini". Iz razloga takvoga terminološkog nesuglasja, u ovom će se radu koristiti termin *sigurnost* u njegovoj ukupnoj pojmovnoj kompleksnosti. Ipak, imajući u vidu engleski jezik kao *lingua franca* današnjeg akademskog rada i interneta (i Mreže), poželjno je pojasniti termine i korespondirajuće odrednice. Terminom *safety* se „iskazuje snaga i sposobnost djelovanja radi sprječavanja mogućeg razvoja nesigurne situacije, odnosno sprječavanje uzroka mogućih sigurnosnih implikacija", dok se *security* više koristi u kontekstu nacionalne sigurnosti, „s čim se označava ostvarenje, čuvanje i zaštita državnog nacionalnog interesa" (Dujević, 2006: 139), tj. za potrebe razgraničavanja, možemo ih deskriptivno označiti i kao „aktivnu sigurnost" (*security*) naspram „preventivne sigurnosti" (*safety*). Tako se iz kontekstualnog značenja u rečenici *Security is therefore the process for ensuring our safety* može zaključiti da je aktivna sigurnost proces za osiguranje naše preventivne sigurnosti.

Unutar oblasti *informacijske sigurnosti* glavni cilj je zaštititi povjerljivost, cjelovitost i dostupnost informacija, dok je sigurnost (*safety*) usmjerena na zaštitu života, zdravlja ili prirodnih utjecaja od bilo kakve štete koju sistemu mogu prouzročiti. Sigurnost (*security*) se usredotočuje na prijetnje koje dolaze izvan sistema, često uzrokovane zlonamjernim elementima, dok se sigurnost (*safety*) usredotočuje na nenamjerne događaje. Te razlike rezultiraju različitim osnovama za prioritiziranje rješenja (Line, Tøndel, Nordland, Røstad, 2006).

U većini problematiziranja kritičkih teorija sigurnosnih studija autori se fokusiraju na državnocentrični diskurs, međunarodnu i nacionalnu sigurnost, humanu sigurnost – u kontekstu međunarodnih odnosa, unutrašnje sigurnosti, policije, vojske i rata, kako klasičnog tako i mrežnocentričnog (Guha, 2011; Salter, Mutlu, 2013; Krause i Williams, 1997;

Jacobs, Bayerl, Horton, Suojanen, 2021; Ramírez, Biziewski, 2020; Cavelty, Balzacq, 2017; Smajić, Seizović, Turčalo, 2017; Vajzović, Turčalo, Smajić, 2019; Turčalo, Smajić, Vajzović, 2019).

Ipak, postoje i drugi koji sagledavaju elemente nadzora, moći i „prizmu bioinformatičke fuzije čovjeka i tehnologije" (Vajzović, 2020: 12), upravljanja populacijom, kroz inverziju čuvene Clausewitzove izreke da je „rat nastavak politike na druge načine" (Clausewitz, Howard, 1993). Tako, naprimjer, Foucault (2002) i drugi autori nastoje istražiti u kojoj je mjeri politika, zapravo, „nastavak rata drugim sredstvima" (Peoples, Vaughan-Williams, 2014: 161; Amoore 2009: 50; Foucault 2002, 2007), odnosno u kojoj se mjeri sigurnosne prakse uklapaju u napore za upravljanje kretanjem ljudi i nastojanjima da identifikuju, nadziru i obuzdavaju elemente stanovništva koji bi mogli predstavljati „sigurnosni rizik" (Peoples, Vaughan-Williams, 2014: 161; vidjeti i: Collective, 2006).

U ovom radu fokus je na kritičkim sigurnosnim studijama u kontekstu informacija i ljudi, jer „usljed apomedijacije[5] u složenom medijskom, informacijskom, obrazovnom, političkom i sigurnosnom okruženju tradicionalni sistemski filteri (*gatekeeperi*[6]) gube svoju pretpostavljenu ili očekivanu ulogu, te većinu tereta poimanja društveno-političke zbilje, pa i sigurnosne kulture, prepoznavanja prijetnji i rizika preuzimaju na sebe sami građani" (Vajzović, 2019: 532; vidjeti i: Moeller, 2020). Ta činjenica nužno ima i svoje refleksije na navike, vrijednosti, potrebe ljudi, ali i percepciju sebe i sigurnosti. Imamo novo stanje s kapitalizmom nadziranja (Zuboff, 2019) i algoritamskom amplifikacijom novih društvenih, demokratskih i sigurnosnih odnosa, pri čemu „društveni ugovor više ne predstavlja odnos između građana i države, već korisnika i platformi društvenih medija", i svakako zahtijeva promišljanje odnosa naroda, države i suvereniteta

[5] Apomedijacija (lat.) – akteri koji u kontekstu digitalnih medija zamjenjuju posrednike između korisnika i usluga (dakle informacija koje korisnici traže), što znači da sada stoje uz njih, osiguravajući dodatnu vrijednost izvana kao apomedijatori (Eysenbach, 2008). Drugim riječima kazano, „apomedijacija" „tradicionalnu ulogu kao čuvara i posrednika odvodi prema ulogama vodiča, savjetnika i facilitatora (podržavatelja)" (Kulenović, 2018). Medijacija je važan koncept koji uključuje ekonomiju, pristup i moć. Tradicionalna vrsta posredovanja je posredovanje, to jest posredovanje između jedne i druge osobe ili između jedne osobe ili entiteta i resursa. Posrednici često blokiraju pristup ili ga na neki način ograničavaju. U nekim slučajevima posrednici postoje jer na djelu postoji model oskudice. Apomedizacija je neologizam stvoren uvođenjem latinskog izraza za „odvojeno, odvojeno, daleko od" (Anderson, 2008).

[6] *Gatekeeper* (engl.) – vratar, čuvar vrata ili ključeva; osoba ili stvar koja kontrolira pristup nečemu. U ovom radu termin treba razumijevati kao tradicionalni sistemski element koji nadgleda, filtrira i uređuje procese.

naspram tehnoloških kompanija (Lovink, 2018; Gunkel, 2014; Hobbes, 2009). Polazeći od toga, možemo reći da se stvara nova varijanta društveno-političko-tehnoloških odnosa u obliku algoritamske demokratije.

Na osnovu istraživanja i definiranja medijske demokratije (Vajzović, 2016; 2017: 273; Meyer i Hinchman, 2010) mogli bismo *algoritamsku demokratiju* definirati (i) kao oblik tvorbe političke volje i donošenja odluka, gdje jednu od ključnih pozicija u informativnom, obrazovnom, pa i političkom procesu preuzimaju algoritmi i umjetna inteligencija (umjesto prethodno: masovni mediji i njihova komunikacijska pravila), koji su tijesno povezani sa stepenom bioinformatičke fuzije čovjeka i tehnologije, medijske i informacijske pismenosti, nezavisnosti regulatora (ne samo sektora komunikacija nego prije svega prikupljanja i korištenja podataka, nadzora i kontrole nad algoritmima), općeg socioekonomskog stanja u državi i stepena digitalne transformacije društva.

Kao primjeri za analizu mogu poslužiti slučajevi Cambridge Analytice s projektima Brexit i Trump (Podumljak, 2018; Amer, 2019; Graham-Harrison i Cadwalladr, 2018). Građani kao izvor podataka postaju predmetom tzv. podacima vođene vladavine (*data-driven governance*) jer je njihovo upravljanje u rukama privatnih IKT[7] kompanija (Greenfield, 2013, u Hibert, 2020).

U nastavku teksta pokušat ćemo argumentacijom značaja medijske i informacijske pismenosti zapravo preciznije kontekstualizirati digitalnu transformaciju sigurnosti. U Deklaraciji o značaju medijske i informacijske pismenosti u Bosni i Hercegovini (2019) daje se sveobuhvatna definicija:

> Medijska i informacijska pismenost odnosi se na kognitivne, tehničke i socijalne vještine i sposobnosti građanki i građana da pristupaju, kritički ocjenjuju, koriste i doprinose informacijskim i medijskim sadržajima putem tradicionalnih i digitalnih informacijskih i medijskih platformi i tehnologija, uz razumijevanje kako te platforme i tehnologije djeluju, kako da prilikom njihovog korištenja upravljaju vlastitim pravima i poštuju prava drugih, kako da prepoznaju i izbjegnu štetne sadržaje i usluge, da svrsishodno koriste informacije, medijske sadržaje i platforme da bi zadovoljili svoje komunikacijske potrebe i interese kao pojedinci i kao pripadnici svojih zajednica,

[7] IKT – informacijska i komunikacijska tehnologija, djelatnost i oprema koja čini tehničku osnovu za sustavno prikupljanje, pohranjivanje, obradbu, širenje i razmjenu informacija različita oblika, tj. znakova, teksta, zvuka i slike (*Hrvatska enciklopedija*, mrežno izdanje).

te da bi prakticirali aktivno i odgovorno učešće u tradicionalnoj i digitalnoj javnoj sferi i u demokratskim procesima.

Ipak, ako mislimo da će razvoj vještina MIP-a sam po sebi biti svrha i stoga (automatski) pozitivno doprinositi društvu te moći raspoznati važnost informacija za demokratsko društvo, Kapitzke (2003) taj koncept smatra obrazovno ispraznim, beskorisnim i čak podmuklim ako njime nije moguće eksplicitno raspoznati sociopolitičke i ideološke dimenzije informacija.

2.
Od kolijevke pa do groba najdraže je digitalno doba[8]

Homo sapiens[9] (*lat.* umni čovjek) – kao vječita misterija i područje introspektivne i retrospektivne analize i istraživanja na nivou ljudskih potreba, sistema vrijednosti, ali i pretpostavki za preživljavanje – od pamtivijeka se uzdao u podatke koje je prikupljao za potrebe donošenja informiranih i obrazovanih odluka na osnovu kojih je radio analizu sigurnosnih rizika i, sukladno tome, odgovarajućih mjera zaštite. Od početka čovjek je obdaren sofisticiranim senzornim sistemom, za svoje potrebe, optimalnim omjerom osnovnih čula: vid, sluh, dodir, miris, okus. Na osnovu njih je isprva donosio sve odluke. To su dugo bili i jedini izvori podataka koji su u datom kontekstu činili informaciju, pa informacije u korelaciji stvarale znanje, a znanje kroz vrijeme i iskustvo stvarali mudrost (Rowley, 2007). Upravo je ta *diferencia specifica* umnosti i temelj logosa kod čovjeka koji je „imanentan svemu postojećemu, on je kozmički princip koji uvodi poredak i umnost u svijet, kao što čovjekov um uređuje čovjekovo djelovanje“ (logos, Hrvatska enciklopedija, mrežno izdanje).

Na osnovu logosa očekujemo razvoj kompetencija medijske i informacijske pismenosti kao *šestog čula* potrebnog za sagledavanje sigurnosnih rizika, prostora političkog, te promišljeno, mudro razvijanje

8 Remiks i kontekstualizacije tradicionalne pjesmice iz (SFRJ) obrazovnog sistema (ilirskog porijekla): *Od kolijevke pa do groba najljepše je đačko doba. Kad se kriju mnoge stvari, kad se pišu spomenari. Blago onom koji umije đačko doba da razumije.*

9 Kako se kosmos ne vrti oko nas ljudi, potrebno je odrediti našu sistematiku, tj. biološku klasifikaciju (znanstvena disciplina koja istražuje raznovrsnost organizama i njihove međusobne veze, i sastavni je dio taksonomije). Pri sistematiziranju je nužno uključiti što više parametara koji utječu na procese evolucije novih vrsta kako bi se utvrdila cjelovita filogeneza. Stoga, *Homo sapiens:* Sistematika: Carstvo:Animalia; Koljeno: Chordata; Razred: Mammalia; Red: Primates; Natporodica: Hominoidea; Porodica: Hominidae; Potporodica: Homininae; Tribus: Hominini; Rod: Homo; Vrsta: Homo sapiens (The Smithsonian Institution's Human Origins Program).

mjera zaštite, posebno u kontekstu digitalne transformacije društva, sfere političkog i sigurnosti. Ipak, da bi nam logos omogućio shvatanje principa i oblika, potrebni su i temeljni ulazni podaci, ali i razumijevanje odnosa s informacijama, znanjem i mudrosti. Prepoznatljiva DIKW[10] piramida/hijerarhija može se razumijevati na nivou kontekstualizacije, perspektive razumijevanja i vremenski (Brahmachary, 2019; Bosančić, 2017).

S vremenom je čovjek izgrađivao potrebu da svoje opažanje, informacije, znanje i mudrost podijeli s drugima, direktno i putem sredstava za prenošenje informacija (počevši od pećinskih crteža, glinenih ploča itd.), pa su se tako razvijali jezik i pismo, kao i metode i materijali prijenosa opažanja, doživljaja, događaja. Razvojem vizuelnog predstavljanja verbalne komunikacije stvaraju se i pouzdani(ji) oblici pohrane i prijenosa podataka. (Pra)čovjek počinje da komunicira s drugima u prostoru i vremenu. Od tada se, suštinski, počinje razvijati i medijska i informacijska pismenost, tj. potreba za tim setom specifičnih kompetencija.

Osim toga, kako se s vremenom razvijalo masovno komuniciranje (vidi: Nuhić, 2000), koje je pratila akumulacija i čuvanje informacija, zatim primjena prakse, perspektive i alata upravljanja, pa prikupljanje, organizacija, čuvanje i širenje informacijskih izvora (Hibert, 2018; Stokić Simončić, 2016; Shera, Foskett, 1965), što je, naravno, snažno doprinosilo razvoju znanja – tako su uviđani i potencijal i potreba za statističkom i matematičkom obradom tih podataka i informacija (O'Neil, 2016). Podaci o podacima: metapodaci počinju bivati vrlo vrijedan resurs, koji polako transformira i stanje sigurnosti i stanje političkog u društvu.

Naporedo s razvojem modernih država, i državnocentričnih sistema, javljaju se i sistemi provjera i propusnosti informacija (*gatekeeperi*): obrazovni sistemi, profesionalni mediji, biblioteke, arhivi, muzeji, regulatori sektora komunikacija, sigurnosni sistem(i) itd. U analognom dobu njihova je funkcionalnost i efikasnost bila uglavnom na visini zadatka. Postojali su sistemski filteri koji su osiguravali da krajnji korisnik (građanin) ima visok stepen povjerenja u informacije koje dobija i na osnovu kojih funkcionira.[11] S obzirom na to da je sfera informacija bila relativno uređena i posredovana, šesto čulo (MIP) biva manje izoštreno, dok je državnocentrična sigurnost bila zadužena za zadovoljavajući nivo sigurnosti (realni i subjektivni) u fizičkom svijetu.

[10] Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom

[11] Ovdje namjerno ne obrađujemo standardne kritike zloupotrebe vlasti i *gatekeepera* u nedemokratskim praksama i sistemima jer su ovi već bili predmetom brojnih analiza i istraživanja, a sam rad bi dodatno odvelo u širinu.

Digitalna transformacija sigurnosti može se posmatrati kao potreban odgovor na izraženu složenost savremenog sigurnosnog okruženja i pojavu novih izvora nesigurnosti, prije svega u *cyber* prostoru i nevidljive ruke algoritama, upotpunjujući nedostatke državnocentričnog okvira, ali i destabilizacije u sferi informacija, kao i distorzije[12] u sferi političkog i tržišnog. U tom kontekstu „sigurnosne prijetnje i izazovi izlaze iz okvira tradicionalnog poimanja međunarodno pravno definisanog i razumijevanog koncepta ratova (sukoba, konflikata), te ulazi u sferu hibridnih asimetričnih sigurnosnih izazova i ratova“ (Vajzović, 2019: 532; vidjeti i: Schmitt, 2017).

Koristeći se našim podacima generiranim kroz digitalni trag, matematičari i statističari proučavaju potencijal naših želja, kretanja, potrošnje, te „predviđanje naše pouzdanosti i izračunavanje našeg potencijala kao učenika, radnika, ljubavnika, kriminalaca“ (O'Neil, 2016: 10), ali i glasača kojima još uvijek niko nije rekao da su u novom društveno-političko-tehnološkom uređenju algoritamske demokratije. Hibert (2018) u vezi s tim navodi da „informacijsko-komunikacijske tehnologije nisu puki alati, već sile novog ekosistema koje utiču na našu percepciju sebe, interakcije i međusobne odnose, kao i predstavu stvarnosti (Floridi, 2015).“ (…) Možemo reći da (…) „prožimajuća emergentnost *onlife* društvene entropije, proistekle iz 'viška' (participacije) u novoj javnoj sferi, tako reaktualizira dijalektički naboj istraživanja odnosa moći u umreženom ekosistemu 'crne kutije' (Pasquale, 2015)“ (Hibert, 2018: 18).

Ovdje se naglašava potreba za medijskom i informacijskom pismenošću zasnovanoj na principima cjeloživotnog učenja. Krovna je to „kompetencija koja se pretpostavlja u društvu koje je doživjelo digitalnu transformaciju i očekuje od građanina da je dovoljno informiran i obrazovan kako bi bio ravnopravan učesnik u demokratskom diskursu, te kao proaktivni samostalni subjekt, konstruktivno i odgovorno donosio odluke i doprinosio društvu znanja“ (Vajzović, 2020: 12). Bitno je shvatiti da „medijska i informacijska pismenost nije samoj sebi svrha, (…) već proces i pristup koji vraća „fabričke' postavke filozofije demokratskog društva i poštivanja ljudskih prava i sloboda“ (Vajzović, 2020: 12).

[12] Prema Vajzović, 2019: Distorzija označava iskretanje, izvijanje, iskrivljenje; izopačenje, izobličenje; promjena izvornoga oblika tijekom manipulacije. U ovom kontekstu distorzija označava namjerno djelovanje na društveno-politički i sigurnosni sistem, sa ostvarivanjem političkog cilja.

3.
Sigurnost, ljudske potrebe i algoritmi

Vrsta sigurnosti ima mnogo, gotovo koliko i interesnih sfera svakog čovjeka: društvena sigurnost, politička, ekonomska, ekološka, zdravstvena itd. Svaka od njih podložna je informacijskoj i medijskoj interpretaciji stvarnosti, i ovisno o stepenu razvoja naših kompetencija medijske i informacijske pismenosti (MIP) sposobni smo donositi informirane, obrazovane i kritički promišljene odluke. Obdareni našim šestim čulom (u kontekstu kompetencije cjeloživotnog učenja) možemo se osjećati sigurno (*safe*) i donositi sigurnosno (*security*) promišljene odluke. Sigurnost je kompleksan i integralan pojam; za nju možemo reći da je „optimalna, poželjna i ohrabrujuća izvjesnost“ (Masleša, 2001); „sigurnost stoji naspram ugrožavanja, prijetnji i obrnuto“ (Beridan, 2008: 25); ona je preduvjet za razvoj i ostvarenje ljudskih prava i sloboda, ali i osnova razvoja društva u ekonomskom, kulturnom i političkom smislu. Stanje političke predvidivosti jedan je od značajnih segmenata poimanja sigurnosti, najvidljiviji kroz prizmu mirne promjene vlasti, vladavine prava, tj. pravnu državu kao pretpostavku ustavne demokratije, odnosno kroz npr. „četvorodimenzionalan model demokratije, ukotvljen u četirima vrstama prava u koje mogu biti razvrstana sva osnovna prava: politička prava, građanska prava, prava na slobodu i socijalna prava“ (Ferrajoli, 2012). Društvenu sigurnost Masleša (2001: 19) definira kao „stanje koje osigurava da se u poželjnim sigurnosnim okvirima i demokratskoj klimi s vladavinom zakona i demokratskom kontrolom na svim nivoima vlasti, svim pojedincima obezbijedi i omogući praktikovanje rješavanje svojih egzistencijalnih i statusnih sadržaja u skoro svim oblastima života i rada, izgradnju međusubjektivnih odnosa s onu stranu nasilja poštivanjem svih postulata modernog demokratskog pravnog i civilnog društva“.

Mangold (1990) sigurnost definira kao „stanje bez opasnosti i ugrožavanja, sigurnost podrazumijeva i osjećaj sigurnosti, ali i aktivnosti, odnosno sistem za ostvarenje sigurnosti“. Tu subjektivnu dimenziju sigurnosti moguće je percipirati kao odsustvo osjećaja straha od ugrožavanja društvenih vrijednosti, dok se odsustvo prijetnji prema društvenim vrijednostima odnosi na objektivu dimenziju sigurnosti (Wolfers, 1962: 147-231). Možemo zaključiti da osiguranje i subjektivne i objektivne dimenzije sigurnosti (*safety* i *security)* podrazumijeva istodobno i zaštitu vrijednosti uz očekivano očuvanje teritorijalnog integriteta. Kako bi država, prema

Hobbsovom viđenju društvenog ugovora, ispunila tu obavezu, njezin sistem sigurnosti treba biti organiziran na način da predviđa, upravlja i odgovara na sve oblike rizika i opasnosti. U kontekstu digitalne transformacije sigurnosti to nije jednostavan zadatak (ako je ikada i bio).

Ipak, sistem državnocentrične sigurnosti ne uključuje samo sposobnosti države za očuvanje vrijednosti svojega društva od unutarnjeg i vanjskog ugrožavanja mira i slobode građana, nego i zajedničko djelovanje s drugim društvenim podsistemima radi daljnjeg razvoja društva u cjelini, kao i ljudske civilizacije (Grizold, Tatalović, Cvrtila, 1999). U periodu nakon hladnog rata i s početkom ere borbe protiv terorizma korespondira i razvoj tehničkih, tehnoloških, i (u)mrež(e)nih pretpostavki za povećani nadzor. U vezi s tim Snowden (2019) piše: „Sudjelovao sam u najznačajnijoj promjeni u povijesti američke špijunaže – promjeni od ciljanog nadzora pojedinaca do masovnog nadzora cijele populacije“ (str. 6). Na osnovu tehnoloških pretpostavki promjene navika ljudi, digitalne transformacije društva i sigurnosti, a pod izgovorom razvoja i zaštite nacionalne sigurnosti, proporcionalno dolazi do ograničavanja prava i sloboda građana, ali i ugrožavanja same demokratije (Romano, 2011: 159-160; Agamben, 2005; Snowden 2019).

Međutim, da se vratimo osnovama ljudskih potreba i vrijednosti, koje bi trebale biti predmetom zaštite. Težnja za dobrobiti, dobrim životom i životom dostojnim čovjeka sastavni je dio ljudskog postojanja (vidjeti i: Tsirogianni, Sammut, Park, 2014). Poznata Maslowljeva teorija hijerarhije potreba (1943) polazi od pretpostavke da ljudi zadovoljavaju svoje želje i potrebe određenim redoslijedom, pa ih je moguće tako hijerarhijski i definirati i postaviti. Maslow (1987: 35-58) navodi da individualno ponašanje ovisi o želji da čovjek zadovolji jednu ili više od svojih pet općih potreba: (a) fiziološke, (b) sigurnosne (*safety*), (c) socijalne, (d) poštovanje samoga sebe, (e) samoostvarenje. U načelu, navedene potrebe hijerarhijski su složene od nižih (fizioloških) prema najvišim (samoostvarenje). Odmah nakon osnovnih fizioloških potreba slijedi potreba za sigurnošću (*safety)*, kao temeljna psihološka potreba. To Maslow objašnjava kao potrebu za stalnošću, redom, za sigurnosti (*safety*), stabilnosti, ovisnosti, zaštitom, za slobodom od straha, od tjeskobe i haosa, odnosno kao potrebu za strukturom, poretkom, zakonom, ograničenjima itd. Digitalna transformacija društva i sigurnosti dodatno usložnjava stvari, daje svoju dozu kompleksnosti. Hibert (2017), uz dozu ironije, dodaje i potrebu za

Wi-Fi (spojenošću na Mrežu) i Bateriju (stalni rad pametnih umreženih uređaja) kao još bazičnije potrebe, možemo reći i kao digitalnu realnost Maslowljeve hijerarhije. Međutim, i za ta dva dodatna elementa sigurnost se (i engl. *safety* i engl. *security*) opet sama nameće. Da je pristup Wi-Fi vezi uvijek dostupan, siguran, pouzdan, te da su uređaji jednako *safe and secure*, po principima informacijske (u širem smislu) i *cyber* (u užem smislu) sigurnosti.

U kontekstu vrijednosti i potreba, digitalna transformacija društva, a posebno digitalna transformacija sigurnosti, uzrokovala je neminovne promjene koje su se desile a za koje još uvijek nismo definirali ili tek trebamo definirati naš pristup i odgovor. Kako i ko definira društvene vrijednosti? Jedna od širih definicija navodi da „pod društvenim vrijednostima nazivamo društveno kolektivna uvjerenja i sisteme vjerovanja koji djeluju kao vodeća načela u životu“ (Tsirogianni, Gaskell, 2011: 2). Danas već samu potrebu za sigurnošću (ali i za potrebama iz sfere društvenog i političkog) ne generiramo iz naših direktnih opažanja, već kroz politički konstrukt uvjetovan algoritmima, umjetnom inteligencijom i tehnokapitalizmom. „Nekada smo digitalne usluge smatrali besplatnima, a sada nas kapitalisti nadzora smatraju besplatnima“ (Zuboff, 2019). Obični građanin u demokratskom društvu zamijenio je svoju ulogu suverena u (ponovnom) uspostavljanju digitalnog društva (i ugovora) novim ulogama: korisnik usluge, potrošač, proizvođač (besplatnog sadržaja), i kao roba (podaci i pažnja).

Snowden u svojoj knjizi *Trajni zapis* (2019) objašnjava kako su tvrtke shvatile da se ljudska veza koju je internet omogućio može unovčiti: „Ovo je bio početak kapitalizma nadzora i kraj interneta kakav sam poznavao“ (str. 14). Autor dodatno obrazlaže (novi) poslovni model e-trgovina koje su propale jer nisu mogle pronaći ništa što nas zanima: imali su novi proizvod za prodaju, a „taj smo novi proizvod bili mi“ (Snowden, 2019: 14). Hibert (2020) objašnjava kako se

> ekstrakcija kognitivnog viška vrijednosti iz neprekidnog živog kapitala (Lazzarato, 2014), mrežnih aktivnosti korisnika, ostvaruje kroz neprestano bilježenje i praćenje, ali i modifikaciju ponašanja, raspoloženja i navika. Proces razotkrivanja akumulacije i upravljanja tzv. bihevioralnim viškom (Zuboff, 2019) (matematičkim modelima koji aproksimiraju ljudsko ponašanje algoritamskom modulacijom matrica podataka) počiva na istraživanjima koja ukazuju u kojoj

mjeri su naše odluke izložene modelima destabilizacije javne svijesti: „Facebook definira ko smo, Amazon definira šta želimo, Google definira šta mislimo“ (Dyson, 2012: 308). Internet je mračna šuma, mentalni prostor mjesečarenja koji su zaposjele mašine s kojima postajemo neurološki intimni (Konior, 2020). (Hibert, 2020: 96)

Možemo dodati da onaj koji ima pristup našim metapodacima i mašinsku moć njihove obrade taj može određivati i naš osjećaj sigurnosti, uvjetujući time sferu političkog, odnosno može otupiti naša čula i stoga onemogućiti realno sagledavanja rizika, prijetnji, pa i same demokratske realnosti.

Zahvaljujući algoritmima i AI-u, velike tehnološke kompanije napravile su imperiju i postale novi *gatekeeperi*. Ovog obrta, uglavnom, građani nisu svjesni, drugim riječima, uglavnom ne poznaju kako ti algoritmi rade i kako im oni uređuju svakodnevnicu. Jedno od uobičajenih opravdanja jest da algoritam predstavlja poslovnu tajnu, tj. intelektualno vlasništvo (za npr. Google, Amazon i Facebook precizno skrojeni algoritmi vrijede stotine milijardi dolara). Može se reći da su *„oružja matematičkog uništavanja* (engl. *Weapons of Math Distruction* – WMD), prema dizajnu, neprocjenjive crne kutije. Zbog toga je dodatno teško definitivno odgovoriti na drugo pitanje: radi li model protiv interesa subjekta? Ukratko, je li to nepravedno? Oštećuje li ili uništava živote?“ (O'Neil, 2016: 30).

Šta su, u suštini, algoritmi? U matematici pojam „algoritam“ znači jednoznačan postupak rješavanja zadane klase problema. Ovdje, u našem kontekstu, „algoritam“ bi trebalo determinirati više kao „automatizirani algoritam“, tj. postupak koji se koristi za automatizaciju obrazloženja ili procesa donošenja odluka i koji, obično, provodi kompjuter upravo s ciljem da se automatizacija i sistemski realizira mnogo većim brzinama od onih koje može postići čovjek; time se također automatski pokreću i mnogi drugi postupci (Whittlestone et al., 2019: 7).

Kao sastavna komponenta algoritama potrebna je „umjetna inteligencija“, koju je najteže definirati i čija je definicija stoga najspornija. Ovdje se umjetna inteligencija odnosi „na bilo koju tehnologiju koja izvodi zadatke koji bi se mogli smatrati inteligentnima (…) i često se može koristiti za optimizaciju procesa i može se razviti za autonomno djelovanje, stvarajući složena ponašanja koja prelaze ono što je izričito programirano“ (Whittlestone et al., 2019: 7). Umjetna inteligencija i algoritmi uče od ljudi, a za potrebe vlasnika digitalnog kapitala.

Može se stoga reći da je za nešto više od polovine populacije na planeti (63,2%)[13], koja spada u umreženi svijet, stvoreno okruženje u kojem svakodnevno iskustvo postojanja biva oblikovano prisustvom umjetne inteligencije, pri čemu su „algoritmi njegovi gradivni organizacijski elementi" (Hibert, 2020). Treba napomenuti da svi mi, *Homo sapiensi*, hranimo algoritme, umjetnu inteligenciju i omogućavamo mašinsko učenje putem našeg digitalnog traga (i rada), interakciju sa IoT (*Internet of Things*) i svim mogućim korelacijama čovjeka i mašine.

4.
Digitalna transformacija sigurnosti

Digitalna transformacija sigurnosti dešava se praktično na svim nivoima: strateškom, operativnom, taktičkom i, naravno, tehničkom. Svaki nivo se može sagledavati iz više uglova, konceptualnih i formalno-pravnih: vojni, policijski, društveni i građanski pristup, zatim *cyber* delikvencija, obavještajno-sigurnosno djelovanje u *cyber* prostoru, potom primjena na javne i privatne institucije, državni nadzor nad Mrežom i građanima, digitalna transformacija/ugrožavanje/razvoj ljudskih prava, sigurnosno propitivanje korelacije pojedinca i sigurnosti u *cyber* prostoru, pa sve do upravljanja nuklearnim potencijalom. Tako širok dijapazon svega što digitalna transformacija sigurnosti obuhvata ili pokriva zahtijeva svakako i sveobuhvatnu ili barem sveobuhvatniju definiciju onoga što sigurnost uistinu jeste u digitalnom prostoru. Dakle:

> Cyber sigurnost jest stanje i praksa zaštite infrastrukture, informacijsko-komunikacijskih sistema, mreža, uređaja i informacija od ugrožavanja, u cilju zaštite ljudi, materijalnih i kulturnih dobara u ličnoj i društvenoj svojini, zaštitu društva i njegovih vrijednosti, cjelovitu zaštitu naroda, nacije, države i međunarodnih odnosa. Prijetnje kojima se suprotstavlja cyber sigurnost jesu brojne, ali ih je, radi jednostavnijeg razumijevanja, potrebno posmatrati prije svega kao cilj ili kao sredstvo (1) u cyber kriminalitetu, (2) u politički motivisanim cyber napadima i (3) u cyber terorizmu (Vajzović, 2019: 534).

Iako bi bilo znanstveno i zanimljivo i značajno analizirati sve spomenute segmente, ovdje ćemo se ipak fokusirati samo na pojedinca, utopijski viđenog kao aktivnog, konstruktivnog građanina, *perpetuum mobile*

[13] Vidi: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (pristup 1. decembra 2020)

demokratskog diskursa i vrijednosti. Digitalna transformacija sigurnosti implicira ne samo korištenje novih tehnologija, mreže, metapodataka, podataka, AI i algoritama za vojne i odbrambene potrebe i za policijski rad nego uključuje i način na koji sigurnost percipiraju građani, te kakve implikacije ona ima na demokratske procese.

Utopijski, utilitaristički gledano: život dostojan čovjeka, ljudska prava i slobode, dugoročni mir i društvene vrijednosti jesu primarni predmet zaštite. O razumijevanju društvenih vrijednosti u kontekstu pitanja o kojima se ovdje govori Darvin Lisica (2011a) kaže sljedeće:

> Temeljne društvene vrijednosti su temeljna uvjerenja, ideje i stanja o onome šta je važno, dobro i poželjno, o čijem prihvaćanju postoji konsenzus unutar određene društvene grupe ili društva u cjelini. One usmjeravaju ponašanje i omogućavaju interakciju pojedinaca i grupa, oblikuju individualne i kolektivne stavove, pomažu profiliranju zajedničkih interesa i ciljeva, osiguravajući tako unutarnju koheziju i stabilnost društvenih struktura kao neophodnih preduvjeta za izgradnju efikasnog sigurnosnog sistema (str. 23).

Sam pojam razumijevanje i doživljavanje sigurnosti (što objektivno, što subjektivno) oduvijek je bio podložan različitim interpretacijama, ovisno o vremenu, geopolitičkom i društvenom kontekstu, kao i shvatanju ili mogućnosti objektivnog detektovanja sigurnosnih rizika.

Iako je pojedinac uvijek bio značajan element u planiranju sigurnosti države i društva, treba naglasiti da je to u kontekstu digitalne transformacije sigurnosti i dodatno došlo do izražaja, i to na svim nivoima: (1) državnom, (2) korporativnom i (3) individualnom, dakle kao kapacitet demokratskog diskursa, kao očuvanje narodnog suvereniteta, ali i kao samozaštita i otpornost na informacijsko-komunikacije distorzije.

(1) Državnu/nacionalnu sigurnost, u kontekstu individua u digitalnom okruženju, sagledavamo u više dimenzija: otpornost pojedinca kao integralnog dijela društva i javnosti na hibridne asimetrične prijetnje i specijalne ratove kroz dezinformacije, manipulacije informacijama, (digitalno)medijske napade na progresivne snage, kao i otpornost na radikalizaciju, nasilni ekstremizam i regrutaciju za potrebe terorizma, osobito putem društvenih mreža.

U dokumentu *Smjernice za strateški okvir cyber sigurnosti u Bosni i Hercegovini* (2019) navodi se da je razvijanje svijesti o *cyber* sigurnosti i obrazovanje u toj oblasti značajan i integrativni element za sve ostalo. Isto je jasno navedeno i u cilju C, C1 i C2. Tu se još potvrđuje i značaj razvoja „šestog čula" – MIP-a, gdje se naglašava: „Podržavati procese uključivanja medijske i informacijske pismenosti u formalno i neformalno obrazovanje", te „Uvoditi teme vezane za *cyber* sigurnost i medijsku i informacijsku pismenost u nastavne planove svih nivoa obrazovanja" (OSCE, 2019: 13-14).

U širem kontekstu gledano, Beridan (2008) navodi da strukturu sistema nacionalne sigurnosti u osnovi čine: *funkcije*, *snage* (nosioci), *djelatnosti* (aktivnosti) i *mjere* sistema sigurnosti. Medijsku i informacijsku pismenost (MIP) možemo najjednostavnije pozicionirati kao komponentu Snaga (nosilaca) sistema sigurnosti, pod segmentom „Društvo i njegove komponente". MIP bi, kao osnažen element, mogao značajno doprinijeti da u perspektivi jedno društvo (neko, svako) bude ili postane mnogo sigurnije (zaštićenije) od vanjskih i unutrašnjih neprijatelja i napada. Prirodno pravo svakog ljudskog bića i skupine kojoj ono pripada jest pravo na „samoodbranu, samozaštitu i samopomoć" (Grizold, Tatalović, Cvrtila, 1999: 11), ali je za sve to potrebno da čulno zabilježimo i shvatimo opasnost, što je u svijetu „algoritamskih kapija" (Hibert, 2020) vrlo izazovno. Sun Tzu u vezi s tim pitanjima podsjeća da svako vođenje rata počiva na obmani, ali istovremeno naglašava da se najveći uspjeh ne sastoji od toga da pobijedimo neprijatelja u svim bitkama, već da otpor neprijatelja savladamo bez borbe (Sun, Nylan, 2020).

Kad je riječ o specijalnim operacijama, one u izučavanjima polemologije[14] i vojnih doktrina nisu novina. One predstavljaju skup organiziranih aktivnosti i djelovanja koje određena država ili više njih poduzimaju (a) *u miru* (u političkom, ekonomskom, vojnom, medijskom, kulturnom, naučnom i svakom drugom pogledu) – radi slabljenja stabilnosti neke države, naročito njezine stabilnosti u pružanju otpora, odnosno (b) *u ratu* – radi slabljenja njezine sposobnosti za odbranu, čime se ta (neka) država dovodi u određeni stepen zavisnosti i potčinjenosti.

Specijalne operacije uključuju i prijeratna i ratna i poratna događanja, ali u pravilu bez obostranog i masovnog korištenja vojne sile. Njihov osnovni cilj jest slabljenje određene države ili političke zajednice, tj. njene unutarnje i vanjske politike, slabljenje njezinog otpora neprijateljskoj politici i, da

[14] grč. *polemeo* – borim se, ratujem + *logos* – riječ, govor, pojam, misao, razum. Naučno, znanstveno istraživanje rata kao društvene pojave, njegovih uzroka, ciljeva i posljedica.

ponovimo, njezino dovođenje u zavisan i potčinjen položaj. Načelno, specijalne operacije podrazumijevaju političke, vojne, ekonomske i druge djelatnosti protiv jedne države ili grupe država, što osim obavještajnih aktivnosti uključuje i različita druga djelovanja: psihološko-propagandna, subverzivna, odbrambena (Molander et al., 1996; Beridan, 2008; Moffat, 2006; Beridan, Tomić, Kreso, 2001). Promatramo li pak sve to u kontekstu društvenih mreža i online platformi, možemo se složiti da su specijalne operacije, praktično, „strateško polje biopolitičke moći u kojem se kao centralna karika pojavljuje mrežni pojedinac zapleten u mrežu bihevioralnog inžinjeringa“ (Hibert, 2020).

Ono što je zanimljivo za daljnja istraživanja jesu modeli, pojavni oblici, efikasnost i elementi hibridnih asimetričnih specijalnih operacija, jer razvoj interneta, *cyber* prostora i Mreže otvara gotovo neiscrpne nove mogućnosti. Tako Snowden (2019) navodi da njegova generacija nije samo unaprijedila obavještajni rad, već su išli i korak dalje: „u potpunosti smo redefinirali što jeste obavještajni posao. Za nas to nisu bili tajni sastanci ili tajna predaja informacija, već rad s podacima“ (str. 8). On pritom vrlo slikovito opisuje protuustavna djelovanja obavještajnih agencija i narušavanje osnovnih vrijednosti svakog slobodnog društva: „Sjedio sam za kompjuterskim terminalom s kojeg sam imao praktički neograničen pristup komunikacijama gotovo svakog muškarca, žene i djeteta na Zemlji koji su ikad koristili telefon ili dodirivali računalo. Među tim ljudima bilo je oko 320 milijuna mojih sugrađana Amerikanaca koji su u redovnom svakodnevnom životu bili pod nadzorom“ (str. 10).

Strateška promišljanja vjerovatno najcitiranijeg autora iz ove oblasti Sun Tzua autorica Michael Nylan (2020) u uvodu najnovijeg prijevoda ovog klasika kontekstualizira današnjicu naglašavajući značaj ovoga djela „posebno u doba kada veliki podaci (engl. *big data*) i umjetna inteligencija sugeriraju da su ljudi kao vrsta podatniji (prijemčiviji za oblikovanje) nego što bismo željeli misliti, dok se internet sve više vidi kao neprijateljski svijet prepun novih ratišta“ (str. 19-20). S druge strane, kroz *doktrinu šoka* (Klein 2008) demokratsko društvo je u krizi jer su građani previše rastrojeni (emocionalno i fizički) da bi se uključili i razvili adekvatan odgovor, te se učinkovito opirali kontroverznim i upitnim politikama koje javne vlasti usvajaju. Demokratski deficit, koji se stvara progresivno, negativno djeluje na stanje sigurnosti u jednom društvu, pogotovo imajući u vidu da se vlasti sve više integriraju s velikim tehnološkim kompanijama kojima se prenose zadaci (*outsourcing*), često uz ovlasti i visoku cijenu, mnogih njihovih osnovnih funkcija na privatne (tehnološke) kompanije (Klein, 2020).

(2) Posmatrano iz ugla *korporativnog* nivoa, u vremenu kad su informacije najvredniji resurs, kad je informacija (tj. podatak/data) postala vrednija i od nafte (*Economist*, 2017; 2010) – informacijska sigurnost postaje ključna za osiguravanje poslovnog kontinuiteta, zaštitu podataka, imovine, sigurnost mreže, za upravljanje incidentima, zaštitu privatnosti itd. Jer sistemom informacijske sigurnosti obuhvataju se „fizička lica, procesi, organizacija i tehnologija. Taj sistem se sastoji od uravnoteženog skupa sigurnosnih mjera, fizičke sigurnosti, sigurnosti podataka, sigurnosti informacionih sistema, koordiniranog uvođenja formalnih procedura, kao što su procjene rizika, certificiranje uređaja i akreditacije tehničkih sistema za primjenu u određenim segmentima poslovnih procesa u institucijama“ (Politika upravljanja informacijskom sigurnošću u institucijama Bosne i Hercegovine, 2017).

Uz ostale, najznakovitija je možda ISO 27000[15] porodica standarda, koja se, uprkos pravilima i procedurama, ipak zasniva na visokom nivou pojedinačne svijesti o sigurnosti i njenim elementima. *Cyber* sigurnost, kao poddomen informacijske sigurnosti, oslanja se na tri stuba: (1) hardver/softver, (2) procedure, i (3) ljudski resursi. Budući da je *čovjek* tradicionalno najslabija karika u lancu, ključno je, kao preduvjet za visok stepen zaštite, da on bude visoko osviješten, obučen, medijski i informacijski pismen. Svijest o informacijskim i *cyber* prijetnjama prvi je i najvažniji korak u postizanju sigurnosti. Nakon toga korisnik može biti spreman za borbu protiv takvih prijetnji, pri čemu treba imati na umu da sigurnost nije jednokratni mehanizam, već je to kontinuirani proces (Calder, Watkins, 2015; Chopra, Chaudhary, 2020; Prasad, 2020; Vajzović, 2019).

(3) Na *individualnom* je nivou zanimljiva percepcija kako u svakodnevnom životu (globalno) o sigurnosti i miru brine država, dok individualna sigurnost (*safety*) očigledno jest ili bi trebala biti osobna briga (Farnicka, 2017). Čini se, međutim, da smo sve svjesniji (ili možda baš i nismo?!) potrebe za samozaštitom u digitalnom okruženju, da sve više razumijevamo značaj digitalnog traga, privatnosti u *cyber* prostoru, samosvijest o

[15] Za više vidi: ISO 27000 porodica standarda: https://www.iso.org/search.html?q=27000

funkcioniranju i utjecaju društvenih mreža. Razumijevanje *backend*[16] nevidljivog dijela Mreže, algoritmi i umjetna inteligencija te njihov utjecaj na demokratske procese, ljudska prava, političku komunikaciju, i očuvanje osnovnih principa ljudskih prava i sloboda – samo su neki od izazova na kojima pojedinac (idealno!) treba svakodnevno raditi u pravcu shvatanja i svoga prilagođavanja, pozicioniranja i djelovanja (vidjeti: Rašidović, 2012). U tom pogledu danas su možda i najzahtjevniji procesi upravo u sferi (vjerovatno) najizraženijeg čovjekovog instinkta, a to je zaštita vlastitih potomaka i porodice. Segment zaštite, tj. „opismenjavanja" djece vezano za njihovu interakciju i djelovanje na Mreži, predmet je posebnih multidisciplinarnih istraživanja. Pravi omjer prednosti i mogućnosti digitalnog svijeta za dijete naspram nedostataka, prijetnji i rizika, jest nešto što se teško može precizirati.

U tom bi se pravcu možda mogla povući nekakva paralela s doktrinom bivše Jugoslavije u pogledu uvođenja u obrazovni sistem nastavnog predmeta Opštenarodna odbrana i društvena samozaštita (ONO i DSZ). Ideja je, kako navode neki autori, između ostalog bila da se odbrambena strategija uskladi s jugoslavenskom ideologijom samoupravnog socijalizma (doktrine o „naoružanom narodu"), poticana svakako strahom od kakve potencijalne invazije (Stevanović, 2018). Na sličan bi način, recimo, manje ili više, MIP trebao razviti preventivno set kompetencija kod učenika, samo ovaj put u digitalnom okruženju. Poenta je razvoj otpornosti na sigurnosne prijetnje u određenom prostoru (*cyber*) i vremenu (sada i sutra), sa svim pratećim izazovima digitalne transformacije sigurnosti u algoritamskoj demokratiji.

Gledajući sa strateškog nivoa, u smislu ratovanja, jasno je da je puno efikasnije, efektivnije, izvodljivije i održivije napasti neko područje, pokoriti ga i vladati nekom državom ili nekim narodom bez upotrebe konvencionalne vojne snage. Tradicionalni domeni ratovanja (kopno, zrak, voda i svemir), koji su također tehnološki vrlo sofisticirani i digitalno transformirani, značajno osnaženi algoritmima i umjetnom inteligencijom, u budućnosti će (vjerovatno) biti neka vrsta preventivne snage u pričuvi za slučaj da treba pokazati i omjer snaga u fizičkom svijetu. Međutim, kako se većina društvenih, političkih, poslovnih i ličnih aspekata života seli ili

[16] *Engl.* U softverskom inženjerstvu izrazi *frontend* (prednji) i *backend* (stražnji) kraj odnose se na razdvajanje problema između prezentacijskog sloja (prednji kraj) i sloja pristupa podacima (stražnji kraj) dijela softvera ili fizičke infrastrukture ili hardvera. Klijent se obično smatra prednjim krajem, a poslužitelj stražnjim krajem.

paralelno odvija u *cyber* prostoru, na Mreži (baš kao i djelimična fuzija tradicionalnih domena i *cyber* ratovanja), potrebno je sagledati ko tim prostorom vlada i gdje se u svemu tome nalazi narod, koji u demokratskom društvu i jest nosilac suvereniteta. Većina sigurnosnih prijetnji i ratovanja se (već) odvija u sferi interneta, *cyber* prostora, Mreže i Logosa. „Osjetljivost građana (pa i cijelog društvenog sistema) na hibridne asimetrične distorzije i napade (vanjske i unutrašnje) proporcionalno se povećala, te su i izazovi za sigurnost postali značajniji“ (Vajzović, 2019).

Sama suština demokratske filozofije uređenja društvenih odnosa, dakle univerzalnost ljudskih prava i sloboda, dovodi se u pitanje upravo upotrebom nevidljivih sila Mreže – algoritama i umjetne inteligencije (vidjeti: Crawford i Joler, 2018; Perkov, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c). Zato se nameću i vrlo važna pitanja koja se ne postavljaju dovoljno često: u čijem su vlasništvu te „sile“ i za koga rade; ko ima „legitimni“ aparat za prisilu (a to više nije samo prisila u fizičkom svijetu); koliko narod nad njima ima demokratski nadzor i kontrolu?

Važno je naglasiti da

> ideal informisanog i obrazovanog aktivnog građanina jest osnov demokratske utopije društva koje teži prosperitetu, visokom stepenu ostvarivanja ljudskih prava i sloboda, životu dostojnom čovjeku i sve to u mirnom i sigurnom okruženju. Takav ideal implicira građanina koji ima razvijeno kritičko mišljenje i otpornost na manipulacije (primarno političko-ekonomske), unutrašnje i vanjske. Takvo društvo ima pretpostavke da je izraz slobodne volje čovjeka, da je autonomno razvijen i realizovan kao izraz nosioca suvereniteta u demokratskom društvu kojem je zagarantovana sigurnost (Vajzović 2019: 530; vidjeti i: Zgodić, 2010).

Na taj se način život modernih informacijskih društava sve više integrira u *cyber* prostor, a samim tim i sigurnosni izazovi sve više proizlaze iz tog istog domena. Ima li se to na umu, jasno će biti zašto se otpornost jednoga društva, države, političkog, ekonomskog i sigurnosnog sistema, medijska i informacijska pismenost sve očitije percipira kao jedna od ključnih kompetencija – i svakoga građanina pojedinačno i društva u cjelini. Odnos pojedinca prema vlastitoj i grupnoj (kolektivnoj) sigurnosti usložnjava se kada građanin postaje *umreženi građanin*, te (ne)svjesno postaje korisnik digitalnih platformi i usluga, kreator sadržaja i njihov konzument, te u konačnici proizvod i predmet trgovine, ali i izmanipulirani objekt unutar algoritamske demokratije (vidjeti: Amer 2019, Rhodes, L. , Orlowski, J., 2020; McDavid, Jodi, 2020). Možemo reći da „iz proklamiranog društva znanja stigli smo u društvo podataka, sačinjeno iz korisnički generiranih, remiksovanih sadržaja postčinjenične naravi. (…) karakter današnje hegemonije temelji se na informacijskom višku o podacima (metapodaci), a ne deficitu znanja (pristup informacijama)" (Hibert, 2020: 97).

5.
Zaključak

Sam historijski tok oslikan u industrijskom i tehničko-tehnološkom napretku ne mora sam po sebi značiti i društveni prosperitet, a savremeni razvoj može u sigurnosnom smislu biti velika opasnost, te u isto vrijeme i velika šansa za čovječanstvo i čovjeka kao pojedinca, pod uvjetom da se adekvatno i pravovremeno uspostave kontrolno-sigurnosni mehanizmi koji bi vodili ljudskom prosperitetu i pogodovali zajednici. Dobar put ka ostvarenju toga bilo bi etičko, političko, pravno, pa i sigurnosno promišljanje tehnologije, AI, algoritama i tehnoloških kompanija, ali i stvaranje pretpostavki za razumijevanje značaja i same paradigme algoritamske demokratije. Na tim pretpostavkama ovaj rad kroz antidisciplinarni pristup kritičkim sigurnosnim studijama utvrđuje temeljnu ulogu medijske i informacijske pismenosti u osnaživanju i jačanju otpornosti građana kao ključnih snaga sigurnosti: i kao pojedinaca u tradicionalnim segmentima snaga sigurnosti (oružane snage, policija itd.), ali i kao zasebnog elementa snaga sigurnosti: „Društvo i njegove komponente" (Beridan, 2008) koji sve više preuzimaju ulogu gatekeepera u digitalnom društvu informacijskog nereda (*information disorder*).

Ta i takva demokratija (algoritamska) mora biti i ostati u rukama i pod kontrolom građana kao nosilaca suvereniteta (recimo kroz ideju i pokret za zajednička dobra (*Commons movement*[17]) (Tomašević, 2018). Ostaje jednako važno osnaživanje građana putem obrazovanja te podizanje nivoa medijske i informacijske pismenosti u stanju postdemokratije[18] i digitalnog doba (Stadler, 2018; Carlsson, 2019; Smith, T. G., 2017: 1-9). Medijska i informacijska pismenost kao šesto čulo posebno je značajna

[17] Vidi: http://www.onthecommons.org/about-commons#sthash.ujNneYrn.dpbs

[18] Stadler (2018, viii) taj termin „post-demokratija" koristi „jer proširuje mogućnosti, pa čak i zahtjeve za (ličnim) sudjelovanjem, dok se sve veći aspekti (kolektivnog) odlučivanja premještaju u arene koje su strukturno odvojene od participacije. Zapravo, ta arena stvara autoritarnu stvarnost u kojoj je mala elita uvelike ovlaštena na štetu svih ostalih".

za razumijevanje digitalne transformacije društva i sigurnosti te njihove implikacije na demokratski diskurs i njihove povezanosti s prijetnjama, rizicima i sigurnosti na državnom, korporativnom i individualnom nivou: kao kapacitet demokratskog diskursa, kao očuvanje narodnog suvereniteta, ali i kao samozaštita i otpornost na hibridne asimetrične sigurnosne prijetnje. Medijska i informacijska pismenost u savremenom trenutku neophodan je i poželjan element shvatanja, kreiranja i zaštite sigurnosti pojedinca, organizacije, države i (post)demokratije!

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Chinese approach to development policies and their effect on the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Abstract: The article tracks the appearance of China as a key development actor on the global development agenda, and consequently as an increasingly important economic partner in the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In accordance with the principles contained in the Beijing Consensus and the Belt and Road and 17+1 Initiatives, China has partnered with different levels of government in Bosnia's complex political system to prepare or execute an increasing number of major infrastructure projects, including two thermal power plants and a highway. Similar as in the neighbouring Serbia and Croatia, Chinese entrance into the local market rung some alarm bells in the corridors of the EU bureaucracy in Brussels. Concerns have been raised regarding the transparency of the deals, their environmental impact and potential effects on the fragile political system in the country.

Keywords: China, development policies, Beijing Consensus, investment, Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina, European Union

Introduction: Investment as a foreign policy tool

Classical political theory recognized only two instruments of statecraft in international relations: diplomacy and war, i.e., military instruments. Changes brought about by globalisation and tectonic shifts in the global security framework due to the emergence of United Nations and its explicit prohibition of war as an instrument of power in the UN Charter necessitated a more complex and nuanced classification of foreign policy instruments. The now-classic classification of different forms of statecraft proposed by David Baldwin (1985) differentiates between four foreign policy tools available to states: diplomacy, military, propaganda and economic.

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Economic concerns lay at the root of international relations in the modern globalized world. Economic prosperity has long been recognized as the chief contributing factor to global peace and security. It has consequently enhanced the role of the economically strong countries, both internally as the source of their financial, military and political strength, and internationally through deft use of economic instruments. As Michael Mandelbaum notes, over the past forty years, "economic issues – above all, the health of the global economy – replaced matters of war and peace as the major focus of national leaders because economic matters came to have greater effects on the countries they led" (Mandelbaum, 2014: 1). Mandelbaum also identifies a clear link between global economic prosperity and politics. The name of the game politicians should be adept at playing, according to him, is "globalization, or cross-border trade, investments (…) on a worldwide scale" (Mandelbaum, 2014: 12).

What Mandelbaum and other contemporary strategic economic thinkers have in mind is that economic instruments give modern states in this economically interconnected world the most powerful and efficient tool to further their interests. These instruments are broadly divided into two groups – punitive (negative, coercive) and assistive (positive, rewarding). The first group includes sanctions, punitive tariffs and embargoes, for instance, and, albeit sometimes effective, these are limited in their use to punishing the countries or regimes seen as transgressors of the international norms of behaviour. Economic sanctions are the oldest of the instruments available to the states and remain popular even in today's globalized world. Some of the reasons for their enduring popularity are: 1) sanctions are quickly deployable; 2) they produce immediate and publicly visible results, something decision makers love; 3) they are easy to justify to domestic and international audiences, as they are invoked in response to a transgression of applicable international norms; 4) sanctions can be calibrated in response to the size or brazenness of the transgression, hence easily demonstrated not to be out of proportion; and 5) sanctions are non-military and/or foreign policy response that is very effective, yet comes without all the risks associated with military action (Moehr, 2017).

However, use of punitive economic sanctions is available to the states only through the global security infrastructure, such as the United Nations and NATO, and then only by securing sponsorship for such measures by the most powerful countries, such as the United States. Use of sanctions by single, less powerful states would be pointless, since the impact on the target country would be negligible. Even powerful countries such as China and Russia could act unilaterally by imposing sanctions only in the most extreme circumstances, such as China tying states' recognition of Taiwan to withdrawal of recognition of those states by official Beijing.

Hence the application of the second group of economic instruments available to states in the globalized world – assistive or positive, that are far more effective and longer lasting, while producing effects that are very often mutually beneficial for all the states involved. Militarily and politically less powerful, but economic powerhouse states, such as Japan, China and Germany, opt for use of assistive economic instruments, as powerful tools that aid their overall foreign policy objectives.

Figure 1. Examples of punitive economic instruments

Trade related	Capital related
Embargo	Freezing assets
Boycott	Controls on import or export
Tariff increase	Aid suspension
Tariff discrimination (unfavourable)	Expropriation
Withdrawal of "most favoured nation treatment"	Taxation (unfavourable)
Blacklist	Withholding dues to international organization
Quotas (import or export)	Threats of the above
License denial (import or export)	
Dumping	
Preclusive buying	
Threats of the above	

Source: Baldwin (1985: 41)

Figure 2. Examples of assistive economic instruments

Trade related	Capital related
Tariff discrimination (favourable)	Providing aid
Granting "most favoured nation treatment"	Investment guarantees
Tariff reduction	Encouragement of private capital exports or imports
Direct purchase	Taxation (favourable)
Subsidies to exports or imports	Promises of the above
Granting licenses (import or export)	
Promises of the above	

Source: Baldwin (1985: 42)

Two decades into the 21st century, the world is slowly entering into the third great era of globalization. The first era of globalization is generally accepted as driven by British industrial and trade domination of the world that started at the beginning of the 19th century and lasted until around the First World War. Afterwards, the United States took over as the industrial and trade leader of the world, marking the beginning of the second great wave of globalization that started in the aftermath of the WWII and lasted into the 21st century. This was the time of triumph of liberal worldview in both politics and economics, while domination of the USA was safeguarded by the institutions of the so-called Washington Consensus (Vanham, 2019).

The third great era of globalization is well under way already. Despite the United States still being the greatest single economic power and by far the greatest military and political power in the world, the centre of the world's gravity is steadily shifting towards China and the group of emerging economies commonly referred to as the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. China is, of course, the preeminent power in this group, with India and Russia also adding to the shift of global economic gravity towards Asia. Despite lingering controversies regarding China's ability to maintain its leadership role within the BRICS

(Beeson&Jinghan, 2018), all of these countries, China included, are perfectly aware that they owe their economic rise to the application of free market policies and globalization and remain staunch proponents of global liberal capitalist order and free market policies. Cynics might add however, that this commitment is also at least partially due to the fact that China's and India's economic power is not matched by their military prowess and political clout.

The emerging "Beijing Consensus" model

During the past few decades China has played an increasingly visible role in the world, using all instruments at its disposal. While Beijing has often been accused of acting as the regional bully in the South China Sea area, the region it sees as its backyard, politically as well militarily, it has adopted a more proactive and cooperative approach in its global foreign policy. In that sense, China has acted as a typical emerging and regional power, whose power limitations compel it to adopt a more constructive approach to achieving its foreign policy objectives.

For years, the Chinese constructive and pragmatic foreign policy lacked a formal strategic and long-term blueprint. More recently, however, a number of authors have identified the outlines of just such Chinese grand foreign policy strategy. In the absence of official recognition of the existence of such strategy, scientists and politicians across the world have embraced the term "Beijing Consensus" to frame China's economic development model. The term itself was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a US economist, who positioned it as an alternative to the Washington Consensus promoted by the international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

As opposed to Washington Consensus' advocacy of rigid, apply-to-all liberal free market principles to economic growth and development that have clearly failed so many developing nations, the Beijing Consensus applies a country-specific pragmatic approach, free of value considerations. In short, the Beijing Consensus positions the non-imperialist looking China instead of the very-much-imperialist US as an alternative development model for the Third World countries (Ramo, 2004). Despite the widespread acceptance of the term Beijing Consensus, however, it must be noted that it has never been adopted or used in any Chinese official document, making its use circumstantial at best (Is there a Beijing Consensus? 2007).

In terms of most metrics of overseas power projection, China still lags far behind the United States and other Western countries. Total overseas development assistance provided by China until very recently was estimated at a fraction of similar aid money spent by the Western governments (CRS, 2008: 4). Recently, the statistics showed a dramatic change in the estimates of the total aid budget of China, the result of linear increases in the amounts of money spent by China, but also the new ways in which the total amount of aid money is calculated (aiddata.org). New reports estimate that China's total aid spending in the 15-year period between 2000 and 2014 amounted to US$ 354.3 billion, which is very close to the US$ 394.6 billion spent by the United States in the same period. In fact, China now outspends the US on an annual basis (NPR, 2017).

In the long run, econometrics will inevitably and increasingly favour China. Even with hard data working in its favour, China might have another trump card up its sleeve when it comes to dealing with developing countries. Soft power, which for years was taken for granted to work in favour of Western countries with their appealing democratic liberal social models, might be experiencing a change of fortune. Western liberal democratic and economic model has indeed worked in countries of origin, as evidenced by the migration flows that inevitably have Western countries as countries of destination. However, despite decades of attempts at emulation in developing countries, the same liberal model, based as it is on strict apply-to-all rules enshrined in the Washington Consensus, has failed to sprout roots across the developing world. Now, after so many decades of apparently futile efforts to replicate its beneficial effects in most of the third world, it has also started to lose its appeal as a soft power tool that benefits the West.

The emerging "Beijing Consensus" model provides not only an alternative approach to development, that will be discusses shortly, but also an alternative narrative that countries that followed the Washington Consensus have failed, while the countries that ignored it – or even directly opposed it – have succeeded in achieving its basic development objectives. Hence China and India, as the most notable examples, developed because they followed an alternative development model to the one advocated by the Western countries and the institutions they control, such as the World

Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This is precisely the reason why the Beijing Consensus possesses such strong soft power appeal that could be utilized by China.

The Beijing Consensus corresponds neatly with the increasing Anti-Western sentiment shared by the elites and the public in developing counties. They view it as a counter narrative to forced wholesale adoption of Western (neo)liberal economic ideals of total privatization and free trade regulated only by the market forces, that are widely considered to have caused widespread impoverishment of low and middle classes and contributed to corruption and enrichment of the elites in the developing countries. Rejection of political reforms and creation of strong and independent political institutions advocated by the West is another darling of the developing countries' autocratic elites, who very deftly manage to sell this narrative as being in the interest of the public through manipulation of the media (NPR, 2017).

Finally, authoritarian elites adore – and populist right-wing leaning masses increasingly buy into – the story that the Beijing Consensus allows nations to fit into the global system while preserving their 'way of life' and without compromising their 'independence', however fleeting and untenable both of these concepts really are in this globalized world. In other words, developing countries can, in the same way that China did, "choose the most useful aspects of the Western model and avail themselves of foreign investments and technology without themselves becoming 'Western'" (NPR, 2017).

According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus is based on three primary principles (Ramo, 2004: 11-12): 1) innovation and constant experimentation; 2) rejection of GDP growth as the sole development objective; 3) self-determination, i.e. no blanket rules; 4) nation-tailored approach to development.

1. Innovation and constant experimentation

This aspect of the Beijing Consensus focuses on the need for the government of the developing country to constantly adjust its plans and strategies and constantly innovate in order to respond to the changing circumstances in the global environment. In other words, it is the recognition that, as developing country, even China is not in position to dictate economic and political terms that best suit its development. Instead, the government needs to constantly innovate and change, adopting different approaches to identify the ones that are the most appropriate for different situations. Evidence of Chinese government's resolve for constant innovation is their heavy and continuous reliance on surveys and polling, designed to precisely gauge the effects of continuously changing policymaking (Turin, 2010).

2. Rejection of GDP growth as the sole development objective

Ramo formulated the second chief aspect of the Beijing Consensus as rejection of the Western development strategies and policies, which take GDP growth as the main, if not the sole, indicator of development achieved by a country (Ramo, 2004: 12). Incessant focusing on GDP growth in case of developing countries is wrong for two very important reasons: one is that by only measuring economic output we fail to account for so many very important aspects of progress achieved by a society, and the second is that, at this stage of development, focusing on GDP-related data heavily skews statistics in favour of developed western societies. The Beijing Consensus instead proposes giving increasing weight to statistics related to the quality of life. There's a broad consensus among social scientists that the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) provides the most accurate metrics of quality of life today. The HDI "provides an alternative to the view of development equated exclusively with economic growth and helps us understand that poverty is really 'the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely… lowness of incomes'" (Ogden, 2002: 367, cited in Turin, 2010).

By using HDI-related statistics to study development, focus can be placed on realization of development objectives that substantially raise overall quality of life of a population, instead on focusing on GDP-related indicators that often translate into increased prosperity for only a tiny fraction of people living in a country (Turin, 2010). Very often, countries that rank very low on GDP-derived global rankings, actually rank much higher than some developed western countries in HDI-related statistical indicators, such as literacy, life expectancy, prevalence of child poverty, health, etc. While western development policies rarely mention balanced and human development, China's development strategy focuses on the so-called 'five balances.' These are listed as follows: 1) balancing urban and rural development; 2) balancing development among regions; 3) balancing economic and social development; 4) balancing development between man and nature; and 5) balancing domestic development with opening wider to the outside world" (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2006: 5, cited in Turin, 2010).

3. Self-determination, i.e. no blanket rules and nation-tailored approach to development

The third fundamental aspect of the Beijing Consensus focuses on the need for developing countries to actively pursue their own development path, free of imposed values and considerations. This is an especially appealing aspect given the developing world's long experience with the Western insistence on implementation of blanket rules and values, many of which seem to be so ill-suited to the realities of the recipient countries. The overbearing and hegemonic Westerners are contrasted to the Chinese who epitomize the country that, even when developing with the assistance of Western capital and knowhow, pursued its own development priorities throughout (Turin, 2010).

In other words, while Western development aid is perceived as being infused with ideological considerations, China allows recipient countries to formulate their own formula for success, as long as it benefits Chinese economic interests. It is also true that such value- and conditionality-free formula allows for perpetuation of some more abhorrent practices among developing countries' governments. But, as cynics would probably point out, it is also true that insistence on incorporating anti-corruption or effective governance agendas into Western development policies has contributed very little to elimination of corruption or increasing government efficiency in at least half a century of Western development intervention in the third world.

The Belt and Road and 17+1 Initiatives as assistive instruments of Chinese global power

Since the beginning of the outward-looking policy orientation resulting from the economic opening and resulting growth of China that started in the1990s, government in Beijing has applied gradually more ambitious political and economic instruments to further its interests abroad. It has developed an elaborate and sophisticated diplomatic network, which is now surpassed in size and reach only by the United States. It has also employed a range of activities in the economic sphere, designed to increase Chinese influence abroad while emphasizing complementary economic interests. This new Chinese assertiveness has attracted the attention of the world's premium superpower, the United States, fairly late. Washington policy makers for much of the 20th century focused on their archenemy Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991, lulling Americans into a false sense of complete supremacy in world affairs. China quickly started to fill the void left by the USSR, making the maximum of the economic investment that the West made in the country following the opening of its economy under the visionary leadership of Deng Xiaoping.

In the 2000s official Washington has already refocused its attention on the rising threat to its traditional supremacy from the newly confident China. In 2008, the famous report prepared by the Congressional Research Service actually *compared* the global influence of China and the United States, by examining their diplomatic services, foreign aid, trade and investment in the developing world. The report found that China

> "has captured the attention of many developing countries due to its pragmatic approach to diplomacy, the ways in which the government links diplomacy, commerce, and foreign aid, and the dramatic expansion of its global economic influence. Since the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of China's economic take-off in the mid-1990s, Beijing's "win-win" diplomatic style has featured greater accommodation and an emphasis on short-term, common economic interests. In the past several years, China's proliferating trade, investment, and foreign aid accords with other countries, made possible by its own rapid development, have stressed mutual benefits. Through these agreements, China has gained markets for its goods, access to raw materials, and international esteem while providing other countries with foreign investment and aid projects without imposing conditions such as political and economic performance criteria. China's style of diplomacy and its foreign policy principle of "non-interference" have been characterized as sensitive to local conditions rather than imposing standards. Many countries appear to appreciate this style." (CRS, 2008: 1)

In a very important finding, the CRS report also makes a very important claim that many developing countries are so eager to attract Chinese foreign assistance precisely due to the fact the Chinese government does not link its assistance with changes in legislation or policies in the recipient countries, which is often the case with Western donor assistance (CRS, 2008: 1). In other words, Chinese intervention, investment and aid to developing countries is based on the underlying premise of finding common economic interests and not on furthering an agenda, either political or economic. As emphasized above, the so-called "Beijing Consensus" that crystalized through the economic and political foreign policies pursued by China developed into an attractive narrative providing an alternative to the already existing investment and donor policies pursued by the West.

In the decade that followed the publication of the CRS report, China's foreign policy has matured to the level where it started to develop its own cohesive, comprehensive, multilateral and cross-sectoral initiatives. True to the overriding orientation of the Chinese foreign policy, cooperation in the economic sector remains the cornerstone and principal goal of these initiatives, as asserted repeatedly by successive governments in Beijing. The current President, Xi Jinping, formulated an increasingly assertive foreign policy orientation for China that has revolutionized the way the world perceives it – from a large but developing economy, to a country that aims to play the role of one of world's preeminent powers. There are two principal initiatives currently pursued by the government in Beijing, both envisaged in the period since the coming to power of President Jinping in 2012: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and The Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), originally known under the acronym "16+1 initiative", now referred to as the "17+1" due to Greece joining in 2019.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is in many ways the principal initiative of President Jinping, who promoted the idea of establishing a cooperation between countries and regions across the Eurasian region to promote the so-called New Silk Road. Mr. Jinping promoted the initiative from the very beginning of his ascendancy to power. The name 'One Belt, One Road' was officially adopted in May 2014 at a conference that the Chinese government convened in Shanghai. The conference drafted the official document outlining the objectives of the new initiative named "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road". The document was published in March 2015.

According to the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, the main objective of the Belt and Road Initiative is to promote and facilitate economic cooperation and infrastructural connection along the route broadly conforming to the ancient Silk Road. The route itself is made up of two components: the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The land-based route will connect China with Europe through several transport corridors laid through Russia and former Soviet Central Asian republics (the "Five Stans"). The maritime route will link China and Europe through major ports situated not only in mainland China, but also in the Indian Ocean, such as the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. Gwadar forms the maritime end of the huge infrastructure project known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which connects the port with inner China through a network of roads, railways and

The Belt and Road Initiative so far includes 138 countries in several regions – Asia, Europe, Middle East, Africa. The number of countries joining the BRI by singing the memorandum of understanding with China is continuously rising. However, the Initiative is based on the following pillars: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, free trade, financial integration and connecting people.

The overall objective of the BRI is to improve international transport and communication infrastructure, that will in turn serve to improve cooperation in key economic areas, including trade, investment, finances and tourism. All of these components are accompanied by the emphasis on improving cultural cooperation between member states, intended to lead to enhanced understanding and developing mutual bonds between the participating states. Such lofty goals make the Belt and Road Initiative a truly global endeavour in scope and scale.[2]

The Cooperation Between China and Central & Eastern European Countries (CEEC), typically referred to as the 17+1 (earlier 16+1) initiative is a grouping of China and seventeen European states. Officially it is older than the Belt and Road Initiative which it was designed to support, with the CEEC officially established in 2012 in Budapest. The stated goal of the CEEC is to develop cooperation between the 17 Central and Eastern European countries and China. The 17+1 countries meet annually. The first summit was held in Warsaw in 2012 and the last one in Dubrovnik in 2019. The CEEC secretariat is located in Beijing. Member states include both EU and non-EU states. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are members from the EU bloc, while non-EU members

[2] https://wiiw.ac.at/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-opportunity-or-threat--n-338.html



Figure 1: Map of the Belt and Road Initiative
Source: https://www.asiagreen.com/en/news-insights/the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-rising-importance-of-china-s-western-cities

states are those belonging to the Western Balkans area, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. The 17+1 is seen by many, including the more powerful EU states, as China's sophisticated instrument of gaining a foothold in the bloc by way of gaining first economic and then possibly political influence in the less-developed EU states in Eastern Europe (Ciurtin, 2019).



Figure 2: Map of member countries of the 17+1 Initiative
Source: https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/08/23/chinas-moves-europe-belt-road-initiative-migrates-west/

Brief overview of Chinese involvement in the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Due to a combination of factors, including poor governance, underinvestment and decades of neglect, the Balkans region has been suffering from the dire state of basic physical infrastructure. Huge investment is needed to alleviate the existing problems, as evidenced by relevant EU and World Bank studies and the resulting development strategies. Both the EU and the World Bank followed up on these documents with significant financial instruments. As a result, most Balkan countries since the nineties commenced large scale infrastructure projects in the areas such as road and rail transport, water supply and treatment, power generation and distribution, health and education.

Many Balkan countries at the time of collapse of communist regimes lacked even a single kilometre of modern highways, for instance, and a single high-speed railway line has yet to be built here. Rates of households connected to sewage network and amount of treated sewage are well below the EU average rates, in some cases closer to African than European Union standards.

Naturally, such dire state of infrastructure presents a valuable opportunity for investment by financial organizations and engagement of construction enterprises in the region. While the Western development agencies and institutions have been put off the large share of infrastructure projects due to considerations inherent in the Western development agenda, such as good governance, environmental impact, solid indicators proving economic viability and so on, the Chinese government does not feel obliged by such considerations with respect to their investments in the region.

The 8th Summit of the 16+1 Initiative, held in Dubrovnik on 11-12 April 2019, showed to the world just how determined China is to make its foreign policy bear fruits, and how important the Western Balkans are for the success of this initiative. Leaders of the countries involved, meeting in Croatia, an EU country, discussed several venues for cooperation under the overall topic of "Building new bridges through openness, innovation and partnership". The summit adopted the Dubrovnik Guidelines for Cooperation, which included strong commitment to maintaining a multilateral approach to development and future cooperation within the 16+1 Initiative. A total of 39 agreements were also signed in the areas covering transport and energy infrastructure, finances and culture. Greece also joined the Initiative, transforming it into "17+1" Initiative as it will be known from this point onward, emphasizing the inclusiveness and flexibility of the Chinese-led efforts in the eastern and south-eastern region of Europe (16+1 Summit, 2019).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, China was late to recognize the potential for new infrastructure investment, with most of its attention in the region focused on Serbia. However, in the past few years Chinese investment and economic cooperation intensified considerably. Total trade between the two countries stood at a modest US$ 187 million in 2018, but this marks a 37% increase over the previous year. Last year, the two countries also signed important agreements on agricultural exchange and animal and health safety, creating the necessary preconditions for potential export of milk and honey products to China.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a beneficiary of Chinese investment in the infrastructure sector, with the 300MW Stanari coal-fired power plant entering commercial operation in 2016. Of the total cost of construction of EUR 500 million, China provided a EUR 350 million loan through the China Development Bank. Agreement on construction of the 450MW Block 7 as replacement for Blocks 3, 4, and 5 of the existing Tuzla thermal power plant is also proceeding on the basis of a loan from the Chinese Exim Bank, covering approximately EUR 614 million out of the total cost of the project of approximately EUR 750 million. Chinese companies are also competing for construction of several lots on highways under construction in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Chinese company Huawei has in the past two years installed 4G equipment in telecom operators in this country. In 2019, the company China Sinopharm International Cooperation started construction of an entirely new hospital in Doboj, funded by the EUR 44 million loan provided by China.

EU reaction

"Director of the Energy Community Secretariat, Janez Kopač, warned authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina not to allow the realization of the project of construction of the new block in Tuzla power plant under the conditions imposed by China" (Glas Slavonije, 2019). Such a stark warning, in contrast with the usually mellow language used by EU bureaucrats, points to Brussels' serious concerns in relation to new Chinese assertiveness in the Western Balkans region. EU reactions to similar projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro (highway Bar-Boljare) and Serbia (Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway) are probably amplified by the subordinate role that the Western Balkans countries play in relation to the European Union. Such strong criticism would be impossible with EU member countries, despite the fact that some of them cultivate far deeper and more engaging ties with China, as evident in the case of Hungary, for example.

The essence of the EU complaint against Chinese involvement in the planned construction of Block 7 of Tuzla Power Plant boils down to the Federation of BiH guaranteeing 100% of the loan extended by the Chinese Exim Bank to finance the deal worth approximately 614 million euros. According to the applicable EU legislation, state guarantees could amount to maximum 80% of such loans. According to the Prime Minister of the Federation, Fadil Novalić, and the public electricity utility Elektroprivreda BiH, investment in Block 7 is of strategic interest for the Federation of BiH and is necessary for ensuring long-term stability of power supply in the country. Such strategic concerns clearly outrank in importance the issue of the remaining 20% state guarantee for the Exim loan (Tuzlanski informativni portal, 2019).

Also speaking in March 2019, the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, sounded strong concerns regarding the level of involvement of China in the Western Balkans region. “Maybe we have overestimated Russia and underestimated China, and we should give both their right place,” Mr Hahn said (Financial Times, 2019). Mr. Hahn also stated that he was concerned that some countries were borrowing heavily from China to pay for infrastructure and raising the risk of long-term damage to their fragile economies. Mr Hahn said the EU would instead be a “fairer” partner. “China never cares how and if a country is able to pay its loans. And if they cannot pay, there is some pressure that things are transferred into their ownership,” he said (Financial Times, 2019).

The EU had previously levelled similar heavy-handed criticism at the authorities in Montenegro, for accepting loan arrangements for construction of a vital highway that “sent the country’s debt to 80 per cent of gross domestic product, even as it raised taxes and imposed a partial salary freeze on public servants" (Financial Times, 2019). The Public Private Partnership (PPP) model that was used to construct the first section of the future Bar-Boljare highway will likely result in the government in Podgorica paying a massive premium to Chinese investors to meet the forecasted levels of traffic and income for them. Critics from the EU and international institutions, such as the IMF, have cautioned the government that it would have been better if Montenegro waited until it joined the European Union, when the new structural funds will become available to build this highway (Reuters, 2018). Most domestic observers regard this as a rather cynical message, since the EU has long ago given up on its commitment to admit the remaining Western Balkan states, for which the waiting period will now likely run into decades. Their domestic development agenda simply cannot wait that long, and in any case, as local politicians are adept at pointing out, the value of such projects is strategic and related to long-term development, so it cannot be calculated using simple short-term econometrics (Reuters, 2018).

Conclusion: Is China a desirable donor?

A recent major study by the AidData think tank compared several types of Chinese aid and investment flows with similar flows coming from the more established 'traditional' donors. The study report did not back up the presumption that Chinese donor assistance is in any way inferior to that originating from the United States, OECD and the World Bank on with respect to economic growth. Nor did the study produce any conclusions that Chinese aid weakens the economic growth effects resulting from the aid provided by traditional donors. The study actually documented that for every new Chinese-financed project, the economic growth of the recipient country increases by 0.7 percentage points. Such findings stand in accordance with research studying the impact of aid from the United States and other leading Western donors and OECD members (AidData, 2017: 10).

Report by the National Public Radio quotes a report produced by the Brooking Institute, which analysed Chinese overseas spending between 2012 and 2014. The report showed that China has shown remarkable willingness to respond to the expressed needs of countries that request aid to fund things like infrastructure or education, but also that it does not translate into Beijing willingly propping up undemocratic regimes. Rather, it could be said that Chinese investment is not tied to considerations that typically top the list of Western donors' concerns, such as the recipient countries' governance and respect for human rights. The report therefore concludes that China's decisions are based substantially on which countries want the money and not necessarily where China wants to invest, and that China is helping to meet recipient countries' often urgent need for infrastructure projects, such as road and railway construction, by providing loans and aid based on criteria that are rather soft in comparison to those imposed by the Western donors (NPR, 2017). The NPR report emphasizes strongly that the evidence collected by studies, such as those by Brooking and AidData, "punctures the myth that China is a rogue donor" (NPR, 2017).

On the other side, many analysts in the West increasingly question the very nature of the overall Chinese investment strategy, not even from the viewpoint of Beijing's motives, but its lack of coherent and well thought-out strategy. The lack of clarity surrounding the BRI projects and numerous instances of abuse of the concept have even led some observers to conclude that year 2020 has already witnessed the peak of the Belt and Road Initiative (Forbes, 2020). However, comparable weakening of the attractiveness of the BRI logo is arguably offset by the strong Chinese aid diplomacy related to the coronavirus pandemic (Rudolf, 2021)

In the Western Balkans, the enthusiasm surrounding Chinese overtures towards the region continues unabated. This is very much due to the fact that the Western Balkan countries continue to suffer from underdeveloped infrastructure and poor state of the existing roads, railways, ports and power grids. Poor state of their finances means that most of them currently spend approximately 1% of their annual GDP on infrastructure development, while in order to bring the infrastructure closer to the EU standard such spending should be 8-12 times higher (Biznisinfo, 2018). Most of the funding comes from loans and grants provided by European financial institutions, but for the reasons mentioned earlier, the levels of new borrowing cannot be increased sufficiently to reach the desired levels of new investments in infrastructure. Reconstruction and development of infrastructure in the region is supported by the EU through the rather limited Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). The whole of Western Balkans is earmarked to receive a total of EUR 1 billion in the period 2015-2020 from IPA II funds, which is a rather paltry sum compared to the overall infrastructure investment needs in the region.

This is precisely the situation where Chinese creditors step in, not playing by the Western rules, such as ensuring the financial viability of the new projects. Instead, the deals they strike with governments in the region guarantee returns on their investments through government underwriting of the debt and the promised profit rates. While in the long term such binding agreements threaten to push countries in the region into debt slavery, at the moment they are proving to be wildly popular, not only with the decision-makers but also with the general public. Tired of waiting for the promised EU assistance, which in the eyes of the public never materializes, people in the region have often arrived at the conclusion that Chinese loans are sometimes the only money available for construction of, e.g., a new power plant guaranteeing long-term stability of electricity supply in the country.

Chinese investment in the region got off to a late start, compared to EU funding. However, China is accelerating its investment quickly, while the EU funding for infrastructure project remains relatively flat. The total value of Chinese infrastructure projects in the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe so far is about EUR 12.2 billion, of which more than two thirds have been initiated since 2013 (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2018: 3). Projects in Serbia, Hungary and Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Budapest-Belgrade railway, Kostolac and Tuzla thermal power plants and the Corridor 11 highway account for a lion's share of the total Chinese investment in the region (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2018: 3).

Such increased levels of investment in the past few years naturally rung a number of alarm bells across the European Union. EU is concerned about multiple accusations of China's corrupt practices in dealing with local governments, as it is not bound by legislative checks ensuring the transparency and accountability of its investment. Environmental concerns are next, driven similarly by the Chinese lack of concern and regulatory rules for environmental protection tied to their investment. The already noted concerns regarding economic viability and debt sustainability are also important, as are the related fears of China acquiring undesirable levels of political influence in the region in this manner.

However, relevant reports on the effects of Chinese involvement in the region all conclude that the Chinese investment will produce both short- and long-term positive economic effects in the Western Balkans, even if many Western-produced reports continue to question Beijing's true motives (Zweers at al., 2020). The highest medium-term projected effects of Chinese infrastructure projects, considered alone, are estimated at more than 10% of GDP for Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, at around 7% of GDP for Serbia and 2% of GDP for Macedonia (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2018: 7). These are only the effects resulting from direct economic impact of the Chinese investment in infrastructure projects. Other, indirect effects such as the resulting increase in trade flows, impact of Chinese tourism (which is yet to take off but possesses incredible potential) could very well completely change the projected economic perspective of the entire Western Balkans region.

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Strateški ciljevi američke politike na Bliskom istoku za vrijeme Trumpovog mandata

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Sažetak: Tretman aktuelnog američkog predsjednika Donalda Trumpa prema Bliskom istoku odraz je njegovog ličnog odnosa prema toj regiji. Uprkos prividu formaliziranih strateških ciljeva, Trump je američku politiku prema Bliskom istoku, svojim odnosom prema tamošnjim problemima i onim koji se tiču položaja SAD-a u regiji, sveo na *ad hoc* reakcije. Trumpovi strateški ciljevi vanjske politike odnose se na tri ključna momenta, a to su: pobjeda u rivalstvu s Kinom, zastrašivanje i disolucija „neprijateljskog Irana" te obuzdavanje Rusije. Sva tri cilja su međusobno povezana i uslovljena, a to se vidi kroz strategiju koju Trump primjenjuje – ostvariti jedan od tri cilja da bi se lakše ostvarila druga dva.

Ključne riječi: Bliski istok, vanjska politika, SAD, strategija, nacionalna bezbjednost, terorizam

Summary: The treatment of the current American president, Donald Trump, towards the Middle East is a reflection of his personal attitude towards that region. Despite the semblance of formalized strategic goals, Trump has reduced U.S. policy toward the Middle East to ad hoc reactions. Trump's strategic foreign policy goals relate to three key points, namely: victory in the rivalry with China, intimidation and dissolution of „enemy Iran" and restraint of Russia. All three goals are interconnected and conditioned, and this is seen through the strategy that Trump is implementing; achieve one of the three goals to make it easier to achieve the other two.

Key words: Middle East, foreign policy, USA, strategy, national security, terrorism

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Uvod

Baš kao što je i obećao u svojoj izbornoj kampanji tokom 2016. godine, Donald Trump je primijenio potpuno drugačiji pristup prema Bliskom istoku u odnosu na Obaminu administraciju, koja se koristila kombinovanim pristupom – uključivanjem u postizanje rješenja i nametanje rješenja sankcijama, recimo, Iranu s ciljem smanjenja mogućnosti da on razvije nuklearno naoružanje (Nurazzaman, 2015). Od preuzimanja dužnosti do danas nije pokazao interes za promociju demokratskih vrijednosti i implementaciju reformi u odnosu s ovom regijom, što je demonstrirao uvođenjem zabrane putovanja iz određenih zemalja, tzv. travel ban, koja se prema najnovijoj proklamaciji odnosi na osam zemalja, od kojih je šest s dominantno muslimanskim stanovništvom, zbog čega se u retorici koristi i termin *muslim ban* (National Immigration Law Center, 8. mart 2019). Za razliku od svog prethodnika Baracka Obame, Trump je politiku na Bliskom istoku usmjerio ka jačanju odnosa sa Saudijskom Arabijom i Izraelom, napustio izbalansiranu poziciju prema rješavanju izraelsko-palestinskog pitanja i pozvao države Bliskog istoka na rješavanje problema u regiji putem regionalne saradnje, s ciljem povlačenja američkih trupa iz bliskoistočnih zemalja (Garcia, 2018).

Kontekst bliskoistočne politike definiran je tokovima Arapskog proljeća koji su obilježili prethodnu deceniju. Autokratije i diktature koje su postojale u brojnim zemljama širom regije (Egiptu, Siriji, Libiji, Jemenu) svrgnuti su poreci, ali nije uspostavljen novi funkcionalni poredak, te nedostatak novog uređenja stvara vakuum koji mnogi lokalni i regionalni akteri teže popuniti. To neizbježno stvara sukobe koje je vrlo teško riješiti. Jedan od rezultata je povećanje sektaštva. Unutar nekih od ovih zemalja raspisan je, uslovno rečeno, konkurs za popunjavanje vakuuma, uglavnom po linijama sunita i šiita. To stvara razdvojenost i konflikt unutar država, ali i destabilizira regiju jer se Saudijska Arabija i Iran takmiče za regionalno vodstvo (o čemu će više riječi biti kasnije). Trumpova administracija je 2017. godine donijela Strategiju nacionalne sigurnosti u okviru koje se definira i pozicija na Bliskom istoku (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Za ovo područje Strategija navodi da nije sigurno utočište i da je *mjesto za uzgoj terorista*, te da zbog toga SAD ne želi dopustiti nijednoj vlasti koja je neprijateljski nastrojena prema SAD-u da dominira regijom (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Strategija ističe da ni *pokušaji demokratske transformacije ni pokušaji isključenja iz regije* nisu mehanizmi koji idu u prilog američkim interesima (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Strategija se poziva na revitalizaciju odnosa s državama regije koje su orijentirane ka reformama u cilju saradnje SAD-a i partnera, ali i država regije međusobno u nadi da će to rezultirati balansom moći (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Iako Strategija tretira utjecaj Bliskog istoka na američku sigurnost, ne daje jasno definirane strateške ciljeve američke politike. Interesantno je da su ciljevi američke politike u ovom dijelu svijeta formulirani u retorici Trumpa i njegove administracije i često završavaju u kontradiktornosti, kao naprimjer kada američki državni sekretar govori o potrebi suočavanja, zastrašivanja i poraza Irana, pa kao cilj navodi poraz ISIL-a i donošenje mirovnog programa za Bliski istok, dok američki predsjednik ističe kako je angažman na Bliskom istoku beskoristan jer je koštao SAD više triliona dolara, a ništa nije dobiveno zauzvrat (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD, 2017: 48-50). Kada se uporedo sagledaju retorika i djelovanje Trumpa i njegove administracije, može se zaključiti da su američki ciljevi na Bliskom istoku sljedeći:

– Minimiziranje utjecaja i snage Irana u regiji radi osiguravanja boljih energetskih uslova u interesu SAD-a i u cilju poraza ISIL-a
– Održavanje i unapređenje odnosa s tradicionalnim saveznicima, poput Saudijske Arabije, Turske i Izraela (države koje su u historiji prihvatile da regionalna sigurnost bude pod pokroviteljstvom SAD-a)
– Pronalaženje dugoročnog rješenja za krizu u Siriji i povlačenje američkih trupa
– Povlačenje iz medijacije izraelsko-palestinskog sukoba i prepuštanje rješenja lokalnim akterima

Iran kao primarni fokus Trumpove administracije

Trumpovi strateški ciljevi vanjske politike odnose se na tri ključna momenta, a to su: pobjeda u rivalstvu s Kinom, zastrašivanje i disolucija *neprijateljskog Irana* te obuzdavanje Rusije (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Ova tri momenta ističem jer mislim da su ovo međusobno povezani i uslovljeni ciljevi. Naime, sudeći po djelovanju Trumpa, njegova strategija je: ostvarivanjem jednog od ciljeva olakšati ili doprinijeti ostvarivanju druga dva. Kontekst odnosa na Bliskom istoku odražava se ekonomski na druge dijelove svijeta. Recimo, Trump je bio zadovoljan mogućnošću da Evropska unija više ne može računati na moguće isporuke iranskog plina i da će morati pristati na kupnju skupljeg plina iz Amerike (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Osim toga, Izrael planira da do 2025. godine isporuči trideset milijardi kubnih metara prirodnog gasa u EU – a ovaj projekt je prirodni konkurent Turskom toku (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Ovo je važna tačka za EU jer gotovo nijedan evropski lider ne želi vidjeti Tursku kao veliko plinsko čvorište. Nakon sastanka s američkim sekretarom Michaelom Pompeom održanog u maju 2019. godine, ruski predsjednik Vladimir Putin sugerirao je da se Iran ne bi trebao oslanjati na Rusiju u konfrontaciji sa SAD-om u vezi s nuklearnim sporazumima (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Samo dvije sedmice kasnije Bloomberg je izvijestio da je Rusija odbila obezbijediti Iranu raketni sistem S-400 iako je ovaj zahtjev navodno došao od samog vrha iranskog političkog liderstva. Zaista, budući da je ovaj sistem oružja postao sve više političko pitanje, ima smisla što su Rusi pažljivi u ovom pitanju, posebno ako postoji šansa za poboljšanje odnosa sa SAD-om i protivljenje od drugih važnih regionalnih igrača, uključujući Tursku, Saudijsku Arabiju i Izrael.

Najavljeno povlačenje američkih trupa iz Sirije važan je element američke antiiranske strategije. Prema logici Washingtona, nije Amerika, već su regionalni igrači (Izrael i Saudijska Arabija) oni koji moraju Iran izbaciti iz Sirije (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). U isto vrijeme Tel Aviv i Rijad spremni su izvršiti ovu misiju – i to ne zbog Washingtona, već iz vlastitih razloga. Izrael treba da „izbaci" Hezbollah i osigura svoje granice od proiranskih frakcija. Nada se i da će spriječiti stvaranje teritorijalnog koridora od Irana do Libana – takozvani šiitski polumjesec[2]. Saudijska Arabija ima istu težnju. Osim političkih i ideoloških razloga za zaustavljanje šiita, Saudijska

[2] Najznačajniji sukob koji danas oblikuje region, određuje politike i destabilizujuće se uvlači u sve pore života je: suniti vs. šiiti. Iran i Saudijska Arabija postali su personifikacija novih blistokistočnih trendova, podjela i okupljanja. U konflikt se uvlače globalni i regionalni igrači sa svojim suprotstavljenim interesima: SAD, Rusija, Turska i Izrael. Promjena vlasti u Bagdadu i povlađivanje šiitskom revanšizmu prema dotle vladajućim sunitima Sadama Huseina širom su otvorili vrata Iranu da krene u realizaciju projekta „šiitskog polumjeseca", koji od Teherana preko Bagdada vodi do Damaska i Bejruta, a za cilj ima uspostavljanje šiitske vlasti u zemljama regiona. Sunitsko-šiitski konflikt direktno je odredio i politike velikih sila. Suniti su Amerikance u vrijeme Baracka Obame krivili za sopstvenu marginalizaciju u Iraku, a onda su se kritikama pridružili i Saudijci zbog sporazuma s Iranom. S dolaskom Donalda Trumpa Washington je još jednom promijenio politiku, pokušavajući da se od optužbi da su pomogli stvaranju ISIL-a odbrane stajući na stranu konzervativnih zalivskih sunita i zauzimajući kurs tvrde konfrontacije prema Teheranu.

Arabija ima i ekonomski interes – Siriju ne treba oživljavati unutar granica 2011. i ona ne bi trebala postati tranzitna zemlja za iransku naftu i gas (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Nakon što je najavio izlazak iz Sirije, Trump je počeo jačati stara uporišta protiv Irana i stvarati nova. Naprimjer, državni sekretar Michael Pompeo posjetio je Katar i dogovorio povećanje broja vojnika u tamošnjoj američkoj vojnoj bazi, na osnovu čega Washington planira poslati pet hiljada vojnika u Irak.

Trump je nedavno izjavio da će američke trupe napustiti Afganistan samo ako nema preostalih militanata ISIL-a i ako Kabul i talibani postignu mirovni sporazum (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Trump će vjerojatno zahtijevati da talibani ponište svoj dogovor s Iranom po kojem im Teheran pomaže oružjem i municijom, a talibani ISIL drže dalje od iranske granice, i na kraju će se Amerikanci pozivom talibana boriti protiv ISIL-a i vršiti pritisak na njegove militante ne od iranske granice, već prema njoj. Ovaj scenarij bi značio da bi se povećao rizik od terorističkih napada unutar zemlje, slično napadu u septembru 2018. godine na Ahvazu. Iračka vlada govori o mogućnosti kršenja sigurnosnog sporazuma sa SAD-om i prijeti da će poslati cijelo strano vojno osoblje sa svoje teritorije. Ovo je bio odgovor Iračana na Trumpovu javnu izjavu da je jedan od ciljeva održavanja američke vojne prisutnosti u Iraku upravo voditi računa o Iranu (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Rusija i Iran zainteresovani su za protjerivanje Amerikanaca iz Iraka i svi su spremni dati svoje ponude. Tokom nedavnog sastanka ministara vanjskih poslova Rusije i Iraka Sergej Lavrov naglasio je da Moskva očekuje da SAD striktno poštuje svoj mandat u Iraku (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Da Amerikanci imaju drugačije viđenje govori primjer da SAD planira izgraditi još dvije vojne baze na teritoriji Iraka – oko stotinu kilometara udaljene od granice sa Sirijom (Katulis i Benaim, 2018). Nije slučajno što je sirijska opozicija zatražila od Masuda Barzanija, bivšeg predsjednika iračkog Kurdistana, pomoć u rješavanju sirijske krize. Nedavno je premijer Iračkog Kurdistana Nechirvan Barzani rekao da američke trupe moraju ostati na teritoriji Iračkog Kurdistana. Njegovi su motivi jasni – on trenutno ima obostrano korisnu saradnju s Trumpom. To ne uključuje samo pritisak na Bagdad. Američki predsjednik želi iskoristiti Barzanijev stav o pitanju PKK-a kako bi obnovio odnose između Washingtona i Ankare. Trumpu je potrebna Turska kao dio njegove strategije za suočavanje s Iranom i Barzani, igrajući ulogu posrednika, može značajno povećati političku težinu svog klana.

Jedan od značajnih poteza Trumpove administracije u procesu prekidanja odnosa s Iranom bilo je povlačenje SAD-a iz ugovora kojim se regulira iranski program za nuklearno naoružanje (*Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action* – JCPOA[3]) (Nasr, 2018). Iran je demontirao veći dio svog nuklearnog programa i međunarodnim supervizorima dao široki pristup svojim objektima u zamjenu za oslobođanje od ekonomskih sankcija. Predsjednik D. J. Trump povukao je SAD iz sporazuma u maju 2018. godine rekavši da *sporazum nije adekvatno adresirao program iranskog nuklearnog naoružanja i balističkih raketa i njegovu ulogu u regionalnim ratovima* (Nasr, 2018: 121). SAD je ponovo nametnuo sankcije i prešao na ukidanje iranskog izvoza nafte. Iran je reagirao obnavljanjem svojih nuklearnih aktivnosti, ostavljajući sporazum bez podrške. Trump i drugi konzervativci često su kritikovali sporazum da nije učinio ništa na rješavanju drugih problematičnih aspekata iranske vanjske politike, uključujući njene težnje za regionalnom hegemonijom i podršku radikalnim skupinama poput Hezbollaha (Nasr, 2018: 106). U septembru 2019. godine dogodila su se dva napada na saudijska naftna postrojenja, a Rijad i Washington su se složili da je krivac Iran, dok su politički analitičari generalno pri stavu kako je ovakva politika Irana posljedica upravo Trumpovog napuštanja spomenutog Ugovora o programu za nuklearno naoružanje (Nasr, 2018).

Godinu dana nakon što se SAD povukao, Iran je ostao pri dogovoru i pokušao izolirati Washington od svojih partnera. Ovakav pristup naišao je na određenu podršku i uspjeh jer su ključne evropske vlade, zajedno s Rusijom i Kinom, stale na stranu Irana i radile na njegovom pridržavanju nuklearnog sporazuma (Nasr, 2018). U međuvremenu, protivnici dogovora tvrdili su da je njihova strategija vodila prema Iranu pod strogim sankcijama, koji se još uvijek pridržavao svojih nuklearnih obaveza iz 2015. godine (Nasr, 2018). To se promijenilo u aprilu 2019. godine, kada je Trumpova administracija najavila da više neće pružati olakšice zemljama koje kupuju naftu od Irana, u pokušaju da spusti iranski izvoz nafte na nulu (Nasr, 2018). Nakon smanjenja prihoda od nafte, iransko rukovodstvo odlučilo je demonstrirati SAD-u troškove nastavka maksimalnog pritiska i poslalo poruku Saudijskoj Arabiji i Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima da bi, ako

[3] JCPOA, koji je potpisan u julu 2015. godine, a stupio na snagu u januaru naredne godine, nameće ograničenja za iranski civilni program nuklearnog obogaćivanja. Kina, Francuska, Rusija, Velika Britanija i Sjedinjene Države, pet stalnih članica Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a, pregovarale su o sporazumu zajedno s Njemačkom; i bili su poznati kao P5 + 1. Tokom gotovo dvije godine pregovora Obamina administracija rekla je da je njegova namjera bila reducirati iranski nuklearni program.

Iran ne može prodati naftu, njihov izvoz nafte također mogao biti na udaru (Nasr, 2018). Mine su u maju oštetile naftne tankere u Ujedinjenim Arapskim Emiratima u luci Fudžera. U junu je japanski tanker pokušao minski napad u Omanskom zaljevu još dok je japanski premijer Šinzo Abe bio u Teheranu pokušavajući deeskalirati tenzije u SAD-u. Samo par dana kasnije Iran je oborio američki bespilotni avion, vodeći skoro do izravne vojne konfrontacije. A sada se čini da Iran provodi veliki napad na kritične dijelove saudijske naftne infrastrukture (Nasr, 2018).

Da je Iran jedna od ključnih briga Trumpove administracije vidi se u Strategiji nacionalne sigurnosti za 2017. godinu koja ga spominje 17 puta, a kao ključni prioritet u regiji navodi sprečavanje prevladavanja *bilo kakve neprijateljske moći prema Sjedinjenim Državama* – referirajući se na Teheran (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). U govoru održanom u maju 2018. godine državni sekretar Mike Pompeo najavio je da će administracija biti spremna obnoviti diplomatske i ekonomske veze u zamjenu za *potpunu denuklearizaciju; prestanak iranskog balističkog raketnog programa; puštanje svih zatvorenika koji imaju državljanstvo u SAD-u ili savezničkom narodu; prestanak napora za širenje iranskog utjecaja u regiji, posebno u Iraku, Siriji, Jemenu i Afganistanu; kraj cyber napada* (Singh, *Foreign Affairs*, 2018). Druge potpisnice JCPOA-e navele su da se namjeravaju pridržavati sporazuma i protiviti se režimu sankcija. Stručnjaci su sa skepticizmom reagovali na stvaranje Pompeove iranske akcione grupe u augustu 2018. godine, koju je administracija determinirala kao *elitni tim stručnjaka za vanjsku politiku* koji će nastojati provesti *kampanju maksimalnog diplomatskog pritiska i diplomatske izolacije* (Singh, *Foreign Affairs*, 2018). Uspostavljanje Akcione grupe za Iran (IAG) u augustu 2018. godine prikriva prešutno i zakašnjelo priznanje Trumpove administracije kako je potreban tradicionalni pristup američkoj diplomatiji da barem izgleda efikasno kao što je bila (Singh, *Foreign Affairs*, 2018). Odluka o uspostavljanju ove grupe također oslikava priznanje Bijele kuće da će ponovno uvođenje sankcija Iranu biti težak zadatak i kako se iranski režim uskoro vjerovatno neće vratiti za pregovarački sto (Singh, *Foreign Affairs*, 2018). Za razliku od sankcija iz vremena Obamine administracije, manjak međunarodnog konsenzusa traži intenzivne diplomatske napore da se uvjere države poput Indije, Kine i Iraka (među ostalima) da ne posluju s Iranom. Tako će IAG imati puno posla sa zahtjevima saveznika koji će tražiti da budu pošteđeni zabrane trgovanja s Iranom, kao i s odlukama o kažnjavanju drugih koji se ne povinuju.

Odnos SAD-a i zaljevskih zemalja u postizanju izraelsko-palestinskog rješenja

Jula 2019. godine Jason Greenblatt, tadašnji izaslanik američkog predsjednika Donalda Trumpa za izraelsko-palestinske pregovore, prisustvovao je rutinskom tromjesečnom sastanku Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a o Bliskom istoku (Mohseni i Nakhjavani, 2018). Dajući ažuriranje razmišljanja Trumpove administracije o mirovnom procesu, istakao je iznenađenu publiku da SAD više ne poštuje „fikciju“ međunarodnog konsenzusa o izraelsko-palestinskom pitanju (Mohseni i Nakhjavani, 2018). Greenblatt je otišao da napadne ne neku ekstremnu ili nejasnu mjeru, već Rezoluciju 242 Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a, temelj pola stoljeća arapsko-izraelskih pregovora, i svaki sporazum koji je Izrael postigao u njima, uključujući mirovne ugovore s Egiptom i Jordanom (Mohseni i Nakhjavani, 2018). Istakao je dvosmislenu formulaciju, koja je decenijama štitila Izrael od arapskih zahtjeva za potpunim povlačenjem s okupirane teritorije; *umorna retorika namijenjena sprečavanju napretka i zaobilaženju neposrednih pregovora* (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Greenblattova prezentacija bila je dio šire kampanje Trumpove administracije za raskid s prošlošću i stvaranje novog bliskoistočnog poretka. Da bi udovoljili predsjedniku, koji voli jednostavne, besplatne odgovore, stratezi administracije osmislili su da se SAD može i dalje povlačiti iz regije a da se zbog toga ne suočava sa štetnim posljedicama jer će Izrael i Saudijska Arabija pokupiti zaostatak. Washington će zadatak obuzdavanja Irana, glavnog izvora regionalne nestabilnosti kako ga u Washingtonu determiniraju, prebaciti na Izrael i Saudijsku Arabiju, dok Izrael pozdravlja suočavanje s Teheranom, kojeg smatra egzistencijalnom prijetnjom (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Ustvari, Izrael je jedna od rijetkih zemalja u regionu koja je zadovoljna predsjednikovom politikom. Čak i prema standardima prethodnih administracija, koje su sve deklarisale Izrael kao bliskog saveznika, Trump je krenuo u izuzetnu težinu da udovolji Netanyahuu, a to je uglavnom proizvod konzervativne političke kulture, gdje je nesporna podrška Izraelu stvar uvjerenja (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Osim što se povukao iz JCPOA-e, koji je Netanyahu naveo kao „historijsku grešku“, Trump je preselio američku ambasadu iz Tel Aviva u Jerusalem – potez koji Izraelci dugo traže – i obavijestio Palestince da će njihova diplomatska misija u Washingtonu biti zatvorena (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Kao ambasadora poslao je advokata Davida Friedmana, dugogodišnjeg prijatelja koji je bio glasni protivnik dvodržavnog rješenja sukoba u Izraelu i Palestini. Administracija ukida i sva sredstva Agencije Ujedinjenih nacija za pomoć palestinskim izbjeglicama, još jedan potez koji je hvalio Netanyahu, i želi drastično smanjiti broj Palestinaca kojima je dodijeljen status izbjeglica. (Time bi se u velikoj mjeri ukinulo pravo povratka većini Palestinaca, što je značajan ustupak Izraelu.) Administracija je smanjila više od 200 miliona dolara bilateralne pomoći Zapadnoj obali i Gazi, a unatoč ovom jednostranom pristupu Trump je obećao da će riješiti izraelsko-palestinski sukob (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Okupio je tim koji su vodili njegov zet, programer nekretnina Jared Kushner, i advokat o kojem je već bilo riječi Jason Greenblatt, dugogodišnji zaposlenik u Trumpovom korporativnom svijetu (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Iako Kushner i Greenblatt nisu objavili nikakve detalje za narednu inicijativu, ne vjeruje se u njen uspjeh jer su, prema izvještajima, ključni regionalni igrači poput Saudijske Arabije, Egipta i Jordana odbacili temeljne komponente plana (Cohen-Almagor, 2018). Nakon prebacivanja ambasade u Jerusalem, predsjednik Palestinske nacionalne uprave Mahmoud Abbas odbio je upoznati Kushnera i Greenblatta, a kamoli razgovarati o mogućnostima dogovora. Također, kako sam jednim dijelom već navela, Izrael ne pokazuje interes za prihvatanje bilo kakvog plana koji uključuje dvodržavni okvir i palestinsku prijestolnicu u Istočnom Jerusalemu.

Sirija kao mjesto sukoba interesa

Vijesti o smrti vođe takozvane Islamske države Abu Bakra al-Bagdadija tokom racije američkih snaga specijalnih operacija 27. oktobra 2019. godine utjecale su na politiku Trumpove administracije prema Siriji (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Sukobi su počeli 6. oktobra odlukom predsjednika Donalda Trumpa da povuče oko stotinu američkih vojnika s njihovih položaja kurdskih snaga na sjeveru Sirije (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Nekoliko dana kasnije naredio je povlačenje cjelokupnog prisustva SAD-a od hiljadu vojnika sa sjevera zemlje, a zatim je krajem oktobra djelimično promijenio tu odluku premještajući nekoliko stotina američkih trupa nazad na sjeveroistok Sirije. Ono što je interesantno jest da u Trumpovom povlačenju iz Sirije vidimo veliki vanjskopolitički izbor koji se očigledno preklapa sa svjetonazorom američke administracije – a neki su to i prepoznali. William Ruger, istraživač s Instituta Cato i potpredsjednik iz Fondacije Charles Koch, ponudio je oduševljene pohvale za ovaj potez; Trump *s pravom povlači naše trupe sa sirijsko-turske granice*, napisao je

(Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Michael Desch, direktor Međunarodnog sigurnosnog centra Notre Dame, rekao je da cijeni Trumpovo priznanje da je geopolitika *hladnokrvan posao* i odbacio je kritike povlačenja kao *naivne*, a Christopher Preble i Doug Bandow, obojica iz Instituta Cato, opisali su Trumpovu odluku kao *temeljno ispravnu* (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018).

U slučaju Bliskog istoka, posebno u slučaju Sirije, Trump i realisti govore da su troškovi američkog vodstva visoki i da je manje koristi od ostanka u Siriji u odnosu na koristi povlačenja (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Zagovornici suzdržavanja obično krive urođenu glupost vojnih intervencija kad god naiđu na probleme implementacije ili nepovoljne događaje, ali kada povlačenje vodi ka katastrofi, kao što je to slučaj u Siriji, pronalaze nešto drugo kao uzrok, sve osim samog povlačenja ili neuspjeha zagovornika povlačenja da se suprotstave pitanju *a šta nakon toga* (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Posljedice povlačenja iz Sirije nisu samo ekonomske, a to vidimo u činjenici da su mnoge pristalice takozvane Islamske države izbjegle pritvor. To bi moglo potencijalno dovesti do ponovnog porasta terorističkih napada u Evropi, pa čak i u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, rizikuju se novi pokolji kurdskih vojnika i civila, nova runda raseljavanja započela je u Siriji, koja je već izdržala najveću izbjegličku krizu od Drugog svjetskog rata jer je otprilike 176.000 ljudi, od kojih 70.000 djece, protjerano iz svojih domova od Trumpovog povlačenja, navode Ujedinjene nacije.

(Izvještaj UN-a, septembar 2019)

Iran je ojačan povlačenjem svog glavnog neprijatelja – SAD-a, iz Sirije i konsolidiranom moći svoga glavnog saveznika – Asadovog režima, te dovršetkom kopnenog mosta prema Libanu i Sredozemnom moru (što Izrael također dovodi u daljnji rizik) (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Rusija je stekla snagu i zamijenila je SAD kao velikog nositelja ravnoteže na Bliskom istoku. Režim sirijskog predsjednika Bašara al-Asada postajao je sve jači, čime je milione sirijskih civila izložio dodatnom riziku (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Nedovršena misija i napuštanje odanog saveznika demoralizirat će američku vojsku, trupe će biti izložene većem riziku sljedeći put kada se budu pokušale udružiti s lokalnim partnerima, nakon što se na ležeran način Trump odrekao Kurda (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). SAD će također izgubiti pristup ključnim obavještenjima o takozvanoj Islamskoj državi i drugim prijetnjama. Kako je rekao Brett McGurk, bivši specijalni izaslanik u koaliciji protiv „Islamske države“, operacija protiv Bagdadija *uspjela je* *samo zbog neophodnih obavještajnih podataka koje su pružili kurdski partneri i drugi lokalni akteri, a koje je omogućilo prisustvo američkih trupa* (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018).

Bez sumnje, ruski predsjednik Vladimir Putin, kineski predsjednik Xi Jinping i sjevernokorejski vođa Kim Jong-un primili su na znanje kako je spretno Erdogan izigrao Trumpa u kontekstu Kurda, a izdaja Kurda štetila je kredibilitetu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Realisti uglavnom odbacuju važnost ovog pojma, ali u stvarnom svijetu kreiranja politika saveznici i protivnici vjeruju u to i oni rutinski donose svoje vlastite odluke dijelom prema tome da li obećanja SAD-a smatraju vjerodostojnim ili ne (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Trump i realisti mogu vidjeti korist u tome što su natjerali Rusiju na još aktivniju ulogu u regiji: Putin je brzo rasporedio ruske snage u kurdsku zonu baš kad su se američke snage povukle. Neki bi povlačenje mogli vidjeti kao korist za Bašara al-Asada, s kojim su Kurdi bili prisiljeni sklopiti sporazum nakon što je SAD odustao, da bi na kraju vratili potpunu kontrolu režima nad Sirijom (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Turska je utjecajni akter u Siriji, a američka vojska koristi zračnu bazu Incirlik za zračne napade protiv takozvane Islamske države. Pored toga, administracija se borila da formulira koherentnu strategiju u vezi sa sirijskim građanskim ratom (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Početkom 2018. godine bivši državni sekretar Tillerson objavio je plan koji podrazumijeva neograničeno obavezivanje trupa u Siriji kako bi se suprotstavile Iranu i osigurale svrgavanje predsjednika Bašara al-Asada (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Potom je u aprilu 2018. godine Trump naredio vojsci da započne planiranje povlačenja trupa, kojih je otprilike 2.200, uglavnom u istočnoj Siriji, i pozvao regionalne saveznike, poput Saudijske Arabije, da preuzmu troškove obnove dijelova zemlje koji su oslobođeni od takozvane Islamske države (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Trump i savjetnik za nacionalnu sigurnost Bolton planirali su se osloniti na Rusiju, a ne na prisustvo američkih snaga, kako bi uvjerili Teheran da odstupi. Nedavno je James Jeffrey, novi predstavnik State Departmenta za angažman u Siriji, najavio još jedno ponovno pokretanje (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Prema bivšem diplomati, *američke trupe ostat će onoliko dugo koliko je potrebno* (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Trump i njegovi savjetnici odlučili su *pronaći načine za postizanje naših ciljeva* – koji će se još jednom usredotočiti na prikrivanje iranskog utjecaja i njegovanje stabilne vlade prihvatljive za Sirijce i međunarodnu zajednicu (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018).

Iako je Trump više puta kritikovao sirijsku politiku Baracka Obame prije nego što je preuzeo funkciju predsjednika, on se suočava s istim izazovom kao i njegov prethodnik, željom da utječe na tok sukoba i na poslijeratni poredak a da ne posvećuje veliki broj američkih trupa tom zadatku (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Kao i Obama, i on je prihvatio sličan pristup, koji uključuje fokusiranje na poraz takozvane Islamske države i pritiskanje drugih naroda da poduzmu akcije koje će služiti američkim interesima. U ovim je naporima imao malo uspjeha jer stalno prisustvo malog broja američkih trupa neće u osnovi promijeniti dinamiku, a kada je riječ o utvrđivanju prirode sirijskog postkonfliktnog političkog krajolika vjerovatno je da će Washington imati manji utjecaj od Rusije, Irana ili Turske (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Jedinice za narodnu mobilizaciju, milicije koje su odobrile države, igrale su presudnu ulogu u porazu snaga takozvane Islamske države, a uprava se boji da će mnoge od tih jedinica prići Teheranu. Američki zvaničnici smatraju Abu Mahdija al-Muhandisa, vodeću ličnost ovog pokreta, teroristom, barem zato što on navodno ima bliske veze s Kasemom Sulejmanijem, zapovjednikom elitnih snaga Kuds Iranske revolucionarne garde koja djeluje u inostranstvu (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Kakav je politički značaj ovih događaja govori činjenica da je Fatah, politički savez koji predstavlja milicije i jedna od najutjecajnijih političkih partija u Palestini, zauzeo drugo mjesto na parlamentarnim izborima u maju 2018. godine (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018). Izrael i SAD su složni u viđenju Fataha kao terorističke organizacije iako je ona zvanično najveća politička socijalistička stranka i organizacija palestinskih Arapa i najveća skupina unutar PLO-a (Miller i Sokolsky, 2018).

Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti – Prioritetno djelovanje na Bliskom istoku

SAD je u okviru Strategije nacionalne sigurnosti (*National Security Strategy* – NSS) iz 2017. godine naveo političke, ekonomske i vojne strateške ciljeve na Bliskom istoku (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Kao politički program navedeno je da SAD teži pomoći partnerima u ovom regionu da postignu stabilnost i prosperitet kroz integraciju i osnaživanjem Vijeća za saradnju zaljevskih zemalja (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Program ističe da će SAD raditi s partnerima na ukidanju svake šanse za razvoj nuklearnog naoružanja i neprijateljske ideologije iranskog režima i postizanju mirovnog sporazuma koji će biti prihvatljiv i za Izrael i za Palestinu. U ekonomskom smislu, posvećuje se pažnja pomoći jačanju egipatske i saudijske ekonomije u cilju modernizacije (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). U vojnom smislu prioritet je poraziti terorističke organizacije, u prvom smislu ISIL. Amerikanci su u Strategiji naveli kako su pripremljeni i zaštićeni od terorističkih napada u domovini, a da je to između ostalog rezultat strožijih postupaka sigurnosti na granici i provedbe zakona (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Nacionalnom strategijom za borbu protiv terorizma SAD želi postići sljedeće ciljeve:

- Ukloniti terorističku prijetnju SAD-u
- Osigurati granicu i luke
- Zaštititi američki način života od terorizma, radikalne islamističke ideologije i drugih nasilnih ekstremističkih ideologija i
- Motivirati strane partnere da se bave terorističkim prijetnjama tako da ove prijetnje ne ugrožavaju kolektivne interese SAD-a i njih samih.

Ova strategija razlikuje se od prethodnih strategija po tome što prihvaća agilniji i ekspanzivniji pristup koji se obraća čitavom spektru terorističkih prijetnji Sjedinjenim Državama, uključujući i neprijatelje u inostranstvu i ljude na koje pokušavaju utjecati i mobilizirati na nasilje u SAD-u (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Strategija adresira i prijetnju terorista u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama koji žele postići svoje političke ili društvene ciljeve nezakonitim nasilnim aktima bez stranih smjernica ili inspiracije (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Ono što je važno, ova Strategija navodi da će sva snaga SAD-a biti upotrijebljena kao i svi dostupni alati za borbu protiv terorizma u zemlji, inostranstvu i u *cyber* prostoru (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). To uključuje vojne i obavještajne službe, akcije provođenja zakona, diplomatski angažman i korištenje finansijskih alata. Jedna od strategija je i pojačana kontrola granica, već spomenuti *travel ban* i u informacijsko okruženje ugrađena su dva alata: *cyber* operacije i strateške komunikacije (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Ovi alati su sastavni dio protuterorističkih aktivnosti, a osim toga ova Strategija daje prioritet širokom rasponu nevojnih sposobnosti, poput sposobnosti da se spriječe i intervenira u terorističkim aktivnostima novačenja, minimiziranja privlačnosti terorističke propagande putem interneta i stvaranja društvene otpornosti na terorizam (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50).

To uključuje iskorištavanje vještina i resursa civilnog društva i netradicionalnih partnera kako bi se umanjili napori terorista da radikaliziraju i regrutuju ljude u SAD-u.

Radikalni islamistički teroristi ostaju glavna transnacionalna prijetnja SAD-u i vitalni su nacionalni interes – navodi se u Strategiji. Istaknute terorističke organizacije, posebno ISIL i Al-Kaida, *više su puta demonstrirale namjeru i sposobnost napada na interese SAD-a i nastavljaju s planiranjem novih napada*, navodi se u Strategiji (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Prema Strategiji, ove grupe iskorištavaju slabu upravu, sukobe, nestabilnost i dugotrajne političke i vjerske prevrate kako bi ostvarile svoj cilj – uklanjanje zapadnog utjecaja u većinski muslimanskim zemljama i preuređenje islamskog društva. Radikalne islamističke terorističke grupe razvile su i koristile se metodama koje su izazvale protuterorističke napore SAD-a, uključujući uspostavljanje državnih vladajućih institucija u njihovim sigurnim utočištima, postavljanje sofisticiranih eksplozivnih uređaja za poraz aviosigurnosnih mjera i korištenje visokokvalitetnih medijskih proizvoda za regrutiranje ekstremista na zapad. Strategija još navodi da radikalni islamistički teroristi imaju nasilnu ekstremističku ideologiju koja služi za stvaranje zajedničkog identiteta i smisla za one koji su osjetljivi na njenu suštinsku poruku, a koristi se i za indoktriniranje novih regruta koji su bez pitanja prihvatili ciljeve i direktive terorističkih grupa, što također omogućuje tim skupinama da održavaju koheziju, osiguraju usklađenost i opravdavaju upotrebu nasilja radi ispunjenja ciljeva ideologije (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). ISIL zadržava finansijska i materijalna sredstva i ekspertizu za pokretanje eksternih napada, uključujući i one protiv interesa SAD-a (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). U kontekstu Arapskog proljeća, ISIL je bio inovativan i iskoristio je slabosti u sigurnosti evropskih granica tokom migrantske krize, a u međuvremenu globalna mreža Al-Kaide ostaje otporna prijetnja na Bliskom istoku (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50).

U Strategiji se navodi da Iran ostaje najistaknutiji državni sponzor terorizma, podrška militantnim i terorističkim grupama širom Bliskog istoka i da njeguje mreže operativaca koji predstavljaju prijetnju širom svijeta (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Ove skupine, ponajviše libanski Hezbollah, koriste se terorizmom i drugim asimetričnim sredstvima u partnerstvu s Iranom kako bi proširile svoj utjecaj na Irak, Liban, palestinske teritorije, Siriju i Jemen da bi destabilizirale svoje rivale. Hezbollah obiluje snažnim vojnim i obavještajnim elementima, posjeduje velike zalihe sofisticiranog oružja i održava široku mrežu operativaca i simpatizera u inostranstvu, uključujući pojedince u domovini. Putem Islamske revolucionarne garde (IRGC-QF), iranske primarne grupe za podršku terorizmu, vlada Irana pruža finansijsku i materijalnu podršku, obuku i smjernice Hezbollahu i drugim šiitskim militantnim grupama koje djeluju u Bahreinu, Iraku, Siriji i Jemenu (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50). Također podržava Hamas i ostale palestinske terorističke grupe. Za borbu protiv onoga što je postalo složenija i geografski raspršena teroristička prijetnja Strategija navodi da će SAD dati prioritet integriranim akcijama i resursima ne samo na domaćem terenu već i u inostranstvu, što nas vraća na uvodni dio u kojem je Iran definiran kao jedan od strateških ciljeva američke politike na Bliskom istoku s ciljem potpunog poraza Irana (Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti SAD-a, 2017: 48-50).

Zaključak

Ako bi se sumirala politika Donalda Trumpa na Bliskom istoku, može se istaći nekoliko ključnih elemenata: Trump podupire uspon saudijsko-izraelsko-UAE osi, cilj američke politike je destabilizirati Iran, uspostaviti mehanizme regionalne saradnje kako bi se osiguralo da postizanje mira u regiji bude odgovornost zaljevskih zemalja i u konačnici povlačenje SAD-a iz obaveza koje su na sebe preuzele ranije administracije. Međutim, nema naznaka da je ovo proizvod pažljivog strateškog razmatranja i analize, već prije rezultat predsjednikove retorike. Usamljena javna prezentacija njegove vizije za regiju, Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti samo spominje nejasne ciljeve poput promocije stabilnosti i povoljne ravnoteže snaga, a kao što su primijetili analitičari ona ima malo veze s predsjednikovom vanjskom politikom. Umjesto toga, njegovo odlučivanje predstavlja spajanje mnogih uglavnom nezavisnih faktora. Washington ima dugogodišnje saveze sa Saudijskom Arabijom i Izraelom, a udvostručivanje na njima je lakše nego slijediti trag koji je Obama ostavio, što je podrazumijevalo komplikovani čin uravnoteženja traženja poboljšanih ali još uvijek napetih veza s Teheranom i prihvaćanja manje srdačnih odnosa sa Saudijcima i Izraelcima. Trump je u pobjedonosnom stilu posjetio Rijad i Jerusalem, a domaćinima je pružio priliku da iskoriste predsjednikovu poznatu podložnost lajkovima. Osim toga, korištenje saudijsko-izraelsko-UAE bloka poništava ključne aspekte naslijeđa njegovog prethodnika.

Trumpov stil vođenja također je odigrao ključnu ulogu u oblikovanju njegove politike na Bliskom istoku. Po prirodi on vlada reaktivno i instinktivno i zanemaruje pitanja koja su mu nezanimljiva. Njegova tendencija da daje prednost lojalnosti nad kompetencijom dovela je do izostavljanja relativno umjerenih i opunomoćenih savjetnika poput Boltona, koji je ojačao ratoborne instinkte predsjednika kada je riječ o Iranu, i usmjerio ga prema jačim stavovima o Siriji. Možda je najveća briga da su predsjednik i njegovi savjetnici malo razmišljali o implikacijama svojih odluka. Zaključak Trumpove administracije nakon njegovog izbora za predsjednika je da režimi poput Sjeverne Koreje i Irana destabiliziraju regije svojim nastojanjima za nuklearnim oružjem ili sponzorstvom terorizma. Na Bliskom istoku Iran se takmiči sa svojim susjedima uspostavljajući luk utjecaja i nestabilnosti, dok se bori za regionalnu hegemoniju koristeći se terorističkim aktivnostima koje sponzorira država, rastućom mrežom satelitskih država i svojim raketnim programom za postizanje svojih ciljeva. I revizionistička sila i nečasni režimi takmiče se u svim dimenzijama moći. Povećali su napore osim oružanih sukoba širenjem prisile na nove fronte, kršeći principe suvereniteta, iskorištavajući nejasnoće i namjerno zamaglivši granice između civilnih i vojnih ciljeva. Sirijski građanski rat, američko-ruske vojne intervencije, povremeni prodori političkog islama, ISIL i nalet terorizma, sektaški sukob Irana i Saudijske Arabije, koji se proširio na frontove od Jemena do Libana, hronično rizična nestabilnost Iraka, Turci, Kurdi, hronična opasnost od tinjajućeg izraelsko-palestinskog konflikta, samo su dio nove stvarnosti Bliskog istoka s kojom se suočava aktuelna američka politika. Koje će biti posljedice odustajanja od podrške dvodržavnom rješenju izraelsko-palestinskog sukoba? Šta će se dogoditi ako JCPOA implodira, a Iran nastavi svoj program nuklearnog oružja? Šta ako američki utjecaj u Iraku i dalje opada, a utjecaj Irana raste? Hoće li nove sigurnosne obaveze, u obliku Strateškog saveza na Bliskom istoku, i nedostatak plana u slučaju Sirije dovesti do uključenosti u druge regionalne sukobe samo su neka od pitanja koja ostaju otvorena.

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Justice, Freedom and Security? Analyzing the counter-terrorism efforts of Western Balkan states towards EU accession

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Abstract: Despite the absence of terrorist activity and departures to foreign conflicts in the recent years, Western Balkans remain vulnerable to extremist influences. The international community is active in the region, tracking the consequences and potential threats. Democratic institutions and mechanisms engaged in counter-terrorism efforts are mainly founded by the European Union, as part of the build-up to the accession process. EU Progress Reports include a detailed description of the progress achieved by Western Balkan states in the selected period from 2014 to 2019, which this paper analyzes and compares across individual states. The comparison indicates a moderate level of readiness of the Western Balkan states to pursue effective activities that meet the requirements of the implemented strategies as well as those of the EU accession.

Keywords: European Union, Western Balkans, counter terrorism, comparative analysis, integrations

Introduction

Terrorism presents one of the largest threats to individual and collective security, obstructs the values of democratic societies as well as the rights and freedoms of citizens. The European Union (EU) has made the fight against terrorism a top priority for its member states[2] and its international partners, recognizing the dangers posed by terrorism and the need to effectively counter this issue. Thus, a comprehensive approach was adopted in order to address the issues of foreign fighters and home-grown terrorism.

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[2] European Council, Council of the European Union General Policy Review from 2020

*Kosovo is a partially recognized state, subject to a territorial dispute with the Republic of Serbia. The EU Reports state that this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Law enforcement agencies and security services are increasingly focusing on enhanced international cooperation in suspect arrest and conviction actions in several EU states. Yet, there is still a sustained threat of further terrorist attacks in Europe, mainly posed by terrorist networks, groups and individuals as well as other extremist and radical groups that now, with the fall of the so-called Islamic State, pose an even larger security threat. When it comes to the Balkan states, EU reports indicate that they cooperate with international partners on counter-terrorism, but the main issue for these states is the lack of resources and cooperation between their institutions. These states are currently dealing with the return of foreign terrorist fighters and making little to no progress in their response measures, such as rehabilitation and deradicalization programs. The European Commission has tracked these challenges over the years, drafting reports on implemented strategies and providing the Western Balkans states with an EU perspective on their progress towards accession to the European Union. The reports explore the priorities and areas of mutually reinforced cooperation and address these challenges together with the need for fundamental reforms and good regional relations. The analysis offers a detailed assessment of each state based on different criteria, discovering the potential for a membership status.

The paper reviews progress reports for six Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia) in the area of justice, freedom and security, with specific focus on the fight against terrorism. The progress of each country is presented individually, leading to a comparative analysis and a conclusion about the degree of readiness to join the European Union. The analyzed reports refer to a five-year period from 2014 to 2019, with the exception of a missing report from 2017. Finally, the paper concludes the analysis of these six states by comparing their progress over the years and identifying their degree of competence in meeting the requirements for membership in the European Union.

Background

According to the Europol report (2017, p.33), the Western Balkans region is particularly vulnerable to religiously motivated as well as ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism and violent extremism, and, to a lesser extent, left-wing and right-wing terrorism. Terrorism in this region did not reach international levels until the 1990s conflict in the Balkans, resulting from the break-up of Yugoslavia. This is when the mujahideen[3] and radical Islamic organizations started their activities in the region, thus contributing to the formation of an environment permissive towards terrorism and violent extremism in the Western Balkans (Bieber, 2003, pp. 49-50). The countries were left with weak systems, so fractured that even two decades later the Western Balkans is characterized by continuous economic crises, weak state institutions and significant dependence on international assistance in dealing with terrorist threats (Azinovic, 2018, p. 13). With the outbreak of recent conflicts in the Middle East, terrorist activities started to pose an increased security threat, particularly due to an estimate that around 1,000 individuals departed for Syria and Iraq between 2012 and 2017 (Azinovic, Becirevic, 2017). Moreover, the region became a transfer zone for Islamic extremists, as it arguably facilitated not just further travel to the EU but also the formation of recruitment cells (Zakem, Rosenau, Johnson, 2017, p. 25). Although the region had made some peacebuilding efforts and did not experience much terrorist attacks in the last decade (Azinovic, 2018, p. 7), a level of insecurity remained and thus international support was maintained through international actors such as the USA, NATO and the EU, all working on combating terrorism in the Western Balkans. The European Union does so through its Agenda on Security, which aims to provide freedom, security and justice for its Member States and potential candidates. The internal and external security dimension is now among the five key principles, next to upholding democratic values, protection of fundamental rights, agency cooperation and proper implementation of EU legal instruments. As the first pillar of the Agenda (2010-2015), the EU has focused on improving information exchange between national law enforcement authorities through the Schengen Information System (SIS). The system contributes to terrorist tracking and is supposed to invalidate the passports of persons suspected of attempting to join terrorist groups. Moreover, Member States are expected to control their external borders, conduct checks on persons, oversee the movement of goods and tackle illegal border activities. However, the Agenda defines three priorities for European security in the next five years (2015-2020): EU response to terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters[4], serious and organized cross-border

[3] The Arabic term for those engaged in jihad ("the struggle" or fight against the enemies of Islam) stands for the Islamic guerrilla fighters, especially in the Middle East.

[4] Includes a phenomenon of EU citizens joining terrorist groups in conflict zones, acquiring training and posing a potential threat to European internal security.

crime[5] and cybercrime[6]. Due to the threats they pose, these priorities require an effective and coordinated response by all agencies at the EU level. Further, the Agenda entails all agencies that could contribute to discovering terrorist networks and developing mechanisms to counter the problem. To be more precise and focus on counter-terrorism efforts, it is relevant to note that the European Counter-Terrorism Strategy primarily involves countermeasures targeting terrorism financing. The EU aims to adapt its instruments and measures to develop mechanisms for effective detection of criminal activity. In the recent years, the legal framework was strengthened with several directives and regulations that must be adopted by all EU Member States and partners.[7] With regard to its Western Balkan partners, the European Union has developed a legal Counter-Terrorism framework that foresees legal alignment with the EU and international bodies with respect to development and identification of policies on terrorism, countering radicalization towards violent extremism, foreign (terrorist) fighters, returning (terrorist) fighters, travel and border controls applicable to terrorism prevention efforts, judicial and intelligence data exchange and internal and external cooperation (European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2017). However, for these initiatives to launch effectively the Western Balkan states must first adapt their institutional mechanisms to meet the standards of good governance and strong rule of law and, by doing so, to increase the level of readiness for EU accession. The Western Balkans area, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, represents a new opportunity for the EU to present itself as a strong peacebuilding actor capable of using its normative power to support the reconstruction of the system in a way that pursues stabilization. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, one approach would entail the implementation of the Sofia Declaration and the Sofia Priority Agenda[8], which require enhanced regional cooperation measures in areas of

[5] Includes crimes that have large human, social and economic costs, such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, firearms trade, etc.

[6] A growing threat to fundamental rights of the citizens and to the economy, entailing criminal abuse of anonymisation techniques and payment mechanisms to enable online trade in drugs or weapons, criminal transactions, money laundering, etc.

[7] Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism; Directive (EU) 2018/843 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering on terrorist financing; Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing, See the following link for more details: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/counter-terrorism/fight-financing-terrorism_en

[8] Sofia Declaration of 17 May 2018, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/34776/sofia-declaration_en.pdf

security, rule of law and migration. The EU invests considerable resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defense policy. In this area the country has a certain degree of preparedness[9], so this area is one of those with the most potential to increase the chances of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet the accession requirements. The country must, however, adjust its legal and institutional framework and its administrative and implementation capacity to align the legislation with the EU acquis and to enforce the required measures. For Kosovo on the other hand, Chapter 35 of Serbia's accession is crucial as the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is one of the requirements that block the accession of both parties. Moreover, Kosovo's future progress remains dependent on the good will of Serbia and thus its development path towards EU accession remains dependent on the decision of the other actor. Nevertheless, for both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, good cooperation with regional states (Serbia) remains one of the key accession requirements. When discussing security, however, both states face dilemmas in the implementation of measures aimed at countering and preventing violent extremism (CVE; PVE) and potential radicalization by those who have returned. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have found themselves among the states with the highest number of foreign fighters in the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq (Azinovic, Becirevic, 2017). Departures to the Ukrainian conflict also pose a significant threat. The regional balance of power revolves around dealing with the phenomenon of foreign fighters and implementation of prevention and countering measures. Therefore, the question that will guide this analysis is:

What are the main security elements on which the Western Balkan states must focus to increase their level of readiness for entry into the European Union?

The following section provides a comparative analysis for each of the Western Balkan states, analyzing their efforts in the area of justice, freedom and security, with focus on the fight against terrorism, together with an overview of limitations and obstacles. The data were compiled from EU Progress Reports for the period from 2014 to 2019, excluding the missing report from 2017.

9 Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application for membership of the European Union (2019), available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-bosnia-and-herzegovina-opinion.pdf

Analysis by state

Albania

When it comes to the counter-terrorism aspect of security, the analysis of reports from 2014 to 2019 shows some progress in the development of institutional countering mechanisms, presenting Albania as moderately prepared to meet the challenges in this area. Significant progress was made in this area throughout the years, advancing from not being fully equipped and operational to establishment of an institutional body and active participation in counter-terrorism initiatives. In 2016, the main institution in charge of countering terrorism was the Counter-Terrorism Directorate of the Albanian State Police. Albania has also recognized the need to work with its religious communities on the prevention of radicalization and religious extremism. Thus, in 2016, the Albanian government identified the need to modify school curricula by introducing a new course supporting inter-religious dialogue. The country also signed bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation agreements with Kosovo and Slovenia and has a functional action plan implemented since 2015. When analyzing the foreign fighter phenomena, Albania has not recorded any citizens leaving the country for battlefields in Syria or Iraq since 2015. There is, however, a number of those who have returned, died or remained on the battlefield, resulting in the need for deradicalization and social reintegration. Albania has implemented a dedicated strategy focused on deradicalization programs in prisons, therefore upgrading its CVE incentives throughout the years. The latest report from 2019 shows significant improvement in Albania's capacity to develop functioning programs and attain the capacity for specialized training, personnel and equipment. Nevertheless, its operational and logistical capacities remain limited, particularly in the area of special investigations and operations, such as surveillance and interception. Online radicalization content remains a challenge and the government was advised to work on developing online monitoring strategies and response capacities by empowering the civil society to promote positive and alternative narratives in the digital space. Furthermore, the country has satisfactory regional cooperation and pro-actively exchanges sensitive information with its international partners. In 2016, a number of changes was introduced, including the delivery of new policies and implementation of counter-terrorism strategies, and in 2017 there were recorded charges for terrorism offences. It is relevant to note here that Albania is an active partner in the Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WBCTi). However, the fight against terrorism relies on general prevention of organized crime and Albania is strongly advised to use Europol's European Counter-Terrorism Centre more proactively in order to upgrade its relevant capacities. Regional cooperation has improved throughout the years, but prevention and monitoring mechanisms should be further developed. Moreover, the government is advised to develop reintegration programs for returning foreign fighters and their families in order to handle the process of deradicalization and reintegration.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina already had an implemented strategy for prevention and combat against terrorism from 2010, in the form of a four-year plan, which allowed the working group to prepare and establish the national counter-terrorism strategy for the following years. The need to build capacities for prevention of radicalization was recognized and the authorities were advised to address the phenomenon of foreign fighters. This year was significant due to amendments to the criminal code, which introduced sanctions for citizens who join paramilitary and para-police forces abroad. This was noted as a significant step forward in the counter-terrorism effort. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina was seriously affected by the phenomenon of foreign fighters, religious radicalization and recruitment processes, which placed the Wahhabi community on the international radar. With that, raising awareness of the effects of hate speech, directly linked to the process of radicalization, became a crucial task for the authorities. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to cooperate with EU Member States due to its lack of capacity for countering terrorism and addressing the associated challenges. This cooperation continued in the 2015-2020 Strategy enacted by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was modelled after the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy and based on four principles: prevention, protection, pursuit and protection. This Strategy was adopted at the state level in 2016. That year Bosnia and Herzegovina faced a major challenge with the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and radicalization, using the sanctions clauses from the national criminal code in criminal proceedings. Once again, hate speech continues to be an issue. Capacities to deal with the situation remain at an unsatisfying level and are dedicated to intensified identification, prevention and disruption of the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to the war zones in Iraq and Syria. Deradicalization and radicalization prevention programs remain to be further developed and introduced also in 2018. Bosnia and Herzegovina's legal framework conforms to the requirements of international instruments on anti-terrorism, but its implementation constitutes a problem. Moreover, cooperation on these matters requires significant improvements. The country has demonstrated its commitment to the implementation of strategies for prevention of violent extremism, appropriate sentencing of foreign fighters and implementation of programs for social reintegration, arms trafficking, border control and terrorism financing. Furthermore, regional and international cooperation continues to support the efforts to address and counter these issues. The CVE aspect is of critical importance for Bosnia and Herzegovina as the state with the highest number of departures for battlefields in Syria and Iraq in the region. However, now it has encountered a new issue related to investigation and prosecution of the returning foreign fighters. Furthermore, countering online terrorist content remains an aspect that must be tackled, while the Wahhabi communities still represent an influential radicalization base. Here, the state was advised to cooperate with Europol more actively and to further develop its internal capacities for countering violent extremism. Nevertheless, the country participates in the Western Balkans Counter Terrorism Initiative (WBCTi), which facilitates adequate capacity development.

Kosovo

In 2014, Kosovo's insufficient progress in counter-terrorism actions was noted in the reports. After an increase in the number of deployed persons (which reached 300 active fighters in conflict zones in the Middle East), Kosovo drafted a law banning citizens from joining armed conflicts outside its territory. However, this law was not passed and the situation called for increased capacities for the prevention of radicalization and enforcement of measures that will effectively address the phenomenon of foreign fighters. It is relevant to note that an exact track record was not established. In 2015, the law criminalizing foreign fighter activities was adopted in line with the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014). But the criminal code did not provide the legal grounds to tackle the financing of terrorism and the overall legislative framework was inadequate for prevention of terrorism and seizure of terrorism-related assets. The year

2015 brought a new action plan for prevention of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism, where the strategy included a five-year plan for cooperation with religious communities, social and frontline workers, the education system and youth organizations. These were the initial efforts aimed at addressing this specific issue. However, Kosovo still lacked consistent efforts necessary to identify, prevent and disrupt the flow of individuals travelling to conflict zones such as Iraq and Syria. Moreover, Kosovo's anti-terrorism strategy does not fully conform to the standards and requirements of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy because it lacks focus on prevention initiatives. Based on the report from 2016, Kosovo has implemented 57% of activities from its action plan and the rest were either partially implemented or not implemented at all. The whole situation became more complex with the high number of foreign fighters returning from conflict zones, as Kosovo still lacks adequate prevention, de-radicalization and reintegration programs. The recommendations for Kosovo included actions aimed at improving cooperation between intelligence services with increased focus on the Western Balkans in its efforts to counter the threat of violent extremism and radicalization. Europol, Interpol and Frontex are some of the suggested cooperation facilitators. Also, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is an important actor in combating terrorism financing, but this unit lacks staff and needs an improved strategy development process to effectively tackle the issues related to extremist religious groups. Kosovo also lacks the expertise and technology to deal with the virtual aspect of radicalization and to investigate terrorism support in this area. Further advice was to establish better cooperation and coordination between all its institutions. Some progress was made over the years, but in 2016 Kosovo was still at a starting point in terms of countering organized crime, terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization. A significant improvement was made with the introduction of laws governing the fight against organized crime. Nevertheless, since 2014, Kosovo did follow up on the recommendations, specifically those related to violent extremism, by introducing the track record and confiscation-related legislation. Furthermore, it should implement its de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration programs through full operationalization of the Reintegration Division. Some of the latest recommendations involve strengthening of inter-institutional and international cooperation and full operationalization of the National

Centre for Border Management. Kosovo has demonstrated consistent effort in tackling this issue and is believed to have the potential to build a greater capacity and mechanisms for participation in CVE strategies. Kosovo has effectively set up the institutions involved in combating terrorism, the main ones being the Office of the Prime Minister, ministries of internal affairs, justice and foreign affairs, police, Kosovo Intelligence Agency, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the prosecution service, including the Special Prosecution Office. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is organized among these institutions, which comprise the system for the fight against terrorism financing. Kosovo authorities have also formed an inter-institutional committee to deal with foreign terrorist fighters and non-combatant returnees, including women, children and the elderly. Kosovo has a strategy and action plan against terrorism (2018-2023) and a strategy and action plan for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (2015-2020). The first strategy is in line with the counter-terrorism strategy of the European Union, whereas the other covers a complex governance area that needs better cooperation between the bodies involved with the strategy. Nevertheless, Kosovo signed the Joint Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism for the Western Balkans in October 2018, thereby ensuring bilateral follow-up on priority actions. Online radicalization and recruitment continues to be an issue and Kosovo is advised to explore further options to counter this area and to ensure a higher level of security on online media platforms in order to prevent the spread of propaganda and preaching of extremist ideologies.

Montenegro

The 2014 evaluation of anti-terrorism efforts in Montenegro indicates the need to build capacities for the for prevention of radicalization and addressing the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Actions targeting terrorism financing needed to meet European and international standards. Montenegro adopted the 2013-2014 Action Plan to implement the Strategy for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing 2010-2014. Preparations were moderately advanced, yet Montenegro did not show any substantial progress in this area. Amendments to the Criminal Code were made the following year, criminalizing the phenomenon of foreign fighters as outlined in the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014). Moreover, monitoring of the situation and assessment of terrorist threats intensified the cooperation with international partners advocating for further strengthening of prevention tools and anti-radicalization measures. Montenegro was described as moderately prepared for correct implementation of the acquis. It did demonstrate some progress, but the fight against terrorism was not identified as a major threat. Montenegro did address the issues of violence-motivated radicalization and the problem of foreign fighters, maintaining its cooperation with the Interpol. Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was signed in October 2016. Moreover, EU and OSCE experts have been actively working on the National Terrorism Risk Assessment in order to place the fight against terrorism on the list of main priorities. A national Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment, adopted in December 2017, identified 6 priority areas for 2018-2019, which include terrorism and religious extremism. of Database integration and maintenance was continued, in cooperation with Interpol, particularly in the area of preventing foreign fighters from crossing the borders. Further, Montenegro ratified the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. The last report from 2019 found Montenegro's legal framework to be largely aligned with the EU acquis and international instruments on anti-terrorism. Prevention of terrorism and terrorism financing is integrated into a new strategy that remains to be adopted after the previous one expires. The strategy to combat violent extremism was extended until the end of 2019, and a national coordinator for countering violent extremism was appointed. Montenegro also participates in the Joint Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism for the Western Balkans and works on the implementation of the Western Balkan Counter Terrorism Initiative (WBCTi) but is advised to work on bilateral follow-up of priority actions.

North Macedonia

In 2013, the FIU took note of two suspicious transactions regarding financing of terrorism and the state recognized the need to prevent radicalization and introduce adequate measures to address the phenomenon of foreign fighters. The legal framework included the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, which imposed restrictions on money flows. Also, the Criminal Code enacted in September 2014 introduced the criminal offences of participation in foreign army, police, paramilitary or parapolice formations. Radicalization is recognized as one of the alarming issues for the country and further efforts on identification, prevention and disruption of the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and their fleeing to battlegrounds in Iraq and Syria are regarded as mandatory. Financing of terrorism is repeatedly mentioned in the report as a persistent issue and a certain degree of reporting exists. 2016 was the year when the authorities recognized the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and radicalization as a larger threat, because the reporting spotted that around 140-150 people have left the country to fight in foreign conflict zones. But this raised the issue of reintegration and deradicalization, as 72 of these individuals have returned. The Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2013-2019 was adopted in March 2016, providing definitions for the concepts of violent extremism, radicalization, prevention and reintegration. A security-based approach was adopted, which led to bilateral agreements with the neighboring countries and creation of joint operational teams, thus initiating further legislative changes. Institutions in North Macedonia in charge of implementing counter-terrorism strategies are the Bureau for Security and Counterintelligence (UBK), the Intelligence Agency, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also plays a facilitating role in international legal cooperation. However, the strategy does not include an action plan with specific projects and dedicated resources. The country is advised to detect and stop financial flows that support terrorism, counter the effects of radicalization and prevent recruitment. However, it contains major gaps and the measures to fight against terrorism are insufficient. Still, good progress over time was noted and North Macedonia is seen as moderately prepared to implement the acquis. The recommendation is to proceed with the implementation of measures to counter violent extremism and fight terrorism. Two implemented strategies, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2018-2022 and the Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism 2018-2022, provided a more integrated and prevention-focused approach. North Macedonia also plays an active role in the implementation of the Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WBCTi).

Serbia

The fight against terrorism in Serbia includes two departments: one for terrorism and the other for extremism. In 2014, criminal charges were pressed in the first case of terrorism ever recorded. However, the draft strategy and action plan were to be adopted together with the new law regulating the financial course to funding terrorism. Some level of preparation was recognized in Serbia to implement the acquis on justice, freedom and security. Further efforts must be made, despite criminalizing the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Serbia lacks a central national database and needs better inter-agency cooperation to ensure consistent identification, prevention and disruption of the flow of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria. The legal framework is based on international instruments on anti-terrorism and the activity of foreign fighters is criminalized in line with UN Security Council resolution 2178 (2014). The Law on International Restrictive Measures, enacted in February 2016, further contributed to terrorism prevention. In 2016, Serbia still did not have a national body to coordinate the implementation of its anti-terrorism strategy, but the main institutions involved in the fight against terrorism are the Ministry of Interior, intelligence services, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. However, in order to make the action plan more effective, Serbia is advised to activate the Financial Intelligence Unit in order to develop its capacities to detect and prevent financial flows supporting terrorism. Despite the lack of a central national database, the Serbian authorities have evidence of around 40 of its nationals fighting in Syria since the start of the conflict, but the number of returnees is very low. This indicates some level of effects caused by the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and radicalization. Furthermore, the legal and policy framework was recognized as largely aligned with the acquis and international instruments on anti-terrorism. A new law was adopted in December 2017 – the Law Amending the Law on the Freezing of Assets for the Purpose of Terrorism Prevention, following the adoption of the National Strategy and Action Plan for the Prevention and Countering of Terrorism (2017-2021) in October. These focus on prevention of violent extremism and radicalization, elimination of terrorist threats and response and prosecution in the event of terrorist attacks. However, a central database for terrorism-related information still did not exist at the national level. Serbia participates in the implementation of the Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WBCTi) and has intensified the cooperation between its Police Service for Combating Terrorism and Extremism and Europol. It showed progress in prevention and anti-radicalization activities with support from the OSCE Mission to Serbia. Serbia has incriminated seven people for terrorism activities (including radicalization and recruitment), six of which were also charged with financially supporting terrorism. Moreover, despite its focus on Islamic extremism, Serbia also faces other radicalization phenomena and a number of its citizens are fighting in other countries for various other terrorist organizations. In 2019, Serbia finally established the National Coordination Body for Preventing and Combating Terrorism and has appointed a national coordinator in April of this year. It drafted the legislative changes required to establish the central national database and support of exchange terrorism-related information. The frameworks and mechanisms for the prevention of terrorism are recognized to be in line with the UN system, enabling freezing of assets and imposing financial sanctions for terrorism. This has proven to be effective. The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2017-2021 remains in force and, since October 2018, Serbia is also a part of the joint EU-Western Balkans action plan on counter-terrorism. Some progress was noted in terms of prevention and anti-radicalization activities supported by the OSCE and USAID. Cybercrime and cyberspace pose a threat to these processes, disabling efficient tracking and targeting of terrorism financing. Nevertheless, Serbia is a specific case when it comes to radicalization and extremism as such. Its authorities have addressed the threat of Islamic extremism, but Serbia is advised to identify its rather limited phenomenon of other forms of violent extremism such as the potential connection between right-wing extremism and football hooliganism.

Conclusion

The paper analyzed the progress of six Balkan states towards meeting the requirements for EU membership in the area of security, particularly its counter-terrorism aspect. This aspect is generally recognized as a national security threat, it is being addressed and the states are showing some level of effort in tackling this issue. Countering violent extremism that leads to terrorism is one of the top priorities for the EU and is starting to gain more recognition among the Balkan states, particularly those most affected by the foreign fighter phenomenon and with the highest number of citizens fleeing to conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq. These countries are North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand there is Serbia, which deals not only with Islamic extremist groups but also other types of terrorist groups which recruit citizens to fight in foreign countries for other purposes and goals. The overall perception is that all six states have made some progress in addressing the recommendations for each year, and are moderately prepared for the accession process. The crucial requirement for all of them is to introduce a central database of terrorism-related information at the national level, as this would contribute to the implementation of strategies against violent extremism. A central database would facilitate more efficient information exchange and better inter-institutional, regional and international cooperation. For Kosovo, substantial presence of the international community supports faster development and implementation of certain strategies and action plans within a shorter timeframe. This gives it a head start for compliance with the criteria in the security aspect. Nevertheless, all states have achieved fairly similar progress in this area and are all now facing a challenge of deradicalization and social reintegration of the foreign fighters who have returned. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, radicalization and recruitment persist as a security threat and the Wahhabi community is being targeted by both internal and international authorities. Additionally, hate speech and recruitment in the digital space remains the aspect that requires further development of operational capacities and deployment of effective mechanisms. All Balkan states have limited capacities in this area. A crucial requirement for all of them is to further develop regional cooperation, especially for Kosovo and Serbia because the recognition of Kosovo's statehood relies on external actors and blocks its path towards EU accession. All in all, these six states enjoy a somewhat similar status on their path to EU accession, with minor differences in legislation and the strategies they employ. All are active participants in the Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism Initiative (WBCTi), recognizing terrorism as a serious security threat and investing efforts in developing programmes to counter violent extremism that may lead to terrorism. The Balkan states are advised to enhance regional cooperation on this matter and follow up on the EU requirements to implement the legislation in its most effective form.

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General models of social policy as alternatives to political particularism

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Summary: This paper presents a description and classification of general models of social policy and analyzes their potential for preventing political particularism. The three general models of social policy presented in this paper are the socialist state, the bureaucratic social state and the market social state. Each of them is characterized by a set of distinct problems; however, the market social state which implements the idea of social constitutionalism based on universal basic income is shown to reduce the degree of political particularism resulting from arbitrary decisions of the political or bureaucratic authority. As such, it facilitates the realization of many desirable goals of social policy and should be included in contemporary scientific and political discussions.

Sažetak: Ovaj rad prikazuje opis i klasifikaciju općih modela socijalne politike i analizira njihov potencijal u sprječavanju političkog partikularizma. Tri opća modela socijalne politike prikazana u ovom radu karakteriziraju socijalističku državu, birokratsku socijalnu državu i tržišnu socijalnu državu. Svaka od njih je karakterizirana nizom specifičnih problema, međutim, tržišna socijalna država koja primjenjuje ideju socijalnog konstitucionalizma zasnovanog na univerzalnom osnovnom dohotku se pokazuje kao sredstvo za smanjenje stepena političkog partikularizma koji je rezultat arbitrarnih odluka političke ili birokratske vlasti. Kao takva, ona omogućuje realizaciju mnogih poželjnih ciljeva socijalne politike i treba biti dijelom savremenih naučnih i političkih rasprava.

Key words: social policy; socialist state; bureaucratic social state; market social state; political particularism

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Introduction

The term “social policy” was first used by the German historian Riehl in 1851, and the purpose of such a policy was to address the problems caused by industrialization, the developing market economy and the breakdown of traditional social institutions (Riehl, in: Buljubašić, 2012:7). At that time, social policy was mostly concerned with the problems of the working class and with achieving a higher degree of cohesion between different classes. This required state policies for wealth redistribution and provision of public goods and services, in order to improve the living and working conditions of the population. Social policy generally aims to eliminate poverty, inequality, discrimination, social exclusion and the like. Elements of social policy also include various benefits, such as a personal and family income, social security, healthcare, housing and education services, as well as support to people who are unemployed due to their age, illness, disability, family responsibilities and market failures. Additionally, they include improvements in living and working conditions, quality of life, achieving equality of opportunity, as well as goals such as solidarity, justice, equality, cohesion, protection of consumers, the environment, etc.

An institutional framework for the realization of social policies is called a “social state” or a “welfare state”. These terms refer to capitalist states, while the policies of socialist states are, by definition, of social character. When it comes to capitalist states, by applying some conceptual innovation, this paper differentiates between the “bureaucratic social state” and the “market social state”. A pure “bureaucratic social state” implies a state which takes money from its citizens through taxation, makes its own profits in the market and earns other revenue, which it then uses, pursuant to the decisions of the government and administration, for direct provision of public goods and services to its citizens. On the other hand, a pure “market social state” implies a state which takes money from its citizens through taxation, makes its own profits in the market and earns other revenue, which it then redistributes from the rich to the poor. Each individual then uses that money to buy goods and services, whether from state companies or from private companies. These are pure or ideal-type models, while in reality every social state combines both kinds of social policy. Depending on which is dominant, this paper differentiates between the “bureaucratic social state” and the “market social state”. One extreme form of a social state is the socialist state, in which there is no private ownership over means of production and whose policies are, by definition, of a social character. Offe notices that the term “social policy” has lost its meaning or has completely disappeared in socialist states (Offe, 1999:336). When it comes to liberal-democratic states, Marshall (1950) speaks about social rights as the third generation of human rights, after the appearance of civil and political rights. These rights, by providing citizens with education, healthcare, social security, etc., create the conditions required for realization of civil and political rights. Theorists who deal with constitutions of contemporary liberal-democratic states emphasize that these rights have to be guaranteed by the constitution, which is indeed the practice in the developed countries of the 20th century (Isensee, 2004:70).

This paper first discusses the concept of a minimal state and then proceeds to discuss the socialist state, the bureaucratic social state and the market social state as three general institutional models of social policy. This differentiation is not based on classifications such as Esping-Andersen's (1990), who differentiates between liberal, corporatist and social-democratic models of the welfare state, nor on similar classifications (more in Spicker, 2014:164-166). In the classification presented here, the criterion of the share of public social spending in total state spending or the GDP, which is most often taken into account when defining the social policy of the state (Zgodić, 2015:71), is less important, while the criterion of the way in which that social policy is implemented, in the sense of who decides on the expenditure of public means, is more important. What is crucial however, is the fact that these models often do not achieve their initial purpose but are primarily used to achieve particular interests. Such use of the state apparatus, which this work designates as “political particularism” or “clientelism”, is accepted as a legitimate form of political activity in multi-party and pluralist democracies (Sartori, 2002, Dahl, 1982, 1997, 1999). However, this is one of the most problematic aspects of these regimes, because their political life is dominated by particular interests. This is why we must identify the kind of political particularism which characterizes each of these three kinds of states together with an institutional model of social policy which is most efficient in preventing or suppressing such practices.

The purpose of this paper is to present a precise description and classification of general models of social policy and to clarify the discussions regarding this area of politics. These models represent ideal-type constructs which do not exist in their pure form. This paper will offer explanations and predictions in the light of the facts that none of these models are applied in a principled way in the contemporary societies, and that individual models are designated as politically undesirable by different political entities. The practical purpose of this paper is to present certain alternative models and instruments of social policy which are currently only at the margins of political discussions, but which can be help to address the related social problems.

The analysis of experiences with egalitarian models of socio-economic policy will point to certain correlations and cause-effect relationships, as well as to phenomena which could become the subject of further research.

By analyzing the literature which deals with these issues, we can notice a theoretical gap with regard to a precise description and classification of general models of social policy, as well as the misunderstandings and inconsistencies in the political ideas and practices of a multitude of authors and politicians. A good example of this revolves around the fact that the market social state is a less ambitious goal of egalitarian socio-economic policy compared to the socialist state and the bureaucratic social state, because it does not rely on continuously moral behavior of politicians and bureaucrats. It is therefore important to show that it is meaningless to rhetorically advocate and seek to achieve more ambitious goals such as a principled socialist state or a principled bureaucratic social state, if within contemporary societies, due to practices of political particularism, not even a principled market social state can be realized. It is also important to show that behind the advocacy of particular models of social policy most often lie the particular interests of certain groups which do not want a government that expresses equal concern for all its citizens. This especially relates to the conflicts between capitalists and bureaucrats as privileged interest groups fighting to appropriate as large as possible share of the domestic product. These two groups have, to a significant degree, achieved control over political processes, and despite proclaiming that they will fight for the "public interest", they foremost realize their particular interests at the expense of the remainder of society, especially those who are poor, poorly organized and less influential. This work opposes such practices by proposing policies which weaken such interest groups in favor of those who are worse off. The primary mechanism proposed here is the idea of a constitutionally guaranteed basic income for all citizens as the main instrument of the market social state, which protects the individual, both from risks of the capitalist market and from arbitrary decisions of the political or bureaucratic authorities.

The capitalist market and the minimal state

In order to analyze the general models of social policy, we must first understand the difference between the "private" and the "public" sector. Petak interprets the differentiation between the private and the public sector made by Foldvary in the sense that when allocating goods the private sector refers to the market, as well as to processes and communities which we could designate as being voluntary, consensual, contractual and multilateral, while the public sector refers to the government, as well as to processes and communities which should be designated as being political, sovereign, imposed and unilateral (Petak, 2001:16).

In order for the capitalist market to function, it needs a certain political government to ensure the basic preconditions required for its functioning. The most basic form of this state was presented by Nozick (1974), who comes to the conclusion that the minimal state, limited to protecting its citizens from violence, theft, fraud, breach of contract, etc., is the only state that can be justified from the moral position which protects the basic civil rights of which Locke (2003) speaks, such as the right to life, liberty and private property. Nozick rejects both the anarchist concept of social organization and any sort of a more extensive state, believing that its redistributive policies would necessarily violate individual civil rights (in order to help someone, resources must be taken from others). Also, the advantages of this state concern the economic efficiency of the market mechanism, a limited bureaucratic apparatus, as well as the minimization of governmental power and public resources, which also minimizes corruption and use of the state apparatus for achieving particular interests.

However, the purpose of this paper is not to discuss the morality or immorality of redistributive policies. Its starting premise is that of political realism, according to which contemporary societies are characterized by a high degree of perceived material scarcity and individuals and interest groups that seek to direct redistributive policies towards their own interest, disregarding any kind of moral or economic principles and not accepting own market losses or political losses. With that in mind, it is important to mention that marginalized economic groups have historically exerted pressure on the political authorities and have, from the 19th century to date, created a certain form of social state which has reduced the degree of economic inequality (Piketty, 2015). Nozick himself notices that the minimal state encounters problems when it comes to the role of the central authority, the method of its election and the way in which it is possible to secure its limitation only to those functions which have been entrusted to it by the original contract of its citizens (Nozick, 1974:329). It is also important to add that the capitalist market is risky by itself and that it would be unrealistic to expect that the existentially endangered market losers will accept their losses and the minimal state model. Besides, the risks of the capitalist market pose important moral, economic and security problems, so that most people in contemporary societies support certain social policies at the state level. In reality, no contemporary state has the institutional framework of a minimal or neoliberal state, because the developed liberal-democratic states appropriate between a third and a half of the domestic product and significantly intervene into the market. It is also difficult to believe that interest groups favored by such policies will give up their privileges in favor of some economic doctrine, the implementation of which would allegedly increase everyone's standard of living. Nevertheless, it is important to analyze the models of social policy in order to highlight some of the greatest problems of contemporary states and offer certain alternatives to their policies. The most radical model of the social state is the socialist state, discussed in the next chapter.

The socialist state

The socialist state represents an institutional model of social policy which is based on abolition of private ownership of means of production, which turns them into state property. The concept of "scientific socialism" or "historical materialism" appeared in the works of Marx and Engels. Relying on the tradition of social-utopianism (see: Đurđević, 1976), they formulated a systematic theory on historical laws which imply that capitalism will necessarily be abolished and surpassed by socialism as the new socio-economic system. These laws were supposed to be implemented by the working class which has achieved equal legal status by abolishing absolute monarchies and feudal privileges. However, with the development of industrial capitalism in the 18th and 19th century, the living conditions of most members of the working class have deteriorated, since they did not have any kind of private property or material security (Engels, 2005). According to Marx, the main purpose of the capitalist state is to protect private property and the capitalist mode of production, which would make it primarily a means of protecting the privileges of the capitalist class. As the capitalist class obstructs true democratization, the working class must pursue its interests through revolutions and abolishment of the whole capitalist socio-economic order, which is, in Marx's opinion, after the Asian antique and feudal socio-economic systems, the last form of class society (Marks, 1976:9).

Creating a classless society based on economic equality requires an authoritative socialist state in the form of a dictatorship of the proletariat (Marks, 1959:25). Marx rejected any kind of conservatism, any kind of moderate leftist policies which accept capitalism and parliamentary democracy, as well as any anarchist suggestions of a complete abolition of the state (see: Marx, 2009, Marks, 1977, Marx, 1962, Marks and Engels, 2009, Marx and Engels, 1975-2004, Marks, 1959, Engels, 1959, Lenin, 2014). Opposing such ideas, he advocated the creation of a socialist state which must crush the resistance of the bourgeois class and other reactionary forces and coordinate the activities of workers in the new socialist society. However, Lenin noticed that Marx had never presented a complete theory on the political form of the future socialist society (Lenin, 2014:93). Marx's theory nevertheless emphasized that unlike the previous states which have primarily served the ruling class that owned the means of production, the socialist state, with its abolition of private ownership of means of production, also abolishes the social classes and with them also the basic function of the state – to protect the class order (Engels, 1951:294, 295). In time, the state itself „withers away", while its functions are transferred to the self-governing worker organizations characterized by immediate democracy (Engels, 1946:159).

However, before the "withering away" of the state, the socialist society is ruled by the communist party as the vanguard of the proletariat that leads, educates, and organizes it. This state represents a transitory form between capitalism and communism, necessary for further development of the communist society and achievement of a post-state communism ruled by the principle: „From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!" (Marks, 1959:17). Marx had recognized an example of a socialist state in the Paris Commune, in which state functionaries were no longer the masters of society but instead accountable to the people (Marx, 1966:168).

However, such a government still has authoritative political power, which implies the power to conduct efficient and flexible distribution of economic resources through which it can create materially privileged and materially deprived groups. Also, the expectation that the socialist government will be democratic and perform its functions in a moral way, have been shown to be illusory. Contrary to the Marxist predictions, socialist states have most often not moved in the direction of decentralization and debureaucratization, and did not "wither away" but were further strengthened and bureaucratized, alienating the government from the society. According to Popper, by emphasizing the primacy of the economic factor Marx has underestimated political power, since it was precisely its concentration in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats that led socialist regimes far from their proclaimed goals (Popper, 1945:118). These states were ruled by a new class of exploiters – politicians and bureaucrats, while the working class was still exploited and, for the most part, excluded from political processes (see: Djilas, 1957, Pašić, 1979, Milanovic, 2011, von Mises, 2005). That these states were not characterized by true economic equality is shown by the data presented by Hayek, 1944:107 and Merleau-Ponty, 1969:138, 139.

Democracy requires an effective political opposition, which, in the minds of the members of current government, creates the perception of a realistic danger of losing power in the next elections. This forces the government to act in the interest of the majority in order to secure its political support. However, for political opposition to be effective, it must have a material basis for the survival and opposition activity of its members. The socialist state, as an almost economically totalitarian state, has an almost absolute power of distributing economic resources and it is the only employer in the society. Also, it has an almost complete control over education and the media. If we accept the premises of political realism which dictate that political entities care only about their own interests and ignore moral principles, then every socialist government will seek to take away the material basis required for survival and opposition activity from its political opponents. Accordingly, if the socialist regime does not murder, imprison, banish or excommunicate its political opponents, it can simply declare them enemies of the socialist ideology and movement. It may then proceed to fire them, their family members, their friends and political partners, denying them the material basis for their existence. With that in mind, the only intra-system opposition which is likely to appear in a socialist state is the one formed by a fraction of the members of the ruling party. In that case, the struggle most often revolves around who will exercise autocratic power in the future. These tendencies have led many theorists to new deliberations on the ways in which it is possible to emancipate the working class.

The bureaucratic social state

A state which on the one hand protects the capitalist market and the capitalist mode of production by guaranteeing private property, compliance with contracts, etc., and on the other hand extensively provides goods and services to its citizens through a large state administration (public education, public health and public companies for energy supply, telecommunications, transport, etc.) and to a certain degree pays out money to certain groups in the population, is in this paper referred to as the "bureaucratic social state". Its functioning requires a large number of bureaucrats or public sector employees. In this context, all employees of the public sector (politicians, workers in the administration, judiciary and public companies) can be called "bureaucrats".

The advantage of the bureaucratic social state in comparison to the socialist state is the fact that it can apply more flexible models of economic policy in order to achieve higher economic growth, while it can also, to a certain degree, protect the sphere of privacy and private property from any sort of authorities. Additionally, it enables people to accumulate private property and create an economic base for the activity of a political opposition, which is the fundamental precondition of democratic societies. This explains the paradoxical correlation of capitalism and democracy. On the other hand, not every capitalist state is truly democratic, because a concentration of property in the hands of a small minority can lead to its disproportionate effect on the political process, which negates the fundamental principles of democracy. Therefore, the degree of democracy in a certain country is significantly affected by the degree of dispersion of private property among its citizens.

In democratic countries, the government is responsible for ensuring that the activities of the bureaucracy conform to democratic principles. However, bureaucrats can be privileged with respect to their income, working hours, workload, special rights, protection from market competition, guaranteed lifelong employment, regular salary, guaranteed pension, ability to coerce, ability to use the state apparatus for private purposes and other privileges. Therefore, the character of the bureaucratic social state and the justification of its purpose depends on whether the politicians and bureaucrats perform their functions in a moral and principled way, by treating all citizens equally, or whether they perform them with the goal of creating privileges for themselves and their partners. If we accept the premises of political realism, the primary purpose of this state is to create privileges for bureaucrats as clients of the ruling political parties, through which these parties gain their political support, while "public interest" and equal treatment of all citizens are only a secondary goal of this state. These premises are in accordance with the public choice theory (Downs, 1957, Buchanan and Tullock, 1999, Olson, 1965), game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953) and theory on political parties (Sartori, 2002), according to which political behavior primarily serves one's own particular interest. Paraphrasing Buchanan, we begin with the premise that it is hard to expect that people who behave selfishly in the market would behave unselfishly in politics (Buchanan, in: Petak, 2001:7).

Therefore, the bureaucratic social state with its redistributive policies not only endangers property rights and often slows down economic growth, but, also, many of its social policies are not primarily intended for the poorest. Even though poor citizens are net winners of redistributive policies (Milanovic, 2011), it is questionable which motives the richer citizens have for helping the poor. It is a known fact that the poor are, to a significant degree, excluded from political processes and that social policies are primarily not the result of their political pressures. If the poor are not particularly relevant politically, they are perhaps being helped in order to prevent illiteracy, crime, illness, destruction of human economic potential and the like, which harm the whole society and endanger the interests of the rich. Regardless of these motives, it is clear that most bureaucrats are also net winners of redistributive policies – technically they do not pay taxes (Rothbard, 2007:120), which begs the question: what price does an average citizen pay for such a social state?

The main characteristics of the bureaucratic social state are that it protects public sector employees from labor market competition, giving them monopoly over their jobs, and that it protects public companies from competition in the market for goods and services, which results in state monopolies. This leads to high taxes and high prices and/or low quality of public goods and services compared to potential market prices and market quality of goods and services. Such policies divide the society into two separate social classes – public sector employees who are protected from market competition and private sector employees who are exposed to market competition. Keeping in mind the practices of corruption, clientelism, employment on political basis and nepotism in the public sector, because of the privileges of bureaucracy and limited social mobility, in certain situations, it is justified to speak about an existence of a privileged "bureaucratic class" or even a "bureaucratic caste" in these societies. This undermines the criteria of efficiency, justice and meritocracy in public sector employment, and the society assumes elements of a caste society in which the opportunities for those who have political connections and are "insiders" are significantly better than the opportunities for those who do not have political connections and are "outsiders". The social state exists, but to a significant degree serves the interests of the clients of ruling political parties and members of their families. On the other hand, because these states also regulate the market, provide tax deductions, exemptions, subsidies and the like, they also create privileged and discriminated capitalists. This shows that moderate political entities, which in pluralist democracies rest upon achieving particular interests (political parties and interest groups of the left, center and right), are just defenders of capitalist and bureaucratic privileges against the marginalized social groups, which include the unemployed, the low-skilled workers and other private sector employees, the handicapped, various minorities, etc., which are to a large degree excluded from politics. Even though the interests of capitalists are often opposed to those of the bureaucrats, the capitalist and bureaucratic political particularism or clientelism are in certain aspects mutually compatible. For that reason, the capitalists' and bureaucrats' demands to abolish those kinds of clientelism that do not favor them are hypocritical, since both privileged groups are initiators and defenders of clientelist practices and their corresponding social institutions.

Nevertheless, the moral advantage of the bureaucratic social state in comparison to the minimal state is the fact that it inevitably produces certain public goods of such nature that no one can be excluded from their use, including those who are politically marginalized. These include national defense, the police, administration, the judiciary, infrastructure, equal and free access to a certain level of healthcare, education, etc.

The market social state

In the context of these general models of social policy, a "market social state" is a state which takes money from its citizens through taxes, makes its own profits in the market and earns other revenue, and then redistributes this money from the richer to the poorer members of the society. Then each individual uses this money to buy goods and services, either from public or from private companies.

This model of social policy has a multitude of advantages in comparison to the previous two. It implies that the state apparatus is reduced only to those functions which the state must perform as a monopolist since technical and moral reasons forbid that they are given over to private entities, and also that the state owns and governs companies which compete with private companies. Such a model reduces the effects which potential autocratic political practices would have on the lives of the citizens. The number and scope of governmental structures is reduced, so that public expenditure and the effect of inefficient state monopolies is also reduced, which increases economic growth. The transfers of money to citizens can be built into the system of tax administration and state transfers, which leads to a debureaucratization of the procedure of paying out social benefits. Citizens get state benefits in the most useful and most flexible form – money. Due to reduced pressure to finance state companies, such as those in the area of healthcare and education, each citizen has a greater flexibility in spending his own money and therefore a higher standard of living (for example, citizens who take better care of their health would spend less money financing the treatment of citizens who take less care of their health). Corruption, political particularism and clientelism are also reduced, but not completely eliminated (since this is a capitalist state, we can expect that the rich will still use their money to influence politics and gain privileges in the form of subsidies, tax deductions, tax exemptions, etc.). Nevertheless, this influence is also reduced because in comparison to the bureaucratic social state, the market social state distributes more money directly to citizens. Therefore, a larger part of public resources is equally distributed to all citizens and not arbitrarily given to individuals and interest groups. This also facilitates the dispersion of power and democratizes the society. Because citizens get money directly from the state and can use it to buy goods and services, whether from private or from public companies, a larger part of the public sector becomes exposed to market competition and can survive only if it can compete with private companies. This forces politicians and bureaucrats to give up a part of their particularist practices which result in bureaucratic privileges to increase the level of competitiveness and meritocracy in the public sector. The division of society into two classes (with elements of castes) of which we have spoken earlier (one which is exposed to market competition and the other which is protected from market competition) is also reduced.

The basic instruments of the market social state are basic income and wage subsidies, which are of universal character. They can take the form of a negative income tax (Friedman, 2002) or basic income (Offe, Mückenberger and Ostner, in: Ofe, 1999; Standing, 2017, 2020), while wage subsidies would be implemented with the goal of preserving the motivation to work in exceptionally prosperous societies which can afford such high levels of basic income that it decreases the motivation to work. Such a social policy can replace many policies which are implemented today, thereby limiting the amount of public funds which the government can distribute arbitrarily. It can reduce the administrative costs of paying out benefits, as well as the degree of state interventionism and paternalism. An analysis of technical, economic, psychological, political and other aspects of basic income as an instrument of social policy surpasses the objectives of this work. It is sufficient to say that it would be funded primarily from taxes as well as from funding intended for education, healthcare, etc. so that, for example, education and healthcare services would have to be co-financed by users to a higher degree than is currently the case. Nevertheless, public education and healthcare would not be completely privatized since these services, at least to a degree, serve public purposes and equally treat all citizens. To further clarify this model of social policy, we can use a rough example – unlike the socialist state which appropriates 100% of GDP and the bureaucratic social state which appropriates around 50% of GDP, the market social state would also appropriate around 50% of GDP. However, roughly speaking, around 25% of the GDP, on basis of constitutional norms, would be immediately taken away from the government and distributed directly to citizens in the form of basic income and wage subsidies. The government itself would then have at its disposal half the resources of the bureaucratic social state and would also lose the monopoly on production of certain goods and services, since the citizens could buy them from private companies.

This egalitarian policy prevents extreme poverty and social insecurity by protecting the individual from the risks of both the capitalist market and arbitrary decisions of a political or bureaucratic authority. Therefore, the market social state is a safer, more just and more democratic model of the social state than the bureaucratic social state. Since it reduces the resources available to the government, political conflicts revolving around those resources, such as conflicts between different identity, territorial or economic groups, are also reduced.

These policies significantly reduce the privileges of bureaucrats, although the privileges of capitalists still remain. Nevertheless, these privileges should not be reduced through models of the socialist state or the bureaucratic social state, since capitalism can evolve towards a more egalitarian capitalism with gradual increases in the amount of basic income and wage subsidies. If there is political will to do so, capitalism can be *suffocated*, so that there is no need for a violent socialist revolution and the dangerous model of socialist state with all of its defects.

A potential flaw of this model is the fact that some people would spend money they get from the government irresponsibly, for example, on narcotics rather than on education and healthcare. This leads to the problem of the kind of redistributive policy (money in the form of a monthly basic income, a one-time basic inheritance for all citizens, food and housing stamps, or something else) and eventual state paternalism. However, this discussion surpasses the goals of this paper. In any case, this counterargument does not appear to be sufficient to invalidate the previous arguments.

Another possible criticism concerns the fact that this model leads to a segregation of society onto those who are competent, competitive and employed, and those who are incompetent, uncompetitive and unemployed and therefore destined to live off of social benefits. However, this is an inevitable consequence of the capitalist socio-economic system and there are three basic methods for solving the problem of unemployment. One method is a complete economic equality in the form of genuine socialism, which seems unrealistic. The second method is employing people in the public sector of a bureaucratic social state; however, this would most likely result in creating a stratum of public sector employees who are privileged in comparison to private sector employees. Moreover, it seems that this "full employment" model has been abandoned, not for economic reasons such as, for example, preserving the country's competitiveness in the global capital markets, but primarily for moral reasons as the employed refuse to share their jobs with the unemployed, while the unemployed do not have the political power to achieve their interests. The third model is a constitutionally guaranteed mandatory employment policy, whether through a reduction of working hours in all forms, which would increase the demand for workforce, or through certain employment quotas that apply to both the public and the private sector. A detailed discussion of this topic would surpass the objectives of this paper, but in any case, unemployment is for the most part not the result of a "lack of jobs" but of a lack of morality on part of those who are employed, who refuse to share their jobs with the unemployed. Also, societies should pay for all kinds of informal but socially beneficial work, such as household work. In order to achieve a social policy of universal character, we need a combination of basic income, wage subsidies, policy of mandatory employment and paid informal work (see: Offe, Mückenberger and Ostner, 1999, in: Ofe, 1999:289-317).

However, if in the socialist state or the bureaucratic social state there is no moral or political will to help the poor and the marginalized, the question arises why would it exist in a market social state? In contemporary pluralist societies, redistributive policies are such that they most often do not treat all citizens equally but rather serve to realize the particular interests of those who directly or indirectly exert political authority. This particularly affects the position of the poor, the illiterate and the unorganized, who are not powerful enough to affect politics and achieve redistributive policies which would treat all citizens equally. This problem of the capitalist and democratic states has a systemic character and is relatively permanent, so that certain social groups are, to a significant degree, excluded from political processes.

In contemplating the implementation of his idea of the negative income tax combined with cash benefits for those without any income, Friedman notices that the biggest obstacle to this solution is the democratic majority principle. Because negative income tax makes the transfer of money explicit, the only solution to this problem is to rely on the restraint and good will of the electorate (Friedman, 2002:194). Therefore, the main problem with the realization of the market social state is gaining political support for that model of social policy. Social rights in the developed countries are constitutionally guaranteed rights, and Offe, Mückenberger and Ostner (in: Ofe, 1999:312) emphasize that these countries have already established certain ethical standards which are accepted as binding, so a policy such as basic income implies simply the implementation of previous political decisions concerning those standards. However, contemporary democratic societies encounter a series of problems when faced with the following questions: How can we guarantee that the government will implement these proclaimed social rights? How can we sanction the government which refuses to do so? How can we create moral and political will to make policies which equally benefit all citizens, rather than benefiting just the minimal number of citizens required to maintain support for the current government? How can we create an institutional model which will ensure that state policies of wealth redistribution are not an expression of political particularism?

It seems that the politically marginalized social groups in contemporary capitalist and democratic societies (the poor, the unemployed, the handicapped, low-skilled workers, various identity groups and regional minorities, etc.) cannot achieve their interests and political equality through the regular democratic procedure. The imperfections of these societies lead to a relatively permanent exclusion of these groups from decision-making on redistributive policies. It is questionable whether contemporary democratic societies are truly ruled by majorities, while relying on the good will of those majorities, in the sense of them acting in the interest of minorities, often seems naive, even in the case of helping the poorest citizens. If contemporary societies do not have a sufficient degree of cohesion to implement social policies of a universal character, the question arises: How can these marginalized social groups achieve their interests?

Contrary to the suggestions that we should rely on the good will of the electorate, I believe that today's democratic procedures are not sufficient to create a principled market social state. Therefore, these marginalized social groups need extraordinary political actions or even revolutions to impose a market social state and protect it with constitutionally guaranteed social rights. In order to prevent democratic majorities or some minority governments from inflicting harm on these groups, ongoing political activity and a sort of a *permanent revolution* will be needed. Therefore, instead of a socialist revolution and a dictatorship of the proletariat, I believe that today's most progressive political idea is a revolution inspired by the model of a market social state as a debureaucratized social state. The goals of this revolution are approximately half as ambitious compared to the goals of the socialist revolution, since the revolutionaries would claim the right to about 25% of the GDP in the form of a constitutionally guaranteed basic income and wage subsidies, while around 25% of the GDP would serve to finance mandatory state functions which cannot be privatized for moral and technical reasons. A principled market social state should be a safer and more just model of social policy compared to the actual experiences with the socialist state and the bureaucratic social state, which have, due to practices of political particularism, failed to achieve their proclaimed goals. The main reason for this is the fact that the principled market social state, unlike the socialist state and the bureaucratic social state, relies less on a continuous morality of the politicians and bureaucrats and more on a one-time morality in the sense of an initial social contract. Rawls advocated this idea, believing that people need to reach a consensus on basic rights and liberties in the form of a social contract which the citizens would create from their "original position", under a "veil of ignorance" about their individual characteristics or life circumstances (Rawls, 1999, 2001). In the case of social policy, this contract or constitution, primarily taking into account the minimal needs of citizens and purely technical criteria, would determine the amount of basic income before any kind of arbitrary decision of the political government regarding those funds.

Therefore, we speak of a model of capitalist state which for the most part ensures the functioning of the market mechanism, which is relatively neutral in relation to different market participants and to a large degree ensures fair market competition. However, unlike the minimal state, the market social state eliminates poverty and other social problems by implementing basic income, wage subsidies and similar policies, creating the foundations for a democratic and egalitarian society.

Conclusion

This paper has presented three general models of social policy as the alternatives to political particularism. In doing so, it has criticized the socialist state and the bureaucratic social state as systems which proclaim that they will implement a certain social policy, while in reality they lead to a concentration of political power in the hands of certain groups which, by focusing on their own interests, harm the society as a whole and especially its lower strata. Opposing such practices of privileging certain groups, a model of the market social state was suggested, whose social policy is market-oriented and of a more universal character. Unlike the socialist state and the bureaucratic social state, the market social state relies less on a continuous morality of the politicians and bureaucrats, and more on a one-time morality in the sense of an initial social contract. The market social state's basic instruments are basic income, wage subsidies and similar forms of market-oriented redistributive policies of a universal character. This protects the individual, from the risks of the capitalist market and from the risks of arbitrary decisions of the political or bureaucratic authorities. With this in mind, contrary to the frequent reduction of politics to a struggle between capitalists and bureaucrats over the domestic product, this paper emphasizes the need for market-oriented social policies of universal character which will most benefit those who are worst off.

Liberal-democratic countries cannot privatize certain parts of the public sector due to moral and technical reasons, so they will always, to a certain degree, retain the characteristics of a bureaucratic social state. However, this is not incompatible with the market social state model, since various models of co-financing public goods and services can eliminate the monopolistic character of certain public companies. In reality, liberal-democratic states combine the elements of the bureaucratic social state and the market social state. A permanent problem of these societies is the misuse of the state apparatus to achieve particular interests of capitalists and bureaucrats at the expense of other citizens. Contemporary politics are dominated by interests and not moral principles, ignoring the principles of efficiency and meritocracy, so that they mostly concern the division of political spoils. It appears that the primary purpose of the state is to favor certain market participants over others and to create privileged bureaucratic positions in exchange for political support, while the general social goals and equal treatment of all citizens appear to be just secondary purposes of the state.

Because of this, contemporary societies often do not give rise to productive or moral citizens but to people who are unproductive, immoral, demagogues, liars, manipulators, criminals, etc. Therefore, we must find ways to achieve the goals of social policy while preventing political particularism. Regular democratic procedures are imperfect, often lead to unjust outcomes and cannot eliminate the problem of particular interests. This implies that the marginalized social groups need extraordinary political actions and even revolutions to impose a market social state that will meet the minimum needs of all citizens, and that cannot be subsequently abolished by any political authority. If there is sufficient political will on the part of the poor and the socially insecure, as well as sufficient morality and support on the part of the rich and the privileged, the most rational model of state-level social policy is the market social state because it does not strongly rely on continuous morality of the politicians and bureaucrats. On the other hand, if people are not moral enough to create a principled market social state, it is naive to believe that strengthening and bureaucratizing the state and nationalizing the economy will lead to a more moral society. It is far more likely that this would just change the composition of the ruling class, where the capitalists would lose power and the politicians and bureaucrats would gain power.

Therefore, the market social state would facilitate the achievement of desirable goals of social policy, such as prevention and elimination of poverty, crime, illiteracy, illness and similar problems as well as realization of human economic potential in the sense of equal opportunity, dignified life for all citizens, etc. With this model we can on the one hand regulate capitalism and on the other prevent the forming of a privileged bureaucratic class. Even if these goals are shown to be utopian, this paper is nevertheless significant as it presents an analysis of the complex problems related to these models of social policy and their advantages and disadvantages, which have to be taken into account in scientific research of particular aspects of social policy and in its practical implementation.

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Social and behavioural responses during the COVID-19 pandemic in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Abstract: In this paper we report the results of an online study conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic (May 2020). The study examined a range of social and behavioural responses by youth from different ethnic backgrounds and across 63 cities (N = 569). More specifically, the study was focused on investigating the relationship between threat perception, public health behaviour, reported stress level and social cohesion. As expected, results indicate that higher perceived threat relates to higher compliance with health and safety measures despite extremely low levels of political trust. Surprisingly, participants reported relatively low levels of stress despite high social isolation and physical restrictions. These results could partially be explained by an increased level of family interaction. Furthermore, participants reported relatively high levels of social cohesion and common ingroup identification in a usually segregated and conflict-ridden context.

Keywords: COVID-19, Bosnia and Herzegovina, public health behaviour, political trust, social cohesion

Introduction

On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization received a report about a lung inflammation case of unfamiliar origin, identified in Wuhan, China. Later, it was discovered that such pneumonia was caused by a new, highly contagious and infectious severe acute respiratory

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syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). The disease caused by this virus was named COVID-19. On 30 January 2020, WHO declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) (World Health Organization 2020a). The epidemic quickly turned into a global pandemic, officially declared by the World Health Organization (2020b) on 11 March 2020. On that day there were 118,319 confirmed coronavirus cases in 114 countries and 4,292 registered deaths caused by the new virus (World Health Organization 2020c). As a result of the crisis, WHO issued prevention and control public health and social measures to be applied during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The first coronavirus case in Bosnia and Herzegovina was confirmed on 5 March 2020 (N1 2020a). A state of emergency at the state-level was declared on 17 March 2020 by the Council of Ministers (2020). This has resulted in the implementation of prevention and control measures and issuing of recommendations and guidelines by the governmental bodies at the entity and state level. The outbreak of the disease and the implemented orders have changed the daily life of citizens. The most rigorous measure was the curfew. It was enforced during March, April, and May by district and entity authorities. This order forbade the citizens to leave their houses or homes during specific hours (or days). In this paper, we report empirical evidence from a study conducted across 63 cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The study examined social and behavioural responses of youth during the pandemic. More specifically, we measured the perceived threat of the pandemic and its relation to behavioural adherence to proposed public health measures, reported stress levels as well as social cohesion.

Perceptions of threat

Literature suggests that perceptions of threat are likely to lead to behavioural changes at both individual and group level (Stephan and Srephan 2020). In the early 1950s, public health researchers at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services sought to discover and understand why people fail to adhere to disease prevention measures. As a result, they developed the Health Belief Model (HBM). The model is derived from behavioural and psychological theory; it provides insights into health-related behaviours and aims to predict them. The HBM points out two determining elements of such behaviours: perception of threat and evaluation of behaviour. The threat perception is based on the perceived susceptibility to the disease and the perceived severity of the disease. The evaluation of behavioural patterns is determined by an assessment of benefits and costs of the recommended behaviour (Abraham and Sheeran 2015). Another model that overlaps with the HBM is the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). The model was originally developed to provide insights about fear appeals and their consequent implications (Rogers 1975). Later, it was expanded to a potential general model of attitude change (Rogers 1983). According to the theory, attitude and assessment of risk will be based on (at least) three factors: the harmfulness (severity) of that specific event, the likelihood of its occurrence and the effectiveness of the protective behaviour. The PMT has been applied in a variety of contexts; however, research analysing different health-related behaviours and attitudes, primarily AIDS prevention, smoking, alcohol consumption and cancer prevention. Considering the nature of events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, it could be anticipated that a large number of people will perceive it as highly threatening. Moreover, we could expect that such perceptions of threat would be related to the specific health and safety attitudes and behaviours. In this study we sought to analyse these relations.

The emotion of fear

The expected emotional response to an event such as the current global health crisis is fear. Literature suggests that emotional states can be contagious and hence shared among the population (Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson 1993). According to the emotional contagion theory, emotions can be consciously or unconsciously shared and mimicked among individuals or groups. Thus, humans emotionally synchronize with those around them. Even though in-person interaction is reduced to a minimum during an outbreak of a disease such as COVID-19, Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock (2014) conducted an experiment which proved that emotional contagion on a mass scale is possible via social networks; thus, for transmission of fear to occur, in-person interaction is not necessary. Although threat and fear are different in concept as threat is cognition while fear is an emotion, research has shown that they are reciprocally related (Witte 1996). Therefore, this study analyses the threat perception of COVID-19, levels of fear reported by the participants and the relationship between threat and fear.

Attitudes and behaviour change

The perception of threat can vary from individual to individual as well as across and within social groups. This difference in perceived threat could produce different social and behavioural responses in individuals and groups. Over years of research, social scientists have identified threat and fear as significant determinants of safety and health-related attitudes and behaviours. In line with the HBM and PMT models, the level of perceived threat could possibly have a significant impact on adherence to protective measures. That is, the increased perception of risk (and fear) could lead to greater compliance with the recommended (protection and prevention) public health measures. Indeed, fear appeals have been used by many (including public health campaigns and institutions) to change or adjust the behaviour of targeted populations. However, appealing to fear does not always produce the desired outcomes. This occurs when people feel incapable of protecting themselves and managing the threat. Thus, Witte & Allen (2020) concluded that if people feel capable and efficient enough to deal with the emotion of fear produced by an imminent or perceived threat, constructive behaviour changes might follow. In addition, some people might hold on to a belief that bad things would not happen, leading them to underestimate the seriousness of the situation and ignore public health warnings. Van Bavel et al. (2020) explained this as the optimism bias. Therefore, the study analysed the relationship between the perception of threat and adherence to public health measures, anticipating that people would be more likely to comply with recommended public health measures, such as hand washing or maintaining physical distance, if they perceive the situation as threatening, as opposed to those who do not.

The role of trust

Furthermore, different factors determine the level of threat an individual or general public perceives. The risk perception can be increased by receiving information from relevant sources, and thus lead to adoption of protective behaviours. However, the extent and effectiveness of it will be determined by several different factors, such as the social context, education, gender and age. One factor particularly highlighted by Khosravi (2020) is trust. It is believed that trust significantly impacts how public health messages are received, interpreted and acted upon. This could be especially relevant in a health crisis, such as the current pandemic. Siegrist and Zingg (2014) conducted a review of literature that examined the relevance of trust when preparing for and during a pandemic. Applying the Trust, Confidence, and Cooperation (TCC) model, they identified the impact of sharing different research findings on trust. Therefore, by reviewing relevant and varied literature, they concluded that trust in the authorities has a positive effect on compliance with the recommended measures. In this study, we measured the people's trust in specific and relevant institutions. We assessed the reported level of trust that youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina have in the healthcare system, media, entity and state institutions. We also analysed the relationship between trust in relevant institutions and perceived threat, presuming that low levels of trust would be related to low-risk assessments.

Mental health and the pandemic

Moreover, concerning stress outcomes, pandemics such as COVID-19 can act as a major stressor and produce psychological difficulties ranging from anxiety, sense of loneliness to relationship challenges. The outbreak of the disease has disrupted the everyday life of many people around the world. Due to an absence of vaccines, various prevention measures such as social distancing and isolation were imposed and advised. This lack of social contact had the potential to trigger various psychological difficulties (Polizzi, Lynn & Perry 2020). Other factors, such as economic difficulties, could intensify them. As Baumeister and Leary (1995) demonstrated, the need to belong and to socially connect (establish and maintain stable relationships with other people) is an essential human motivation. It helps people to regulate their emotions and cope with difficulties. Lack of such connections can produce and aggravate adverse psychological reactions, such as the feeling of loneliness (Polizzi, Lynn, and Perry 2020). On the other hand, there are mechanisms that could help people to cope with these challenges. Increased engagement in online interactions could foster a sense of social connection. Moreover, different coping activities (such as hobbies, reading, watching television, learning a new language) could alleviate the stress caused by the pandemic and consequent isolation. Therefore, we sought to examine whether youth in BiH have experienced psychological difficulties, measured through reported stress, during the new pandemic. Here, we will report the results of mental health indicators, including changes in social interactions reported by the participants.

Social cohesion and the pandemic

In addition to the above, we also measured the potential effects of perceived threat on social cohesion indicators. As suggested in the literature, societal threats such as pandemics can have at least two outcomes for intergroup evaluations and relations. They can cause a range of negative social phenomena such as polarization, national isolation or scapegoating (Riek et al., 2006). Or they can lead to increased intergroup solidarity and prosocial behaviour due to perceptions of common shared destiny, leading to increased common ingroup identification. Thus, the pandemic could result in an augmentation of common identity perception. The source of sameness would be the same danger faced by everyone, which can induce a feeling of common fate (Van Bavel et al., 2020). Investigating such questions in an ethnically heterogenous country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina is not only relevant but potentially constructive. In this particular study, we have measured inclusive and exclusive forms of social identity and examined their relationship with a range of prosocial behavioural responses during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Methodology

Participants

A total of 569 (N) participants took part in the study. The sample included 376 females (64.5%), 198 males (34.8%), and 4 participants (0.7%) who reported their gender as "other". The participants were aged between 18 and 33 (M = 21.46, SD = 1.93). As a place of residence, the participants reported 63 different cities. A total of 226 (39.7%) participants identified as Bosniaks, 219 (38.5%) as Bosnian-Herzegovinians, 45 (7.9%) as both Bosniaks and Bosnian-Herzegovinians, 35 (6.2%) as Serbs, 18 (3.2%) as Croats, 3 (0.5%) as foreigners (but residing in BiH), 1 (0.2%) as Croat and Bosnian-Herzegovinian, and 22 (3.9%) reported their identity as "other".

Research design and procedure

The study used both exploratory and confirmatory research design. It explored the impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, a novel situation characterized as the global health crisis of our time, on a number of important social and behavioural indicators reported below. The data were collected via an online survey over a period of eight days in

May 2020 (6-14 May). The survey was uploaded to the Google Forms platform. The researchers contacted potential participants via e-mail and social networks. Participants who were contacted directly and consented to participation were asked to share the invitation among their contacts. Therefore, the sample was a combination of convenience and snowball sampling methods. The data were analysed using statistical methods from the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).

Materials

The survey was designed to measure the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on healthy behaviour changes, stress and coping, and prosocial behaviour changes at the group level (social cohesion). Firstly, the threat was measured by asking the participants to rate how much they agree with the statement "I think the COVID-19 virus poses a major threat to our society". They chose one response on a scale of 1 to 5; 1 represented "strongly disagree", 2 "disagree", 3 "neither agree nor disagree", 4 "agree" and 5 "strongly agree". Secondly, health behaviour changes were evaluated by participants' self-reported adherence and support to the public health measures recommended by the governmental bodies and specifically the World Health Organization. The participants were presented with the information that "According to the WHO, there are measures that should be taken to reduce the spread of COVID-19." In order to assess adherence to health and safety measures, we asked the participants to rate how frequently they practice the following behaviours: "Washing your hands for at least 20 seconds, especially after visiting public spaces" (1), "Avoiding public gatherings" (2), "Staying home and avoiding direct social contact" (3). They chose a response on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented "not at all", 2 "rarely", 3 "sometimes", 4 "often" and 5 "always". The support for public health initiatives was measured using Likert scale questions where participants evaluated how much they agree with the statements "It is essential that we strictly adhere to social distancing measures until experts say otherwise" (1) and "Right now, the most important thing we can do is adhere to all pandemic prevention measures" by choosing a response on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represented "strongly disagree", 2 "disagree", 3 "neither agree nor disagree", 4 "agree" and "strongly agree". Thirdly, we measured a degree of trust participants have towards institutions. We asked them to rate their level of trust in the healthcare system (1), entity institutions (2), state institutions (3) and the media (4). Fourthly, stress and coping mechanisms were measured with multiple items assessing how frequently the participants experience the following stress symptoms: consumption of alcohol (1), consumption of cigarettes (2), consumptions of other harmful substances (3), inability to relax (4), fear of the worst (5), anxiety (6), fear of death (7), loneliness (8), fear of being forgotten (9), overthinking (10), loss of social connections (11), identity crisis (12), indigestion or discomfort in the abdomen (13), change in sleep patterns (14), and change in eating patterns (15). The participants were asked to self-assess how often they have felt the listed symptoms by choosing one of the options: 1 "never", 2 "rarely", 3 "sometimes", 4 "often" or 5 "always". In addition, we measured the participants' social interactions with the following items: "I am spending more time talking about politics with my friends since the state of emergency was declared" (1), " I have been following the media much more since the pandemic was declared" (2) and "Family activities became more important during isolation", where they assessed their level of agreement by choosing a response on the scale from 1 to 5. Lastly, prosocial behaviour at group level was measured by examining the level of social cohesion. The participants were asked about which group of people they were mostly concerned about during the pandemic: their neighbours (1), their community (2), their entity (3) or all citizens of the country (4). They were also asked which group they would help the most, if they could do so. The following responses were offered: people in my community (1), members of at-risk groups (2), members of my ethnic/national group (3), all people in my state equally (4).

Results

Perception of threat

Overall, more than half of our participants reported that they perceived COVID-19 as a threat, whereas 18,8% were not sure what to think. See figure 1 for the distribution of results.

Figure 1: Percentage of young people perceiving COVID-19 as threatening



Perception of threat and public health behaviours

The research examined the level of adherence and compliance with the recommended public health measures across the country and investigated the particular relationship between the threat perception of COVID-19 and emotional and behavioural responses at the individual level. More specifically, we investigated the relationship between perceived threat and adherence to specific and recommended public health measures, as well as the relationship between perceived threat and the emotion of fear.

The data from Table 1 indicates high adherence to health and safety measures recommended by the WHO. The participants reported the highest compliance with the measures of washing hands for a minimum of 20 seconds (M = 4.48, SD = 0.83) and avoiding public gatherings (M = 4.31, SD = .93). Somewhat lower compliance was recorded for the staying home and avoiding direct social contact measure (M = 3.87, SD = 1.08). Moreover, the participants reported relatively significant support for public health initiatives. They characterized adherence to all implemented measures as important (M = 3.96, SD = 1.13), particularly with respect to the social distancing measure (M = 3.83, SD = 1.17). These results are presented in Table 2. As can been seen from both tables below, participants, on average, have reported high adherence to specific measures and have stated that such adherence is of utmost importance. The average scores were all above the mid-point of the scale (3). In addition, as can be seen in Figure 2 below, the relationship between perceptions of threat and public health behaviours is statistically significant ($r = 0.38$, $p < 0.001$) indicating that the more people perceived the pandemic as threatening, the more likely they were to support and adhere to public health measures and recommendations.

Table 1: Reported adherence to health and safety measures, mean values and standard deviations

	M	SD
Washing hands for a minimum of 20 seconds, especially after being in public spaces	4.48	0.83
Avoiding public gatherings	4.31	0.93
Staying home and avoiding direct social contact	3.87	1.08

Note. N = 569. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Scores ranged from 1 to 5.

Table 2: Reported support for public health initiatives, mean values and standard deviations

	M	SD
Right now, the most important thing we can do is adhere to all pandemic prevention measures	3.96	1.13
It is essential that we strictly adhere to social distancing measures until experts say otherwise	3.83	1.17

Note. N = 569. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Scores ranged from 1 to 5.

Figure 2: Relationship between perceptions of threat and adherence to public health measures



Trust in relevant institutions

As indicated above, participants were asked to indicate their degree of trust in the relevant institutions. As can be seen in Figure 3, participants reported extremely low levels of trust across all institutions, with average levels below the mid-point of the scale (3). Furthermore, the level of trust (specific or combined) did not correlate in any meaningful way with public health behaviours, indicating that it was not trust in the governmental institutions that was driving the changes in behaviour but rather the people's assessment of threat.

Figure 3: Reported levels of trust



Reported stress levels

Overall, the participants did not report a high frequency stress symptoms during the peak of the pandemic in the country. Overthinking (M = 3.62, SD = 1.35), change in sleep patterns (M = 3.34, SD =1.54), and nervousness (M = 3.16, SD = 1.26) were the symptoms the participants experienced most frequently during that period. Consumption of harmful substances (M = 1.22, SD = 0.70), consumption of alcohol (M = 1.28, SD = 0.76) and fear of death were the least frequent symptoms experienced by the participants (M = 1.58, SD = 0.96). The overall results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Reported stress symptoms, mean values and standard deviations

	M	SD
Consumptions of other harmful substances	1.22	0.70
Consumption of alcohol	1.28	0.76
Fear of death	1.58	0.96
Consumption of cigarettes	1.79	1.36
Identity crisis	1.96	1.29
Fear of being forgotten	1.98	1.23
Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen	2.17	1.30
Fear of the worst	2.35	1.24
Loss of social connections	2.48	1.26
Loneliness	2.63	1.33
Inability to relax	2.79	1.21
Change in eating patterns	2.90	1.46
Nervousness	3.16	1.26
Change in sleep patterns	3.34	1.54
Overthinking	3.62	1.35

Note. N = 569. M = *Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Scored ranged from 1 to 5.*

Unlike public health behaviour measures, the perception of threat was not related to overall stress indicators. In other words, perceiving the pandemic as more threatening did not lead participants to report higher stress symptoms. However, perception of threat was significantly correlated with one specific stress indicator (fear of the worst) with $r = 0.15$, $p < 0.001$. This indicates that perceiving the pandemic as more threatening was more likely to lead to an increase in reported fear. See Figure 4 for illustration of this particular relationship.

Figure 4: Relationship between perceptions of threat and reported fear



Social interactions

The results in Table 5 show that there was no significant increase with respect to interest in politics (M = 2.73, SD = 1.30) or media consumption (M = 2.96, SD = 1.31) during the pandemic. In addition, Table 6 demonstrates that a significant number of participants (M = 3.62, SD = 1.27) assigned higher importance to family activities during isolation.

Table 5: Reported participation/passivity, mean values and standard deviations

	M	SD
I am spending more time talking about politics with my friends since the state of emergency has been declared	2.73	1.30
I have been following the media much more since the pandemic has been declared	2.96	1.31

Note. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation.

Table 6: Reported importance of spending time with family during the pandemic, mean values and standard deviations

	M	SD
Family activities became more important during the isolation	3.62	1.27

Note. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation.

Perception of threat and social cohesion

Closer inspection of Table 7 and Table 8 demonstrates a high level of social cohesion. When asked about whom they are mostly concerned about during this pandemic, a significant majority (72.4%) of participants responded that they are mostly concerned about all citizens of the country. Correspondingly, when asked which group they would help the most if they could, 54.1% answered all people in the country and 35.3% answered to the members of at-risk groups, accounting for 89.4% of all responses.

Table 7: Frequency of reported concern about specific group

	N	%
My neighbours	21	3.7%
My community	111	19.5%
My entity	25	4.4%
All citizens of my country	412	72.4%
Total	**569**	**100%**

Table 8: Frequency of reported willingness to help specific groups

	N	%
People in my community	52	9.1%
Members of at-risk groups	201	35.3%
Members of my ethnic / national group	8	1.4%
All people in my state equally	308	54.1%
Total	**569**	**100.0**

Table 9 provides a summary of the main results.

Overview of main social and behavioural responses

Finally, we wish to present an overview of main social and behavioural responses (adherence to health and safety measures, reported support for public health recommendations, reported stress levels and social cohesion) to the perceived threat of COVID-19 pandemic in our sample of 569 citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Table 9.

Table 9: Overall mean levels of main social and behavioural responses



Discussion

In this paper we reported data on some important social and behavioural responses from a sample of young people (N = 569) of different ethnic backgrounds and from different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the COVID-19 pandemic. The major advantage of this study was not only its sample size but the recruitment of participants from 63 different cities and towns across the country. Thus, approximation of a representative sample adds to the validity of the reported results. However, we also need to note some major limitations: first, the lack of longitudinal design makes it impossible for us to follow specific changes and relationships over time.

In particular, in acute societal conditions such as pandemics, longitudinal monitoring of social and behavioural responses is a worthy insight. Second, our sample was biased in age and was not representative across age groups. This particular limitation places certain restrictions on the interpretation of our results. However, based on our existing data, results suggest that people, on average, are taking the pandemic seriously enough, which makes them more likely to comply with public health measures such as handwashing and social distancing. This indicates that increased awareness about the risk has produced a favourable impact on compliance with the measures (e.g., Wise et al., 2020) . Furthermore, results indicate that it was perception of threat that predicted public health behaviours and support for public initiatives, rather than trust in the relevant institutions (political trust) which was extremely low across all levels. Relating these results with the existing literature, it could be argued that participants exhibit relatively high levels of self-efficacy, causing threat perceptions to produce more constructive responses such as compliance and adherence to health and safety measures (Witte et al., 2000).

Furthermore, perception of threat was not related to stress indicators, which were relatively low despite social isolation and imposed physical restrictions. Correspondingly, the results show that perception of threat did not produce an unfavourable impact on the mental health of people. These patterns could be explained by an increased proximity and interaction with family members, reducing the sense of social and emotional isolation. In addition, cultural factors such as individualism or interdependence could partially explain the patterns and implications of more community and intimate family relationships.

On a positive note, in regard to social cohesion, participants reported relatively high levels of social cohesion including a relatively high identification with the entire country (38.5%) – rather than specific ethnic groups. It could be argued that this particular pandemic as a societal threat provided a sense of shared destiny, leading people to expand the boundaries of their identity and make it more inclusive to others. The sense of shared destiny might have led people to reorganize themselves and members of other ethnic groups into a single community. Such creation of common ingroup identity category is easier to establish in contexts where subgroups share equal status (Dovidio et al., 2007), as they do in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As of late May and early June, the authorities in BiH have eased many restrictions previously put in place to prevent the spread of COVID-19 disease, including the curfew. However, the number of confirmed coronavirus cases continues to rise at a significant rate. To illustrate, the number of confirmed coronavirus cases on 1 June was 2,524 and on 11 August it reached 876. From March to June, the number of new cases per day was usually below 50. In July and August, on most days this number exceeds 100, reaching 300 or more (Worldometer, 2020). The authorities and media are frequently expressing concern over non-compliance with the recommended measures (wearing masks, social distancing and avoiding public gatherings) as a significant contributor to these numbers. Based on the results of our research, we could conclude that people no longer perceive the COVID-19 pandemic to be as threatening as it was a few months earlier, and thus do not adopt the recommended behaviours. This implies that support and adherence to public health measures requires people to have a high awareness of the risk, i.e. to perceive the situation as threatening.

Conclusion

The world is currently struggling with the pandemic of the coronavirus disease 2019, also known as the COVID-19 pandemic. The first registered COVID-19 case occurred in Wuhan, China. The virus causing the disease, SARS-CoV-2, has spread quickly and in a few weeks the outbreak became a global health crisis. Countries around the world, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, are facing the impacts and consequences of the pandemic.

On 5 March, the first coronavirus case was confirmed in BiH. In the following weeks and months, state-level authorities and the authorities of Republika Srpska, Federation of BiH and Brcko District have been issuing different protection and prevention measures. These measures and the spread of the disease have impacted people's everyday life. Therefore, we wanted to explore and analyse the attitudes and behaviours during the pandemic, specifically in young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We surveyed 569 young people (online) all over BiH for one week in the first half of May. During this time, many of the measures and restrictions were still in place. Our results showed that more than half of the participants (56.1 %) perceived the spread of the disease as a threat. The participants demonstrated a high level of adherence and support for public health measures. We discovered that these behaviours were best predicted by the perception of threat rather than trust in healthcare, state, entity and media institutions, which was notably low. Moreover, participants did not exhibit symptoms and signs of psychological health issues despite social distancing measures, and their threat perception was not correlated to these symptoms (except for the "fear of the worst " indicator). Finally, we found high levels of social cohesion considering that participants reported concern about and willingness to help all citizens of their society rather than only their ethnic/national (or smaller) groups.

These results point to the importance of risk and threat perception because such perceptions are highly correlated with safer behaviours. In addition, these results support the argument that societal threats can lead to higher levels of societal cohesion and create opportunities for bridging the divisions in multi-ethnic societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, further investigation into specific conditions and processes that might facilitate such prosocial outcomes (e.g., social cohesion) of societal threats remains to be further examined in the future.

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Spremnost online korisnika za detektovanje i provjeravanje lažnih vijesti

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Sažetak: Cilj rada je provjeriti kompetentnost građana Bosne i Hercegovine za prepoznavanje lažnih vijesti te utvrditi njihovu spremnost za aktivno provjeravanje medijskih informacija u čiju istinitost sumnjaju. U istraživanju je primijenjen kvalitativno-kvantitativni pristup. U fokus grupama učestvovalo je 26 diskutanata, dok je anketnim upitnikom ispitano 445 građana Bosne i Hercegovine. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da većina respondenata (71,5%) prepoznaje valjanu definiciju lažnih vijesti, ali ih često brkaju s propagandom, pristranošću i manipulacijom. Lažne vijesti najčešće prepoznaju po brojnim pridjevima i prilozima. Pri procjeni istinitosti informacije više se vode ličnim osjećajima i uvjerenjima nego objektivnim indikatorima. Najčešće korištena tehnika za provjeru informacija sporne vjerodostojnosti je konsultovanje respektabilnih medija.

Ključne riječi: lažne vijesti, kompetencije građana, provjera, vjerodostojnost

Online users' readiness for detecting and checking fake news

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to find out how competent the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are to recognize fake news, as well as to determine their readiness to actively check the credibility of information they suspect to be fake. A qualitative-quantitative approach was applied in the research. 26 discussants participated in the focus groups, while 445 B&H citizens were surveyed by a questionnaire. The results of the research show that the majority of respondents (71.5%) recognize the correct definition of fake news, but they often confuse it with propaganda, bias and manipulation. Fake news is most often recognized by numerous adjectives and adverbs. In assessing the credibility of information, the respondents rely on their personal feelings and beliefs rather than on objective indicators. The most commonly used technique for verifying information of disputed credibility is checking if the news has been published in respectable media.

Key words: fake news, citizens' competencies, checking, credibility

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UVOD

Lažne vijesti u medijima velika su opasnost za kredibilitet savremenog novinarstva, kao i za društvo uopće. Iako nisu novi fenomen imanentan mrežnim medijima, ekspanzija interneta, a naročito društvenih mreža, doprinijela je njihovom eksplozivnom umnožavanju i ekstenzivnom širenju. Problem dodatno usložnjava činjenica da lažne vijesti nije lako prepoznati ni obrazovanijim *online* korisnicima (Bohannon, 2015; Wineburg i McGrew, 2017), kao i to što se šire višestruko brže od istinitih informacija (Nyhan, 2013; Vosughi, Roy i Aral, 2018). S ekspanzijom lažnih vijesti raste i zabrinutost za njihove konsekvence po demokratičnost društva i kvalitet informacija na osnovu kojih građani oblikuju svoje percepcije događaja. Na razmjere problema ukazuje i veliki interes naučnika za ovaj fenomen u posljednjih nekoliko godina, dokumenti Evropske komisije, a onda i zainteresovanost organizacija civilnog društva. Meta-analiza kojom su obuhvaćene 393 naučne studije o lažnim vijestima pokazala je da je više od 88% ovih radova objavljeno od 2015. do 2019. godine (Biloš, 2019).

Jednom od glavnih strategija za suzbijanje lažnih vijesti smatra se razvijanje medijske i informacijske pismenosti (MIP) građana. Pretpostavlja se da su građani s višim nivoom kompetencija koje uključuje ova vrsta pismenosti sposobniji identifikovati lažne informacije i oduprijeti se njihovim negativnim utjecajima. Bosna i Hercegovina, kao i druge države jugoistočne Evrope, vapi za opismenjavanjem građana u ovom polju. Prema indeksu medijske pismenosti za 2019. godinu Bosna i Hercegovina je na 32. mjestu među 35 evropskih država obuhvaćenih istraživanjem (Open Society Institute – Sofia i European Policies Initiative, 2019: 18).

U Bosni i Hercegovini nedostaje sistematičnih istraživanja o kompetencijama građana za identifikovanje lažnih vijesti, a naročito o stepenu angažovanosti građana u provjeravanju suspektnih informacija. Dostupne analize dosad su uglavnom provodile nevladine organizacije, dok su akademska istraživanja pretežno preglednog ili teorijskog karaktera. Argumentacija o medijskoj i informacijskoj pismenosti u Bosni i Hercegovini i dalje je pretežno zasnovana na teorijskim raspravama o njenom općem značaju u digitalnom društvu. Svrha ovog rada je provjeriti kompetencije građana za prepoznavanje lažnih vijesti te utvrditi koliko su spremni aktivno provjeravati informacije u čiju istinitost sumnjaju. Rad se temelji na sljedećim istraživačkim pitanjima:

- Znaju li građani BiH šta su lažne vijesti, odnosno razlikuju li ih od srodnih pojmova?
- Prepoznaju li indikatore lažnih vijesti?
- Da li i kako provjeravaju informacije spornog kredibiliteta?

2. TEORIJSKI OKVIR

2.1. Identifikovanje lažnih vijesti

Obimno istraživanje o širenju dezinformacija putem Twittera pokazalo je da su lažne informacije bile *retvitovane* u lancu korisnika koji je obuhvatao i do 19 ljudi. To im je obezbjeđivalo znatno veći doseg u poređenju s istinitim informacijama, čiji lanac dijeljenja nije prelazio deset korisnika. Lažne vijesti su šest puta brže od istinitih dosegle oko 1.500 korisnika, a 20 puta brže su dostigle lanac dijeljenja od deset osoba. Također, u poređenju s istinitim informacijama, bilo je 70% vjerovatnije da će biti podijeljene (Vosughi, Roy i Aral, 2018). Najčešće se dijele lažne informacije iz domena politike, a slijede one o urbanim legendama i naučnim „otkrićima" (2018: 4). Korisnici su skloni dijeliti informacije bez provjere njihove vjerodostojnosti (Shin i Thorson, 2017). Važan kriterij kojim *online* korisnici vrednuju informacije je novost (Vosughi, Roy i Aral, 2018: 5), a ne vjerodostojnost. Paradoksalno je da, iako ljudi najmanje vjeruju društvenim mrežama kao izvorima informacija u poređenju s konvencionalnim i mrežnim medijima, njih najviše koriste (Frau-Meigs, 2019: 18).

Prvi korak u suzbijanju lažnih vijesti je njihovo identifikovanje. Zbog čestog brkanja ove sintagme s pojmovima propagande, pristranih izvještaja, netačnih informacija i satire treba precizirati da u ovom radu pod lažnim vijestima podrazumijevamo „članke koji su namjerno i potvrđeno lažni i koji mogu obmanuti čitaoce" (Allccot i Gentzgow, 2017: 213). Dakle, isključivo one informacije koje su neistinite, a ne one koje sadrže jednostrane i tendenciozno izabrane činjenice karakteristične za pristrane informacije. Drugo krucijalno svojstvo lažnih vijesti je intencija obmanjivanja korisnika. Za razliku od netačnih informacija koje sadrže nenamjerne greške, u lažnim vijestima one su rezultat namjere. Lažne vijesti nije uvijek lako prepoznati jer vizuelno (naslovima, grafičkim dizajnom) i stilski (narativnom strukturom, načinom izražavanja) oponašaju profesionalne medije. Usto, pojavljuju se u istom ambijentu, tj. na istim platformama i stranicama dok korisnici skrolaju po ekranima mobilnih uređaja. Korisnicima društvenih mreža teško je procijeniti je li neka vijest istinita ili lažna (Silverman, 2016). Kombinovanje činjenica i izmišljenih izjava, situiranje događaja na pogrešne lokacije ili datume, dekontekstualizovanje činjenica, ubacivanje dvosmislenih ili satiričnih elemenata u priče dodatno usložnjavaju identifikovanje lažnih vijesti. Izlaganje satiričnim lažnim sadržajima i onda kada su korisnici svjesni da su satiričnog karaktera zamagljuje granicu između istinitih i lažnih vijesti, naročito kod onih koji manje prate „tvrde“ vijesti (Balmas, 2012). Također, percipiranje lažnih vijesti kao realističnih ostavlja i dugoročne posljedice na politički senzibilitet pojedinaca (2012: 17).

Postoji, ipak, niz indikatora koji mogu pomoći u prepoznavanju lažnih vijesti: *clickbait* naslovi, nepoznate ili neobične domene, objavljivanje na nekredibilnim stranicama, izostavljanje izvora informacije ili njegovo neprecizno navođenje, izostavljanje ili pogrešno navođenje vremena i mjesta događaja, nevjerovatnost/nepotkrijepljenost događaja koji su predmet vijesti, sporan lingvistički i stilski kvalitet teksta. ***Clickbait*** naslovi pogrešni su i obmanjivački s ciljem podsticanja korisnika da kliknu na određenu vijest. U tu svrhu su preuveličani, neusklađeni sa sadržajem priče, a korištenjem nejasnih ili dvosmislenih pojmova ili izostavljanjem bitnih činjenica navode čitaoca na pogrešne zaključke. Emotivno su potentni, često preopterećeni pridjevima. Čak i kada se takve informacije pokažu netačnim, rijetko se mijenjaju naslovi ranije objavljene vijesti (Silverman, 2015: 107), pa su *clickbaitovi* glavni uzročnici brze difuzije nevjerodostojnih informacija (2015: 100-111). Za objavljivanje i distribuiranje lažnih vijesti često se koriste tzv. farme web stranica, odnosno mreže web i Facebook stranica koje se poveznicama međusobno promoviraju, dijeleći sporne, često lažne sadržaje radi postizanja što većeg broja posjeta u profitne svrhe. Zbog širenja različitih vrsta dezinformacija neki mediji su poznati po lošoj reputaciji, a pojedini se nalaze i na tzv. crnim ili crvenim listama koje objavljuju *fact-checkeri* u različitim državama. U lažnim vijestima često se spominje samo naziv portala koji „prenosi“ određeni sadržaj, **bez navođenja izvora koji ga je prvi objavio i bez imena autora**. Umjesto preciznim navođenjem izvora, vjerodostojnost informacije pokušava se kompenzirati pozivanjem na neimenovane „ugledne stručnjake“, „institute“, „naučna istraživanja“ i sl. Osim toga, **izostavljanjem datuma i mjesta događaja** neke lažne vijesti bivaju reciklirane više puta, godinama kružeći internetom. Nije rijetkost ni obmanjivanje *online* korisnika objavljivanjem fotografija s drugih lokacija, odnosno događaja na koje se informacija ne odnosi. Sadržaj naslova odnosno teksta nekad je toliko malo vjerovatan da i samo zdravorazumsko promišljanje i poznavanje načina na koji određeni sistem funkcionira ukazuje na suspektnost informacije. Dodatni indikator vjerodostojnosti je i valjanost dokaza ponuđenih u tekstu. Glavni generatori lažnih vijesti su anonimni web portali i Facebook stranice koje nemaju redakciju niti zaposlene novinare, a njihove preuzete ili fiktivne informacije objavljuju pojedinci ili grupe vođeni profitnim ili propagandnim ciljevima. To odsustvo profesionalnog novinarskog znanja i etičkih principa manifestuje se i lošijim lingvističkim i stilskim kvalitetom tekstova. Naslovi su uglavnom senzacionalistički, argumentacija kvazinaučna, terminologija neprecizna ili pogrešna, a stil pisanja neformalan i intimizovan.

Ispitivanje provedeno u Hrvatskoj pokazalo je priličnu samouvjerenost respondenata pri samoprocjeni kompetencija za detektovanje lažnih vijesti. Gotovo 80% ih je donekle ili vrlo sigurno da znaju prepoznati lažne vijesti (Biloš, 2020: 175). Još uvijek je malo empirijskih dokaza o tome koje individualne karakteristike korisnika i kako utječu na podložnost ili otpornost na dezinformacije (Amazeen i Bucy, 2019). Prema nekim nalazima, podložniji su im pojedinci koji provode manje vremena koristeći medije, manje obrazovani i oni mlađi (Allcott i Gentzkow, 2017). Također, oni kojima su društvene mreže i platforme glavni izvor informacija manje su kritični prema *online* vijestima (Allcott i Gentzkow, 2017). Neki autori preporučuju preusmjeravanje fokusa u edukovanju građana za prepoznavanje lažnih vijesti s mlađih na starije korisnike (Veszelszki, 2016). Oni također koriste *online* platforme, a nedostaje im medijskih i informacijskih kompetencija u digitalnom okruženju.

2.2. Kompetentnost građana za valorizovanje istinitosti medijskih informacija

Medijska pismenost podrazumijeva „sposobnost građanina da pristupi, analizira i stvara informacije za postizanje specifičnih rezultata" (Aufderheide, 1992: 6). U kontekstu prepoznavanja i provjeravanje lažnih vijesti, koji su predmet rada, fokus je na ovoj drugoj komponenti – kompetencijama korisnika da analiziraju i valorizuju informacije. Informacijska pismenost podrazumijeva „intelektualni okvir za razumijevanje, pronalaženje, vrednovanje i korištenje informacija“ (ACRL, 2000). Medijsko i informacijsko opismenjavanje građana, pa tako i borba protiv različitih vrsta informacijskih poremećaja, zahtijeva sistemsko djelovanje različitih aktera, uključujući državne zakonodavne i pedagoške institucije, obrazovne ustanove, medije, novinarska udruženja i organizacije civilnog društva. Ovaj rad bavi se pismenošću iz perspektive korisnika, odnosno mjeri njihove kompetencije za detektovanje, a onda i za provjeravanje lažnih vijesti.

Građani s višim nivoom ovih vrsta pismenosti kritičnije evaluiraju informacije i manje su podložni utjecaju informacijskih poremećaja (Vraga i Tully, 2016; Kahne i Bowyer, 2017). U Evropi je najviši nivo medijske pismenosti kod građana sjeverne Evrope, srednji kod građana srednje Evrope, a najniži kod građana južne i istočne Evrope (Celot i Pérez, 2009). Povjerenje građana Bosne i Hercegovine u naučnike, ali i u medije i novinare vrlo je nisko (2019: 11-13). Pad povjerenja u institucije, zvaničnike i medije reflektuje se na učestalije informiranje iz alternativnih izvora koji objavljuju dezinformacije (Newman i sar., 2017), a koje u odnosu na *mainstream* medije korisnici smatraju oslobođenim političkih i ekonomskih utjecaja (Coleman i sar., 2009: 35). Lažne vijesti na društvenim mrežama i blogovima mlađe korisnike privlače zbog ideoloških sukobljavanja u njima, alternativnih i kontroverznih prikaza događaja koje smatraju objektivnijim i informativnijim načinom prikupljanja informacija u odnosu na one iz *mainstream* medija (Marchi, 2012: 258).

Medijsko opismenjavanje građana je imperativ njihovog kvalitetnijeg informiranja i boljeg snalaženja u digitalnom društvu (Carlsson, 2018; Evropska komisija, 2018). Medijski i informacijski kompetentnim građanima lakše je razlikovati vjerodostojne od lažnih vijesti, pa bi MIP mogao doprinijeti i popravljanju narušenog povjerenja u medije. Umjesto rastuće apstinencije od vijesti, mogli bismo očekivati i bolje vrednovanje kredibilnih medija. To ipak ne garantuje i promjenu informativnih navika korisnika. Meta-analiza o efektima medijskog opismenjavanja (Jeong, Cho i Hwang, 2012) pokazala je da su bolje postignuti ishodi u vezi s kritičkim pristupom medijima nego oni koji se tiču ponašanja. Moguće objašnjenje za to autori nalaze u tome što je većina programa medijskog opismenjavanja fokusirana na jačanje kritičkog razmišljanja, a ne na podsticanje promjena ponašanja, kao i da su prvi ishodi neposredniji i lakši za mjerenje (Jeong, Cho i Hwang, 2012). I istraživanje o efektima medijskog opismenjavanja u SAD-u (Mihailidis, 2008) ukazalo je na slične nedostatke ovakvog pristupa. Studenti koji su odslušali medijsku pismenost postali su cinični (2008: 171). Stoga bi, umjesto podsticanja pretjeranog skepticizma prema medijima u cjelini, valjalo razvijati znanje i vještine korisnika za diferenciranje vjerodostojnih od nevjerodostojnih informacija i uvažavanje kvalitetnog novinarstva.

Izbor lažnih umjesto istinitih informacija nije uslovljen isključivo kompetencijama korisnika, nego i njihovom otvorenošću prema vijestima koje ne korespondiraju s njihovim stavovima. Korisnici su skloni birati i vjerovati onim informacijama koje potvrđuju njihovu percepciju stvarnosti, a one suprotne odbacivati kao iskrivljene i pristrane (Lefevere i sar., 2012; Prior, Sood i Khanna, 2015; Robison i Mullinix, 2016; Shin, Jian, Driscoll i Bar, 2016; Shu i sar., 2017; Lazer i sar., 2018). Studija u kojoj su učesnicima prikazani naslovi lažnih vijesti na prosudbu (Guess i sar., 2018: 2) pokazala je da znatan broj njih odobrava sumnjive i lažne vijesti kada su kompatibilne s njihovim političkim uvjerenjima.

Uprkos upitnom kredibilitetu mnogih *online* informacija s jedne strane, te dostupnosti podataka u različitim izvorima s druge, većina korisnika nije sklona provjeravati njihovu vjerodostojnost (Patterson, 2007; Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016; Lazer i sar., 2018). To rade uglavnom samo u određenim situacijama: onda kada se radi o nečemu što smatraju izuzetno važnim ili zanimljivim (Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016), o informaciji koja opovrgava njihove predrasude ili kada su podstaknuti na provjeravanje (Lazer i sar., 2018: 1095). Zbog utjecaja predrasuda na valorizovanje informacija upitna je i učinkovitost *crowdsourcing* pristupa u verifikovanju informacija. Pri označavanju vijesti istinitim ili lažnim korisnici bi potvrđivali kao istinite one priče koje se uklapaju u njihove stavove, a bacali sumnju na one suprotne, bez obzira na njihovu istinitost (Flintham i sar., 2018: 8).

Za razliku od *fact-checking* stranica koje djeluju retroaktivno nastojeći umanjiti štetu od objavljenih neistinitih informacija, medijsko i informacijsko opismenjavanje priprema građane da ih sami prepoznaju i odupru im se. *Fact-checking* je zato opisan kao liječenje infekcije, a MIP kao jačanje imunog sistema (Rushkoff, 2018, prema McDougall, 2019: 30). Nije dovoljno označiti vijest kao istinitu ili lažnu, nego korisnicima treba ponuditi linkove na dodatne, kredibilne izvore u kojima mogu provjeriti koji dijelovi priče su istiniti, a koji ne (Flintham i sar., 2018: 9).

U studiji u kojoj je testirana učinkovitost medijske, informacijske, informativne i digitalne pismenosti za prepoznavanje i opovrgavanje lažnih vijesti najkorisnijom se pokazala informacijska pismenost (Jones-Jang, Mortensen i Liu, 2019). Ova vrsta pismenosti značajno povećava vjerovatnoću prepoznavanja lažnih vijesti. Autori to objašnjavaju time što je medijska pismenost fokusirana na kritičko razumijevanje medijskih poruka, a informacijska na identifikovanje, lociranje, evaluiranje i korištenje informacija, što smatraju i krucijalnim kompetencijama za informiranje u digitalnom dobu. S druge strane, budući da lažne vijesti oponašaju format vijesti, kao i da se sistematično proizvode i distribuiraju, „vještine kritičkog promišljanja medijskih poruka možda više nisu dovoljne za razlikovanje istinitih od lažnih priča" (2019: 12). Zato zagovaraju pristup u čijem će fokusu biti efikasno prikupljanje istinitih informacija, odnosno procjenjivanje vjerodostojnosti svih informacija. U studiji koja se bavila ulogom individualnih karakteristika korisnika u zaštiti od dezinformacija dobijeni su nešto drugačiji rezultati. Pokazalo se da pojedince koji prepoznaju legitimno novinarstvo od izmišljenih vijesti karakterizira njihovo razumijevanje načina na koji funkcioniraju informativni mediji (Amazeen i Bucy, 2019).

Istražujući kako korisnici provjeravaju autentičnost informacija na društvenim mrežama, Edson Tandoc i sar. (2017) utvrdili su da se prvenstveno vode svojom procjenom, a tek po potrebi koriste i vanjske izvore. Prema studiji o ulozi kredibiliteta osobe, odnosno medija koji dijeli vijesti na društvenim mrežama (Sterrett i sar., 2019), Amerikanci pri procjeni vjerodostojnosti informacija na Facebooku pažnju obraćaju više na kredibilitet osobe nego medija. Preciznije, veći utjecaj na njihov odnos prema informaciji imalo je povjerenje u ugledne pojedince koji je dijele nego kredibilitet medija koji ju je objavio. Naziv medija bio je važan samo kod medija u koje korisnici nemaju povjerenja. Tada su se ponašali slično kao i prema vijestima podijeljenim na profilima osoba sumnjivog kredibiliteta – nisu povjerovali u nju.

Studija provedena na Univerzitetu Standford (Allcot i Gentzkow, 2017) pokazala je da većina učesnika nije u stanju provjeriti vjerodostojnost izvora informacije. Glavni razlog tome istraživači vide u činjenici da se većina tehnika evaluiranja vjerodostojnosti informacije fokusira na tehnike koje korisnike zadržavaju na istom web portalu koji se provjerava (provjeravaju domenu, gramatičke i pravopisne greške, fotografije). Zaključili su da je važno savjetovati korisnike medija da provjeravaju informacije i na drugim web lokacijama. I semantičko označavanje neistinitih sadržaja može utjecati na percepciju korisnika o vijestima. Prema istraživanju o tome da li korisnici češće percipiraju vijesti kao lažne ako se uz naslov vijesti pojavljuje i neka vrsta upozorenja, izlaganje tagovima „sporno" ili „ocijenjeno lažno" nije utjecalo na percepciju neoznačenih lažnih ili istinitih naslova, dok je izlaganje generalnim upozorenjima da je informacija možda neistinita smanjilo i povjerenje u istinite naslove. Dakle, učinkovitije je koristiti tagove poput „sporno" ili „ocijenjeno lažno" jer nema „prelijevajućeg efekta" koji dovodi do toga da građani sumnjaju i u istinite informacije (Clayton i sar., 2019: 19).

2.3. Provjeravanje suspektnih vijesti

Istraživanja o ponašanju korisnika *online* informacija pokazuju da uglavnom nisu spremni uložiti vrijeme ni trud u provjeravanje vijesti spornog kredibiliteta (Melro i Pereira, 2019; Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2019). Rijetki su oni koji obraćaju pažnju na impresum web ili Facebook stranice (Wineburg i McGrew, 2016; Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016). Studija o reakcijama korisnika društvenih mreža na lažne vijesti pokazala je da ona uglavnom izostaje. Većina korisnika ne reaguje na neistine u njima, niti ih ispravlja. Postove s ispravkama objavljuju samo onda kada se informacija direktno tiče njih ili njima bliskih osoba (Tandoc, Lim i Ling, 2019). Istraživanje o informativnim navikama mladih u Bosni i Hercegovini (Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016) pokazalo je da ih većina ne provjerava dodatno *online* informacije u čiju istinitost sumnja. Greške i razlike u vijestima zanemaruje, osim ako ih smatra veoma važnim, odnosno ako se tiču njihovih ličnih potreba i interesovanja (2016: 79-80, 118).

Među najčešćim tehnikama provjere spornih informacija je upoređivanje iste informacije u različitim medijima (Melro i Pereira, 2019), obično onima koje smatraju kredibilnim (Hargittai, 2010; Chung i sar., 2012; Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016; Nielsen i Graves, 2017; Nelson i Taneja, 2018). Iako korisnici imaju poteškoća u diferenciranju vjerodostojnih od nevjerodostojnih izvora, u situacijama kada su voljni provjeriti istinitost informacije znaju u kojim medijima ih potražiti (Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016; Nielsen i Graves, 2017).

Studije ukazuju na važnost kredibiliteta medija i u kontekstu dosega i utjecaja lažnih vijesti. Profesionalni mediji s dobrom reputacijom i dalje privlače najveću i najlojalniju publiku u poređenju s manjom i nelojalnom publikom lažnih stranica (Nelson i Taneja, 2018). Ovdje ipak treba uzeti u obzir kumulativni utjecaj više lažnih stranica. Dakle, iako, posmatrano pojedinačno, određena lažna stranica u pravilu ima znatno manju publiku od profesionalnog medija, korisnici su izloženi većem broju takvih stranica, pa se njihov utjecaj ne smije zanemariti.

Metoda

Za prikupljanje podataka korišten je kvantitativno-kvalitativni pristup istraživanju primjenom dviju istraživačkih tehnika, i to: fokus grupe (kvalitativno ispitivanje) i anketnog upitnika (kvantitativno ispitivanje).

Fokus grupa kao moderirana grupna diskusija o određenoj temi radi spoznavanja stavova i motiva učesnika pogodna je i za razumijevanje odnosa građana prema lažnim vijestima. Održali smo ih u četiri bosanskohercegovačka grada – Sarajevu, Tuzli, Mostaru i Banjoj Luci, od jula do novembra 2019. Prema Timothyju Collinsu fokus grupe su prikladna tehnika istraživanja koja se bavi analiziranjem načina na koji građani percipiraju različite vladine mjere, produkte ili javne (pa i medijske) kampanje (1999: 11-12), a mogu se koristiti i kao priprema za kvantitativno istraživanje. U ovom istraživanju fokus grupe smo organizovali prvenstveno radi provjere stavova građana o lažnim vijestima i načinu na koji ih razumijevaju i evaluiraju, a rezultati fokus grupa koristili su nam i za preciziranje pitanja u anketnom upitniku. U četiri fokus grupe učestvovalo je ukupno 26 učesnika (14 osoba ženskog i 12 muškog spola), a sve diskusije su zvučno snimljene i naknadno analizirane. U svakoj grupi bilo je šest ili sedam diskutanata, što je omogućilo dinamičnu i ravnomjernu interakciju.

Anketnim upitnikom obuhvaćeno je 445 građana Bosne i Hercegovine u novembru i decembru 2019. godine. Inače, anketni upitnik je tehnika ispitivanja koja se koristi za istraživanje „masovnih pojava“, a njene odlike su „sistematičnost, relativna kratkotrajnost i ekonomičnost“ (Termiz, 2009: 279). Korištena je metoda slučajnog uzorka, a prema uputi za komunikološka istraživanja iz knjige *The Media of Mass Communication* odabran je i broj učesnika. John Vivian navodi da su 384 respondenta sasvim dovoljan broj da bismo dobili 95% objektivne rezultate, s mogućnošću greške od 5% u slučaju ispitivanja neograničenog broja osoba

(Vivian, 2002: 327). Anketiranje smo proveli kreiranjem mreže anketara širom Bosne i Hercegovine. Dobnu klasifikaciju građana preuzeli smo od američkog Pew Research Centra koji navodi sljedeće generacije:

a) generacija Z: 7-22 g.
b) milenijalsi: 23-38 g.
c) generacija X: 39-54 g.
d) baby boomeri: 55-73 g.
e) spavači: 73-91 g.

Anketni upitnik sadržavao je 15 pitanja, od kojih se prvi set pitanja odnosio na osnovne karakteristike respondenata (dob, spol, nivo obrazovanja, mjesto stanovanja). Drugi set pitanja odnosio se na uopćene navike u korištenju medija (vrijeme koje provode dnevno uz medije, društvene mreže na kojima posjeduju profile, izvore informiranja, zadovoljstvo pronađenim informacijama i sposobnost da tragaju za istim, vrstu *online* aktivnosti, odnos prema *clickbait* naslovima i reklamama). Treći set pitanja odnosio se na sposobnost građana da prepoznaju i definiraju lažne vijesti, na način na koji provjeravaju vjerodostojnost informacija i elemente informacije na osnovu kojih najčešće posumnjaju u njenu istinitost. Pitanja u anketnom upitniku bila su zatvorenog tipa, pri čemu su odgovori ili stepenovani prema Likertovoj skali od 1 do 5 ili je ponuđeno više odgovora od kojih su respondenti mogli izabrati jedan ili više. Podaci su obrađeni u softveru SPSS, a korištene su sljedeće statističke procedure:

1. deskriptivna statistika (frekvencije, prosjek, medijana, mod, mean ili aritmetička sredina)
2. neparametrijski testovi prikladni za podatke dobijene na osnovu Likertove skale i pitanja s mogućnošću izbora (Kruskal-Wallisov test, Mann-Whitney test, Hi kvadrat test).

Rezultati i analiza

U svrhu odgovaranja na prvo istraživačko pitanje – znaju li građani šta su lažne vijesti, ispitanicima su ponuđena tri moguća odgovora između kojih su mogli izabrati jedan. Prvi odgovor je bio da su lažne vijesti članci/objave koji su namjerno i potvrđeno lažni i koji mogu obmanuti čitaoce. U drugom odgovoru je navedeno da su lažne vijesti netačne informacije koje oponašaju stvarne događaje na humorističan način. Treći odgovor je bio da su lažne vijesti nekritičke i netačne informacije koje veličaju određene političke subjekte i njihove politike. Prvi ponuđeni odgovor je definicija lažnih vijesti Hunta Allcotta i Matthewa Gentzgowa (2017: 213), dok je drugi odgovor definicija parodije (engl. *news parody*), a treći definicija političke propagande prema tipologiji Edsona Tandoca, Zhenga Wei Lima i Richarda Linga (2018: 141-146). Iako postoje različite definicije lažnih vijesti, ponuđenu definiciju Allcotta i Matthewa smatramo adekvatnom jer obuhvata dva krucijalna svojstva ovog fenomena: neistinitost i intencionalnost obmanjivanja. Druga definicija je preuska za lažne vijesti jer obuhvata samo parodiju, dok predmet lažnih vijesti ne moraju biti stvarni događaji niti moraju sadržavati elemente humora. Također, kod parodije u pravilu ne postoji intencija obmanjivanja recipijenata. Treća definicija je također preuska jer obuhvata samo političku propagandu, dok se lažne vijesti odnose na brojne oblasti života, osim politike, a usto nisu nužno ni nekritične ni glorificirajuće. Parodija i propaganda su srodni pojmovi lažnim vijestima, ali nikako identični, pa je od ponuđene tri definicije adekvatna samo prva.

Većina učesnika u istraživanju izabrala je valjanu definiciju lažnih vijesti (oko 71,5%), lažne vijesti definiralo je kao propagandu oko 22% učesnika ispitivanja, dok je definiciju parodije izabralo oko 6% (Grafikon 1).

Grafikon 1: Prepoznavanje valjane definicije lažnih vijesti



Prema ovim rezultatima mogli bismo zaključiti da građani prilično dobro razlikuju lažne informacije od sličnih fenomena. Ipak, učesnicima fokus grupa bilo je teško pojasniti sintagmu lažne vijesti, dok neki stariji učesnici nisu uopće znali o kakvom je fenomenu riječ, niti su sintagmu mogli povezati s medijima. Jedna učesnica (36 godina) nije mogla pojasniti pojam niti navesti primjer lažnih vijesti iako je kategorično tvrdila da zna o kakvom je fenomenu riječ. Ovi rezultati korespondiraju s nalazima drugih znanstvenih istraživanja (Biloš, 2020) koja su pokazala da građani često neosnovano tvrde da znaju šta su lažne informacije. Mnogi diskutanti, uključujući studente i zaposlenike s visokom stručnom spremom, lažne vijesti su najčešće povezivali i objašnjavali kao političku propagandu. Pojam su često brkali s ideološkom medijskom pristranošću i uopće medijskom manipulacijom. Takvo poimanje ilustruju odgovori o „plaćenim, naručenim člancima koji otkrivaju jednu stranu istine“ (A. M.), „svjesnom pisanju laži protiv političara ili glumaca“ (V. B.), o sastancima stranačkih lidera nakon kojih se „pišu vijesti, vjerovatno iz njihove režije“ (Z. M.).

Vrijedi spomenuti da su mnogi učesnici, iako ih se većina informira uglavnom putem digitalnih medija, kazali da ne vjeruju tim medijima. Na isti problem ukazala su i neka druga istraživanja (npr. Frau-Meigs, 2019). Iako nisu znali pojasniti šta su lažne informacije, građani su često spominjali da im smetaju medijske manipulacije i pristranost u informiranju. Ovi fenomeni su i mogući uzroci iskazane skeptičnosti prema medijskim informacijama. To je posebno izraženo u Bosni i Hercegovini, u kojoj većina političkih partija otvara vlastite web portale ili više njih na kojima se manipulira informacijama, a na kojima je uočljiva i otvorena stranačka pristranost i *trolling*. Tipični su odgovori poput „...danas ni videima ne vjerujem jer je montaža veoma sofisticirana...“ (S. M.), ili „ako čujem aktera, onda vjerujem. Kad mediji prenose informaciju, onda 50:50%“ (V. B.), odnosno „Ako su neke vijesti iz lokalne sredine koje možete provjeriti, vjerujem, ovo ostalo nemate čemu vjerovati...“ (M. Z.).

Većina učesnika imala je listu medija kojima ne vjeruju, a kao najčešći primjeri spominjani su Srpska novinska agencija (SRNA) te portali www.blic.rs, www.infromer.rs, www.telegraf.rs, www.avaz.ba, www.bljesak.info, www.thebosniatimes.ba, www.gradsarajevo.ba.

U Tabeli 1 prikazana je rasprostranjenost izbora valjane definicije u različitim dobnim skupinama. Budući da je uzorak veoma razuđen i da najviše respondenata pripada dvjema dobnim skupinama (milenijalsima i generaciji X), nisu bile moguće preciznije statističke analize.

Tabela 1: Izbor valjane definicije lažnih vijesti u različitim dobnim skupinama

Dobna skupina	Valjana definicija	Pogrešna definicija – Parodija	Pogrešna definicija – Propaganda	Ukupno
od 18 do 22	73	9	16	98
od 23 do 38	124	8	35	167
od 39 do 54	104	4	24	132
od 55 do 73	16	5	26	47
74 i više	1	0	0	1
Ukupno	**318**	**26**	**101**	**445**

Ipak, vidimo da su pogrešnu definiciju najčešće birali stariji građani, pa su tako osobe od 55 do 73 godine češće lažne informacije brkali s propagandom, što je i razumljivo zbog njihovog društvenog *backgrounda* i činjenice da su uglavnom odrastali uz štampu i televiziju koja je nerijetko služila upravo u propagandne svrhe.

U izboru valjane definicije bolje su se snašli obrazovaniji građani (Tabela 2), što je bio slučaj i s učesnicima fokus grupa, a slične rezultate pokazala su i druga istraživanja (npr. Allcott i Gentzkow, 2017).

Tabela 2: Izbor valjane definicije u različitim obrazovnim skupinama građana

	Izbor valjane definicije	Valjana definicija	Pogrešna definicija – Parodija	Pogrešna definicija – Propaganda	Ukupno
Stepen obrazovanja	Bez obrazovanja	6	1	5	12
	Osnovno obrazovanje	4	1	5	10
	Srednje obrazovanje	113	6	26	145
	Fakultet (dodiplomski studij)	143	17	50	210
	Fakultet (postdiplomski studij)	46	1	15	62
	Fakultet (doktorski studij)	6	0	0	6
	Ukupno	**318**	**26**	**101**	**445**

U anketnom upitniku građanima smo ponudili niz tvrdnji koje se tiču načina na koji prepoznaju lažne informacije. Tvrdnje su ocjenjivali na skali od 1 do 5. Najčešći indikatori suspektnih informacija za učesnike ispitivanja su stil pisanja, nedostatak transparentnih izvora informacija, kredibilnost i poznatost medija. Slično misle i učesnici fokus grupa koji su ponudili niz tehnika kojima se služe u razotkrivanju lažnih vijesti. Neke od njih su:

- provjeravanje naslova članka (ako je izrazito senzacionalistički – posumnjaju u istinitost)
- analiza stila pisanja (kako su neki učesnici u fokus grupi kazali „kulture pisanja“)
- analiza argumentacija (dokazi, činjenice, podaci)
- provjera iste informacije u drugim medijima
- posezanje za „unutrašnjim osjećajem“ koji ne znaju objasniti, a koji im, kažu, često govori šta jeste istina
- provjeravanje izvora informacije
- provjeravanje kvaliteta fotografije objavljene uz informaciju
- traganje za istom informacijom u klasičnim medijima, najčešće televiziji.

Zanimljivi su komentari učesnika fokus grupa o tome da „mogu osjetiti kada je informacija lažna“ (D. S.) ili da je lažnu informaciju moguće prepoznati „isto kao što prepoznajete lažljivca“ (B. V.). Diskutanti ukazuju na naslove, *lead* i stil pisanja kao indikatore za detektovanje lažnih vijesti: „Prepoznajem ih po naslovima, ali i po načinu na koji je vijest početa. Ne znam kako da kažem, bude mi jasno kad vidim na koji je način vijest 'servirana“ (K. M.). Nisu rijetki ni oni koji kažu da uopće ne provjeravaju vijesti, dok drugi provjeravaju na „suprotnim portalima“ (V. B.), misleći pod tim na portale drugačije političke orijentacije ili najčešće portale koji se obraćaju drugoj etničkoj skupini.

Iz navedenih odgovora primjećujemo i to da građani prepoznaju različite političke orijentacije web portala pa tako one koji ne podržavaju njihova ubjeđenja nazivaju „suprotnim“ ili „lijevim“ portalima. Ovakvi komentari odgovaraju i drugim znanstvenim istraživanjima koja su pokazala da korisnici češće posežu i vjeruju onim informacijama koje potvrđuju njihova viđenja stvarnosti (Lefevere i sar., 2012; Prior, Sood i Khanna, 2015; Robison i Mullinix, 2016; Shin, Jian, Driscoll i Bar, 2016; Shu i sar., 2017; Lazer i sar., 2018; Guess i sar., 2018; Anderson i Rainie 2017; Vajdijanatan 2018).

Više puta su diskutanti naglasili kako nikada ne vjeruju informacijama koje su utemeljene na izjavama „neimenovanih“ ili „pouzdanih“ ali nepoznatih izvora informacija. Ipak, često se dešava da ne provjeravaju ni ko je autor nekog teksta, osim ako je to tema koja ih izrazito zanima.

I ovaj nalaz korespondira s rezultatima drugih istraživanja koja pokazuju da korisnici rijetko provjeravaju vjerodostojnost informacije. To najčešće rade samo ako im je lično stalo da saznaju više (Patterson, 2007; Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016; Lazer i sar., 2018), što dovodi u pitanje pretpostavke o (pro)aktivnim korisnicima mrežnih medija.

Uočavamo da je većina indikatora lažnih vijesti koje su korisnici navodili u suglasju s pokazateljima informacija sumnjive vjerodostojnosti navedenim u teorijskom dijelu istraživanja. Stil pisanja i *clickbait* naslovi lako se uočavaju, pa su tako ovo i najčešće spominjani indikatori kako u anketnom ispitivanju tako i u fokus grupama. Građani se rjeđe služe sofisticiranijim tehnikama za razotkrivanje lažnih vijesti poput provjere „crnih lista“ sumnjivih medija koje obično nude portali za raskrinkavanje, ili analizom kvaliteta fotografija. Ovo je razumljivo zbog slabe medijske i informacijske pismenosti građana Bosne i Hercegovine. Kada je riječ o indikatoru koji su građani imenovali „unutrašnjim osjećajem“ za istinitu informaciju, doista su i druga istraživanja pokazala da se građani pri procjeni vjerodostojnosti informacija koje pronalaze na društvenim mrežama vode ličnom procjenom (Tandoc i sar. 2017).

Sagovornici iz fokus grupa smatraju da mogu prepoznati lažne informacije u domenu zabave, no misle da je to teže učiniti u slučajevima kada se informacija odnosi na politička zbivanja. Mnogi vjeruju i da se istina „sama proširi“, ali im se dešavalo da povjeruju u lažne vijesti ili da ih prenesu.

Po velikom broju pridjeva i priloga u vijesti lažne informacije najčešće uočavaju građani najmlađe životne dobi, dok po samom nazivu portala lažne vijesti češće prepoznaju milenijalsi, koji su odrastali uz televiziju i Internet, i građani iz generacije X, odrasli uglavnom uz televiziju koja je najveći dio njihovog života bila najutjecajniji medij (Tabela 4). Ovo je i razumljivo jer je u vremenu televizije kao centralnog informativnog medija bilo dostupno manje televizijskih programa, pa je i lakše bilo brendirati naziv medija.

Generacija X također najprije uočava lažne vijesti na osnovu toga što ih objavljuju portali koji su zabilježeni na „crnim listama" organizacija i web portala za raskrinkavanje lažnih vijesti, što je neuobičajen nalaz jer se radi o digitalnim imigrantima koji su relativno kasno počeli koristiti mrežne medije. Očigledno se građani ove životne dobi bolje od ostalih snalaze s tehnikama za provjeru istinitosti informacija, a naprijed smo vidjeli i da je ista dobna skupina najmanje griješila pri izboru valjane definicije lažnih vijesti. Zanimljivo je da su građani generacije X i najskeptičniji u pogledu svojih sposobnosti za razlikovanje lažnih od istinitih vijesti. S druge strane, najmlađi građani, koji su odrastali uz mrežne medije, uvjereniji su da to i nije tako teško (Tabela 6). Iako je riječ o malim razlikama u prosječnoj ocjeni kojom su građani različitih dobnih skupina označili ovu tvrdnju, ipak treba promisliti o ovim rezultatima u kontekstu intenzivnijeg rada na razvijanju kritičke medijske i informacijske pismenosti mlađih građana.

Tabela 3: Način prepoznavanja lažnih vijesti

Ocjena tvrdnji na skali od 1 do 5	N	Minimum	Maksimum	Aritmetička sredina	Standardna devijacija
Lažne vijesti prepoznam na osnovu pravopisnih i gramatičkih grešaka	445	1	5	3,08	1,336
Teško je razlikovati lažne od istinitih vijesti	445	1	5	3,11	1,195
Lažne vijesti prepoznam po tome što se portal koji ih prenosi nalazi na „crnoj listi" portala koji prenose lažne vijesti	445	1	5	3,17	1,303
Lažne vijesti prepoznam na osnovu naziva medija koji ih je objavio	445	1	5	3,31	1,265
Lažne vijesti prepoznam zato što se često odnose na nevjerovatne događaje	445	1	5	3,38	1,174
U lažnim vijestima često nisu precizirani vrijeme ni mjesto događaja	445	1	5	3,42	1,216
Lažne vijesti često objavljuju stranice nepoznatih ili neobičnih naziva	445	1	5	3,60	1,183
U lažnoj vijesti se ne spominju izvori informacija ili ih ima vrlo malo	445	1	5	3,61	1,245
Lažne vijesti sadrže brojne pridjeve i priloge	445	1	5	4,04	1,169

Tabela 4: Prepoznavanje lažnih vijesti po kriteriju – Zastupljenost velikog broja pridjeva i priloga među različitim dobnim skupinama

Lažne vijesti sadrže brojne pridjeve i priloge				
Dobna struktura	**Aritmetička sredina**	**N**	**Standardna devijacija**	**Medijan**
od 18 do 22	4,28	98	1,023	5,00
od 23 do 38	3,96	167	1,263	4,00
od 39 do 54	4,10	132	1,040	4,00
od 55 do 73	3,70	47	1,366	4,00
74 i više	3,00	1	.	3,00
Ukupno	**4,04**	**445**	**1,169**	**4,00**

Tabela 5: Prepoznavanje lažnih vijesti po kriteriju – Objavljivanje na stranicama nepoznatih ili neobičnih naziva među različitim dobnim skupinama

Lažne vijesti često objavljuju stranice nepoznatih ili neobičnih naziva				
Dobna struktura	**Aritmetička sredina**	**N**	**Statistička devijacija**	**Medijan**
od 18 do 22	3,60	98	1,164	4,00
od 23 do 38	3,68	167	1,189	4,00
od 39 do 54	3,70	132	1,139	4,00
od 55 do 73	3,00	47	1,198	3,00
74 i više	4,00	1	.	4,00
Ukupno	**3,60**	**445**	**1,183**	**4,00**

Tabela 6: Ocjena pojedinih kriterija na osnovu kojih se mogu prepoznati lažne vijesti među različitim dobnim skupinama

Dobna struktura		**U lažnim vijestima često nisu precizirani vrijeme ni mjesto događaja**	**Lažne vijesti prepoznam po tome što se portal koji ih prenosi nalazi na „crnoj listi" portala koji prenose lažne vijesti**	**Teško je razlikovati lažne od istinitih vijesti**
od 18 do 22	Aritmetička sredina	3,46	3,23	3,03
od 23 do 38	Aitmetička sredina	3,49	3,17	3,07
od 39 do 54	Aritmetička sredina	3,39	3,24	3,20
od 55 do 73	Aritmetička sredina	3,17	2,83	3,09
74 i više	Aritmetička sredina	4,00	4,00	4,00
Ukupno	**Aritmetička sredina**	**3,42**	**3,17**	**3,11**

Rezultati Kruskal-Wallisova testa pokazali su da nema statistički značajne razlike između respondenata različitih nivoa obrazovanja u pogledu prepoznavanja lažnih vijesti po nekom od navedenih indikatora.

Posljednji, treći set pitanja odnosio se na ponašanje građana kada naiđu na suspektne vijesti, konkretno da li ih provjeravaju i ako da, na koji način. Najčešće korištene tehnike su konsultovanje drugih, kredibilnih medija, te oslanjanje na kredibilitet novinara koji je tekst napisao (Tabela 7). Rezultati prate nalaze drugih znanstvenika koji su utvrdili da je upoređivanje informacija u različitim medijima najčešća tehnika provjere istinitosti (Melro i Pereira, 2019; Hargittai, 2010; Chung i sar., 2012; Hrnjić Kuduzović, 2016; Nielsen i Graves, 2017; Nelson i Taneja, 2018).

Tabela 7: Tehnike provjeravanja istinitosti informacija

	N	Aritmetička sredina	Statistička devijacija
Kada želim provjeriti je li informacija koju sam pronašao/la na internetu istinita, provjerim ko je novinar koji je napisao ili objavio vijest	445	2,71	1,432
Kada želim provjeriti je li informacija koju sam pronašao/la na internetu istinita, provjerim da li su ugledni mediji objavili istu vijest	445	3,40	1,370
Kada želim provjeriti je li informacija koju sam pronašao/la na internetu istinita, provjerim da li je vijest objavio neki *fact-checking* portal	445	1,97	1,202
Kada želim provjeriti autentičnost neke fotografije, provjerim neki od *online* alata za provjeru fotografija	445	1,99	1,261
Kada želim provjeriti istinitost informacija na nekom portalu, potražim impresum	445	2,38	1,442
Ako želim provjeriti istinitost informacije, provjerim ko je prvi objavio tu informaciju ili fotografiju	445	2,62	1,377
Ukupno:	**445**		

Sličnim tehnikama provjeravanja koriste se i učesnici fokus grupa. Zbog niskog nivoa medijske i informacijske pismenosti u Bosni i Hercegovini ova metoda je očekivano najkorištenija. Ponovo, respondenti najrjeđe provjeravaju informacije posjećivanjem *fact-checking* portala, korištenjem alata za provjeru autentičnosti ili traganjem za impresumom web portala. I u teorijskom okviru spomenuta je manjkavost *fact-checking* pristupa u suzbijanju lažnih vijesti. Efekti *fact-checkinga* su trenutačni i vrlo često nemaju dugoročan utjecaj na razvijanje kompetencija korisnika za buduće razotkrivanje suspektnih informacija.

Rezultati Kruskal-Wallis testa pokazali su da nema statistički značajne razlike između građana različitih dobnih skupina kada je riječ o tehnikama koje najčešće koriste za provjeru istinitosti informacija. S druge strane, istim testom utvrdili smo statistički značajnu razliku među obrazovnim kohortama s obzirom na to kojim se tehnikama najčešće koriste prilikom provjeravanja istinitosti informacija. Razlika je najuočljivija u upotrebi sljedećih tehnika provjeravanja:

- provjeravanja impresuma stranice
- upotrebe *online* alata za provjeru vjerodostojnosti fotografija
- posjećivanja *fact-checking* portala
- provjeravanja kredibiliteta autora članka.

Očekivano, najveće razlike su između osoba bez obrazovanja, s osnovnim ili srednjim obrazovanjem s jedne strane i osoba sa završenim trećim ciklusom studija. Obrazovaniji respondenti se više i koriste tehnikama provjeravanja istinitosti (Grafikon 2), što korespondira s rezultatima ranijih istraživanja.

Grafikon 2: Tehnike provjeravanja kojima se koriste građani različitih obrazovnih kohorti



Zaključak

Manipuliranjem i zbunjivanjem građana lažne vijesti nanose veliku štetu kredibilitetu novinarstva, demokratičnosti društva i ispravnom odlučivanju zasnovanom na činjenicama. U suzbijanju posljedica različitih vrsta dezinformacija, neophodni su medijski i informacijski kompetentni građani koji znaju prepoznati lažnu vijest te primijeniti tehnike kojima će provjeriti vjerodostojnost vijesti. Rezultati ove studije pokazuju da građani Bosne i Hercegovine precjenjuju svoje znanje o lažnim vijestima. Često ih brkaju s pristrasnošću i propagandom. Među indikatorima lažnih vijesti uglavnom prepoznaju one najuočljivije – *clickbait* naslove i loš stil pisanja, dok se sofisticiranijim indikatorima poput provjeravanja kredibiliteta izvora rijetko koriste. U poređenju s drugim dobnim skupinama, naročito generacijom Z, čiji pripadnici su uvjereniji u svoju sposobnost razlikovanja lažnih od istinitih vijesti, te *baby boomera*, koji lažne vijesti brkaju s propagandom, generacija X u tome manje griješi. Indikativno je da je upravo ova generacija najkritičnija prema svojim sposobnostima detektovanja lažnih vijesti. Građani ne ulažu mnogo truda u provjeravanje informacija. Vode se pretežno ličnim uvjerenjima i osjećajima. Posmatrano po starosnim grupama, i ovdje se najbolje snalazi generacija X. Činjenica da su oni „digitalni imigranti“ koji su relativno kasno počeli koristiti mrežne medije u poređenju s generacijama Z i milenijalsima upućuje na važnost informacijskih kompetencija za identifikovanje, lociranje, evaluiranje i korištenje informacija u odnosu na digitalne vještine. Među respondentima različitih nivoa obrazovanja statistički su značajne razlike u tehnikama koje primjenjuju za provjeravanje informacija. Visokoobrazovani građani češće provjeravaju impresum stranice i kredibilitet autora, koriste se *online* alatima za provjeru vjerodostojnosti fotografija i posjećuju *fact-checking* portale. Slabe kompetencije za utvrđivanje istinitosti informacija na koje su ukazali rezultati ove studije upućuju na potrebu intenzivnog i temeljitog medijskog i informacijskog opismenjavanja građana Bosne i Hercegovine, naročito *baby boomera*, koji su najveći dio života proveli uz konvencionalne medije, te pripadnika generacije Z i milenijalsa, kojima, uprkos samouvjerenosti u digitalne vještine, nedostaje kompetencija za evaluiranje informacija. U suprotnom, građani Bosne i Hercegovine će ostati podložni lažnim vijestima te posljedično manipuliranju.

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Mračna tetrada, stavovi o ratu i miru, militantni ekstremizam i šizotipije kao prediktori stavova o samožrtvovanju selefija u Bosni i Hercegovini

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Sažetak: Ovo istraživanje ima cilj da utvrdi u kojoj mjeri neke osobine ličnosti (mračna tetrada), stavovi o ratu i miru, militantni ekstremizam i šizotipija stoje u vezi sa stavovima selefija o samožrtvovanju. Samožrtvovanje definišemo kao psihološku spremnost da se žrtvuje nešto veoma vrijedno, pa čak i vlastiti život, iz nekog razloga, ali taj razlog mora biti društveno važan. Istraživanje je sprovedeno u drugoj polovini 2017. godine na uzorku od 317 ispitanika iz Bosne i Hercegovine, a koji sebe svrstavaju u selefije. Dobijeni rezultati pokazuju da osobine ličnosti nisu značajno povezane sa stavovima o samožrtvovanju i da su mnogo značajniji stavovi selefija koji se tiču rata i njihove percepcije svijeta u kojem žive. Stavovi prema ratu se izdvajaju kao najbitnija varijabla u odnosu na sve ostale varijable koje smo mjerili, potom slijede stavovi o prihvatanju teorija zavjere, apologija nasilja i sveti cilj kao dio skale militantnog ekstremizma. Naravno, ovdje treba biti oprezan u interpretaciji dobijenih rezultata imajući u vidu njihov način života i interpretacije islama, ali i specifične pozicije unutar bosanskohercegovačkog društva.

Ključne riječi: selefije, mračna tetrada, samožrtvovanje, ekstremizam, Bosna i Hercegovina

Abstract: The aim of this research is to determine the extent to which some personality traits (dark tetrad), attitudes about war and peace, militant extremism and schizotypy are related to the attitudes of Salafis about self-sacrifice We define self-sacrifice or martyrdom, which we will use as synonyms, as the psychological readiness to sacrifice something very valuable, and even one's own life, for some reason, but that reason must be socially important. The research was conducted in the second half of 2017 on a sample of 317 respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who classify themselves as Salafis. The obtained results show that personality traits are not significantly related to attitudes about self-sacrifice and that the attitudes of Salafis regarding war and their perception of the world in which they live are much more significant. Attitudes towards war stand out

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as the most important variable in relation to all the other variables we have measured, followed by attitudes about accepting conspiracy theories, apologies for violence and the sacred goal as part of the scale of militant extremism. Of course, one should be careful here in the interpretation of the obtained results, having in mind their way of life and interpretation of Islam, but also specific positions within BiH society.

Keywords: Salafis, dark tetrad, self-sacrifice, extremism, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Uvod

Postoje najmanje tri pristupa u razumijevanju šta je selefizam i šta predstavlja u povijesnoj i aktuelnoj perspektivi (Abazović, 2016: 14). „Prvi pristup razmatra 'salafiyya', odnosno selefizam kao višeznačan pokret islamskog modernizma sa kraja devetnaestog do sredine dvadesetog vijeka. Islamski učenjaci poput Džamala al Dina al Afganija, Muhamada Aduha i Rašida Ride bili su inspiracija, osnivači ili predvodnici pokreta reformi koji se naziva 'salafiyya', sa namjerom da bude osnova modernih islamskih studija. Nastojali su pomiriti islam sa socijalnim, političkim i intelektualnim idealima prosvjetiteljstva. Vidjeli su pobožne pretke (al-salaf al-salih) kao uzore za genijalnost i prilagodljivost čiji primjer omogućava da se moderni muslimani emancipuju od okova tradicije i pridruže maršu civilizacijskog napretka. Drugi, mnogo zastupljeniji pristup među naučnicima, ali i među velikom većinom današnjih samoproglašenih selefija širom svijeta, definiše selefizam kao autentičnu i purističku religijsku orijentaciju unutar sunitskog islama. Purističke selefije doista su se stavile u središte međuislamskih polemika zbog tvrdnje da su oni jedini koji slijede jedini pravi islam koji može dovesti do spasenja. Za mnoge od njihovih protivnika ovaj oblik selefizma je gotovo sinonim za vehabizam – konzervativni pristup islamu koji vlada u Saudijskoj Arabiji, a koji je prvi izložio Muhammed ibn Abd el Vahab u osamnaestom vijeku. Međutim, purističke selefije negiraju tu karakterizaciju i odbacuju termin 'vehabizam' s obzirom na to da su sljedbenici Muhammeda ibn Abd el Vahaba u konačnici stvorili novu vjersku orijentaciju. Selefizam, tvrde oni, nije ništa drugo nego islam onakav kakav je bio kada je prvi put otkriven, neokaljan od bilo kakvih inovacija (*bida*), odstupanja (*inhiraf*) ili dodavanja (*ziyada*), 'nezagađen' od egzogenih uticaja. To je po njima čisti islam koji su pobožni preci u prve tri generacije suobličili. Konačno, medijski najviše eksploatisan jeste treći pristup, tzv. militantni selefizam. Tu se radi o samorazumijevanju selefista kao naoružanih grupa koje preduzimaju nasilne mjere za zaštitu muslimanskih zajednica od vanjske agresije i zločina protiv islama. Za militantne selefije, trpljenje i poniženje muslimana širom svijeta nisu nepovezane epizode, već samo jedna u nizu aktivnosti od strane 'krstaško-cionističkog' saveza protiv islama i muslimana. Unutar tog religijskog diskursa, ideja mučeništva uživa povlašteni položaj. Militantni selefizam je, uslovno rečeno, sirova verzija vulgarnog marksizma, gdje se klasa zamjenjuje religijom u objašnjenju kako svijet funkcioniše. Za militantne selefije različiti sukobi u udaljenim dijelovima svijeta tumače se kroz diskurs zapadnog napada na muslimane."

Kada govorimo o selefijama u Bosni i Hercegovini, možemo reći da se o njima malo zna i javnost ima podijeljeno mišljenje. Vrlo često se selefija izjednačavaju sa teroristima (Puhalo i dr., 2016) jer je nekoliko pripadnika ovog pokreta počinilo neke terorističke napade u Bosni i Hercegovini[2], dok se spekuliše da je više od 240 pripadnika ovog pokreta otišlo da se bori na strana ratišta u Siriju i Irak (Azinović i Jusić, 2016). S druge strane, najveći broj selefija iz Bosne i Hercegovine pokušava normalno da živi praktikujući islam na svoj način i odbacujući bilo kakav vid nasilja.

Iako su selefije u Bosni i Hercegovini prilično heterogena populacija, ne možemo da zanemarimo činjenicu da je dio njih sklon ekstremizmu, a koji podrazumijeva i spremnost na samožrtvovanje. Zbog toga smo odlučili da istražimo njihove stavove o samožrtvovanju i da vidimo u kakvoj su vezi sa nekim drugim varijablama.

Samožrtvovanje ili mučeništvo (koristićemo ih kako sinonime) definišemo kao „psihološku spremnost da se žrtvuje nešto veoma vrijedno, pa čak i vlastiti život, iz nekog razloga, ali taj razlog mora biti društveno važan" (Bélanger et al., 2014).

Za običnog čovjeka je spoznaja da je neko spreman da se žrtvuje ili umre za neku ideju šokantna sama po sebi i najčešće takvo ponašanje vidi kao ludilo ili psihopatologiju. Klinička istraživanja su pokazala da zapravo postoji jako slaba veza između terorističkog ponašanja i psihičkih poremećaja (Loza, 2007). Važno je naglasiti da se samožrtvovanje ne može izjednačavati sa samoubistvom, niti na taj način objašnjavati. To je sasvim evidentno iz same definicije samožrtvovanja, ali to pokazuju i istraživanja u svijetu (Merari, 2004; Salib, 2003). Takođe, nekada je spremnost na samožrtvovanje stvar „egzistencionalnog izbora", gdje pojedinci svojim

[2] http://hr.n1info.com/Regija/a359470/Za-terorizam-u-BiH-osudjeno-40-osoba-izreceno-150-godina-zatvora.htm

samoubilačkim činom obezbjeđuju materijalnu sigurnost i poštovanje u društvu (Milošević, 2009).

Ne smijemo zanemariti ni činjenicu da postoje neke zajednice koje veličaju samoubice kao heroje i prihvataju njihova djela kao plemenita djela otpora. U intervjuima sa zatvorenim palestinskim teroristima gotovo svi su kazali da su za bombaše samoubice čuli kada su sa roditeljima išli u džamiju. Ime mučenika redovno se slavilo u džamiji. Da ta indoktrinacija počinje od malih nogu, najbolje se vidi preko natpisa na zidovima palestinskih dječjih vrtića kojima upravlja Hamas: „Djeca vrtića su šehidi sutra." U islamskoj školi u Gazi koju vodi Hamas jedna jedanaestogodišnja učenica kaže: „Napraviću od svog tijela bombu koja će eksplodirati među cionistima, sinovima svinja i majmuna... Ja ću raznijeti svoje tijelo u male dijelove i prouzrokovati više boli nego što će ikada upoznati" (Kelley prema Post, 2009).

Veoma je važno da naglasimo da domaći islamski teolozi na samoubilačke napade gledaju kao na veliki grijeh[3].

Istraživački problem

Kao što smo ranije naglasili, selefije su vrlo specifična grupa ljudi. S jedne strane oni jesu radikalni islamisti, ali samo neki od njih su u posljednjih desetak godina učestvovali u terorističkim aktima ili ratovali u Siriji i Iraku (Azinović i Jusić, 2016). Zbog toga smo željeli utvrditi koliko su stavovi o samožrtvovanju prihvaćeni među selefijama u Bosni i Hercegovini i u kakvoj su vezi sa pojedinim osobinama ličnosti i nekim drugim stavovima povezanim sa militantnim ekstremizmom.

1. Pretpostavljamo da neće postojati povezanost sklonosti ka samožrtvovanju mračne tetrade (makijavelizam, psihopatija, narcizam i sadizam) i šizotipije. Istraživanja pokazuju da je najveći broj terorista racionalne osobe i kod njih nisu nađeni neki ozbiljni poremećaji ličnosti (Crenshaw, 1981; Sprintzak, 2000).
2. Pretpostavljamo da će postojati povezanost između sklonosti ka samožrtvovanju i stavova o teorijama zavjere. Istraživanja pokazuju da su teorijama zavjere sklonije marginalne grupe (Oliver & Wood, 2014; Cichocka, Marchlewska & Golec de Zavala, 2016),

[3] https://www.preporod.com/index.php/duhovnost/tradicija/item/3618-zlocin-ubistva-i-samoubistva-u-islamskom-ucenju

što selefije svakako jesu, a postoji veza i između teorija zavjere i ekstremizma (Van Prooijen et al., 2015).

3. Pretpostavljamo da će postojati povezanost između sklonosti ka samožrtvovanju i militantnog ekstremizma. S druge strane, istraživanja Stankova i saradnika (2010) nalaze vezu između religioznosti i ekstremističkih uvjerenja, dok Borum (2014) nalazi vezu između ekstremizma i dogmatizma. Petrović i Međedović (2015) nalaze vezu između tri komponente MEMS-a i konzervativizma.
4. Pretpostavljamo da će sklonosti ka samožrtvovanju biti u negativnoj korelaciji sa stavovima o miru i pozitivnoj sa stavovima o ratu. Sama činjenica da su neki od selefija otišli na strana ratišta (Azinović i Jusić, 2016) daju nam za pravo da vjerujemo u ovu vezu.

Instrumenti

Za mjerenje stavova o *samožrtvovanju* koristili smo se skalom (Bélanger, Caouette, Sharvit, Dugas, 2014) koja se sastoji od deset stavki i sedam ponuđenih opcija. *Makijavelizam, psihopatiju, narcizam* mjerili smo skraćenom verzijom skale mračne trijade (Jones & Paulhus, 2014), a *sadizam* skalom O'Meara, Davies & Hammond (2011). Sve četiri crte su mjerene sa po tri stavke. Skala ima ukupno 12 stavki i pet ponuđenih opcija. *Skala teorija zavjere* (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, Imhoff, 2013) sastoji se od pet stavki i pet ponuđenih opcija. Stavove o ratu i miru mjerili smo skalom (Bizumic, Stubager, Mellon, Van der Linden, Iyer, Jones, 2013) koja sadrži šesnaest stavki sa pet ponuđenih opcija. *Militantni ekstremizam* (Stankov, Saucier i Knežević 2010) je instrument konstruisan za mjerenje militantno-ekstremističkog pogleda na svijet, preciznije, tri njegova aspekta: apologija nasilja (zagovaranje upotrebe nasilja u određenim okolnostima), zli svijet (uvjerenje da je svijet u kome živimo zao i da funkcioniše na pogrešan način) i sveti cilj (vjerovanje u boga i mučeništvo). Instrument se sastoji od dvadeset i četiri stavke, sa pet ponuđenih opcija. *Šizotipija* (Knežević, Opačić, Kutlešić i Savić, 2005) je kratka skala dezintegracije koja predstavlja operacionalizaciju šizotipalnih osobina ličnosti. Obuhvata deset stavki, sa pridruženom petostepenom skalom Likerovog tipa. Sve skale su Likertovog tipa.

Metodologija i tok istraživanja

Istraživanje je sprovedeno od maja do novembra 2017. godine na uzorku od 345 ispitanika koji za sebe kažu da su selefije, ali zbog nepravilnosti u popunjavanju upitnika uzorak čini 317 ispitanika. U okviru istraživanja posjetili smo njihove zajednice širom Bosne i Hercegovine. Ispitanici su samostalno i dobrovoljno popunjavali upitnik u svojim domovima, na mjestima gdje se okupljaju ili na mjestima koja su unaprijed dogovorena, ali uz obavezno prisustvo ispitivača.

Uzorak

U okviru uzorka nalazimo 287 ili 90,5% muškaraca i 30 žena ili 9,5%. Najveći broj ispitanih selefija ima završenu srednju školu, četvrti stepen (35,6%), potom zanat (26,5%) i fakultet (20,5%). Završenu samo osnovnu školu ima tek 7,9% ispitanika, dok je 5,4% završilo višu školu. U okviru uzorka nalazimo 4,1% selefija sa završenim magisterijem ili doktoratom. Među ispitanicima je najviše onih starosne dobi do 29 godina (42,6%), a slijede ispitanici starosne dobi od 30 do 44 godine (37,2%) dok je starijih od 45 godina bilo 63 ili 19,9%. U okviru uzorka se nalazi i sedam selefija koji su osuđeni za terorizam i odlazak na strana ratišta.

Rezultati istraživanja

Ispitanici su imali mogućnost da ocjenama od 1 (uopšte se ne slažem) do 7 (potpuno se slažem) procijene slaganje sa 10 tvrdnji koje mjere njihov stav o samožrtvovanju.

Tabela 1. Prosječne vrijednosti selefija na skali stavova o samožrtvovanju

	N	M	SD	SEM
Samožrtvovanje	317	5,0909	1,15411	,06482

Kod selefija nalazimo povišenu vrijednost na skali samožrtvovanja (5,09), ali bi bilo korisno da znamo kolike su prosječne vrijednosti stanovnika Bosne i Hercegovine na ovoj skali da bismo mogli donositi neke relevantnije zaključke.

Analizu ćemo nastaviti primjenjujući regresionu analizu kojom se kontroliše efekat međusobne koreliranosti prediktora na ukupno objašnjavanje varijense ishodišnih varijabli.

Regresiona analiza je statistički značajna (F = 7,364; df1 = 14, df2 = 295; p = .000) i sa pet prediktora sadizam, sklonost teorijama zavjere, stavovi o ratu, apologija nasilja i sveti cilj objašnjava 22% varijanse varijable stavovi o samožrtvovanju.

Tabela 2. Model Summary

Model	R	RS	ARS	SEE
1	,473	,223	,195	1,03526

Tabela 2.1. ANOVA

	Model	SS	df	MS	F	p
1	Regresija	94,014	11	8,547	7,974	,000
	Rezidualni	326,890	305	1,072		
	Ukupno	**420,903**	**316**			

Tabela 2.2. Koeficijenti

	Model	Nestandarizovani koeficijenti		Standardizovani koeficijenti	t	p
		B	SE	Beta		
1	(Konstantno)	,806	,800		1,007	,315
	Makijavelizam	,045	,086	,032	,529	,597
	Narcizam	,099	,077	,074	1,291	,198
	Psihopatija	,105	,114	,056	,920	,358
	Sadizam	-,474	,230	-,115	-2,061	,040
	Sklonost teorijama zavjere	,377	,100	,217	3,772	,000
	Stavovi o miru	,069	,109	,037	,635	,526
	Stavovi o ratu	,347	,076	,281	4,548	,000
	Apologija nasilja	,263	,125	,138	2,112	,036
	Zli svijet	,028	,081	,019	,343	,732
	Sveti cilj	,349	,127	,145	2,737	,007
	Šizotipija	-,113	,100	-,066	-1,129	,260

Najsnažniji prediktori su stavovi o ratu i sklonost teorijama zavjere, ta povezanost je pozitivna i niska. Slijede apologija nasilja i sveti cilj gdje postoji veoma niska i pozitivna veza. Negativnu i veoma nisku korelaciju sa stavom o samožrtvovanju nalazimo kod sadizma (Tabela 2.2).

Rasprava

Ovim istraživanjem željeli smo utvrditi u kojoj mjeri pojedine varijable mračna tetrada, stavovi o ratu i miru, militantni ekstremizam i šizotipija stoje u vezi s stavovima selefija o samožrtvovanju.

Kao što smo vidjeli na početku, na sedmostepenoj skali stavova o samožrtvovanju nalazimo povišenu vrijednost na skali samožrtvovanja (5,09), ali nismo sigurni koliko se oni razlikuju od prosječnog stanovnika Bosne i Hercegovine. Imajući u vidu da su ispitanici radikalni vjernici, i da imaju specifičan odnos prema samom pojmu samožrtvovanja, bilo bi interesantno provjeriti kako su oni razumjeli ova pitanja i da li se ta spremnost za samožrtvovanje odnosi na borbu vjernika sa svojim iskušenjima ili na spremnost da žrtvuje sebe zbog nekog društveno važnog cilja.

Stavovi prema ratu se izdvajaju kao najbitnija varijabla u odnosu na sve ostale varijable koje smo mjerili. Veza između stavova o samožrtvovanju i stavova o ratu je mala i pozitivna, ali moramo biti oprezni kod same interpretacije rezultata. Trebamo imati na umu da su selefije vjerski radikali i da je njihov doživljaj samožrtvovanja specifičan. To je prije svega odnos prema samom sebi, tj. predanost u praktikovanju islama, što podrazumijeva mnogo samoodricanja, borbe sa samim sobom i iskušenja. Kada se govori o njihovom odlasku i učešću u ratu, ono je, kao i mnogo toga drugog, definisano vjerskim propisima. Moramo imati u vidu da postoje različita viđenja učešća u ratu i samožrtvovanju. Propisi su vrlo jasni, pojedinac treba sam sebe čuvati i kada se zvanično obznani rat (džihad) dozvoljeno mu je da se pridruži drugim muslimanima. Ukoliko pogine, biće zahvalan Allahu, ali ukoliko sam sebe ubije eksplozivnom napravom pričvršćenom za sebe u svrhu napada na neprijatelja takvo djelo će se smatrati neispravnim i nedozvoljenim. Naravno, postoje i drugačija tumačenja samožrtvovanja koja smatraju da je taj čin u pojedinim situacijama opravdan i kao rezultat toga imamo terorističke akte svjesnog samožrtvovanja.

Sklonost ka teorijama zavjere je povezana sa stavovima o samožrtvovanju. Ta veza je pozitivna i ona se izdvaja kao druga po važnosti među mjerenim varijablama. Možemo reći da je ovaj rezultat prilično očekivan ako imamo u vidu nalaze drugih istraživanja. Sklonost ka vjerovanju u teorije zavjere je izraženija kod manjinskih grupa (Oliver & Wood, 2014; Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, 2016), što selefije svakako jesu, a to je pokazalo i istraživanje Puhala iz 2016. godine. S druge strane, postoji objektivna mogućnost da su selefije u određenoj mjeri praćene, prisluškivane i nadzirane od domaćih i stranih bezbjednosnih službi[4] i postavlja se pitanje da li je to sklonost vjerovanju u teorije zavjere ili njihova realnost. Takođe, neka istraživanja pokazuju vezu između prihvatanja teorija zavjere i ekstremizma (Van Prooijen et al., 2015), a ekstremizam je prisutan kod jednog dijela selefija u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Apologiju nasilja, dio skale militantnog ekstremizma (MEMS), definisali smo kao zagovaranje pribjegavanja nasilju kao načinu i sredstvu postizanja ciljeva i ova varijabla je u pozitivnoj, ali veoma niskoj, korelaciji sa stavovima o samožrtvovanju. I ovdje moramo da budemo oprezni prilikom same interpretacije rezultata, jer apologija nasilja, kao dio militantnog ekstremizma, nije svojstvena samo ekstremistima, već taj sklop nalazimo i kod običnih ljudi. Kod ekstremista je ona samo veoma izražena. Takođe moramo imati na umu da je ponašanje u ratu (kad se počinje, kako se postupa prema neprijatelju, izdajnicima, zarobljenicima, inovjercima, civilima, imovini) veoma precizno definisano u islamu i istinski vjernik treba da se drži tih uputa, jer jedino na taj način nasilje kao takvo dobija svoje opravdanje. Naravno, svjedoci smo da postoji jedan dio muslimana koji ta pravila drugačije tumače i nasilje i spremnost na samožrtvovanje vide kao sredstvo za ostvarivanje političkih i vojnih ciljeva, ali je teško reći koliko je takvih među bosanskim selefijama.

Sveti cilj je dio skale militantnog ekstremizma i podrazumijeva pozivanje na „svete" sile (i ideale) kao opravdanje za ekstremizam i nasilje. Veza između skale stavova o samožrtvovanju i svetog cilja je pozitivna i veoma niska, ali značajna kod regresione analize. Kao što smo nekoliko puta ranije kazali, islam je pokušao da precizno definiše, koliko je to moguće, ponašanje u ratu i da učini prihvatljivim određenu vrstu nasilja prema neprijateljima. On je takođe definisao i vrste rata i kako trebaju muslimani

[4] https://www.zurnal.info/novost/21945/hrvatski-obavjestajci-vrbovali-selefije-da-prenose-oruzje-u-mesdzide-u-bih

da se ponašaju u takvim slučajevima. U zavisnosti od interpretacije samog rata od strane islamskih vjerskih poglavara varira i opravdanje ekstremizma i nasilja. Sve gore navedeno moramo imati na umu kada interpretiramo ovu povezanost između spremnosti na samožrtvovanje selefija i pravdanje toga vjerskim načelima.

Sadizam se pokazao kao bitan, ali negativan prediktor u regresionoj analizi. Iako bi laički očekivali da je spremnost na samožrtvovanje povezana sa željom da se drugima nanese bol, da se oni kazne ili potčine, naši rezultati pokazuju da to nije tako. Izgleda da je spremnost za samožrtvovanje usmjerena više na same selefije, a ne na druge ljude. Postavlja se pitanje da li je ovaj oblik samožrtvovanja rezultat želje da se istraje u svojoj vjeri i pored osuda i pritisaka okoline i nikako ne kao uživanje u nanošenju bola ili kažnjavanju drugih ljudi.

Jasno je da osobine ličnosti nisu značajno povezane sa stavovima o samožrtvovanju i da su mnogo značajniji neki stavovi koji se tiču rata i njihove percepcije svijeta u kojem žive. Kao što smo kazali na početku ovog rada, selefije su specifična grupa muslimana koji nastoje da žive islam na način koji oni smatraju ispravnim. Oni nastoje da se striktno pridržavaju tih pravila i postavlja se pitanje koliko su ove veze rezultat njihovog promišljanja ili su to pravila koja su propisana u vjerskim spisima. U svakom slučaju, treba voditi računa o tome kada se interpretiraju dobijeni rezultati.

Iako na prvi pogled izgleda apsurdno, možemo se zapitati da li precizna i striktna vjerska pravila koja se tiču rata, nasilja i samožrtvovanja predstavljaju branu za dobar dio selefija koji su skloni nekoj vrsti agresije.

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